

POLITICS IN ILOILO CITY: A STUDY OF ILONGGO PERCEPTIONS
ON POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND DYNASTIC POLITICS IN
THE POST-EDSA PERIOD, 1986-2006

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ABSTRACT

The study was conducted to examine the dynamics of politics in Iloilo City by looking into the 'Ilonggos' perceptions on the system of political patronage, the extent it is practiced by local politicians, and how these conditions influence their views toward 'dynastic' politics in the local level. The study surveyed 273 barangay officials in three of Iloilo City's six districts –Lapaz, Jaro and City Proper from October 2006 to January 2007 using the cluster sampling and simple random techniques. The data was analyzed using SPSS and Chi-square and Gamma tests for statistical analysis. Results of the study based on the data culled from the respondents' collated scores show that they have a positive perception towards political patronage, and that the extensive practice of patronage has greatly contributed to the election success of the City Mayor, Congressman and the barangay officials themselves in local politics. The data also show that the barangay officials tend to positively view the existence of 'dynastic' politics in the local level. Chi-square tests indicate that respondents' socioeconomic characteristics are not significantly related to their perception towards political patronage. A similar test for association also shows that respondents' perception towards political dynasty is not significantly associated with their incomes, educational achievement and membership in civic and political organizations. It is, however, worthy to note that those who have been ward leaders hold a positive view towards 'dynastic' politics. Interestingly, none of these ward leaders espoused a negative view on political dynasty. Gamma tests revealed that respondents' perception on political patronage is significantly related to their perception on dynastic politics. This means that respondents who tend to view patronage positively hold a similar view towards political dynasty. The same statistical test shows a strong correlation between the respondents' perception on political patronage and the extent of patronage. Conversely, the extensive practice of patronage is strongly associated with the respondents' perception toward political dynasty. By and large, the study validates the hypothesis that the Ilonggos' positive perception towards political patronage leads to its more extensive practice – a practice that ensures the electoral success of a politician (including his *siblings*) as long as he is able to sustain it. For as long as politicians are able to provide short-term benefits to their constituents and ensure the continuous flow of these goods and services, political loyalty and electoral support can be expected. Thus, this study, lends support to the thesis that politics in Iloilo City is largely determined by patronage practices of local politicians who necessarily come from 'dynastic' political families.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Context and Rationale of the Study

Political dynasties are among the most formidable structures in Philippine democratic life. In local politics, where the real dynamics of governance and power struggles take place, the dominance of political families is becoming an almost permanent fixture among local governments in both urban and rural areas. Such a situation is an anathema to the Filipino democratic way of life and is characteristic of the patronage system of politics that has been a hindrance to national development for it stifles meaningful political competition and electoral choice (House Bill 463, 2001).

Political dynasty refers to the concentration, consolidation, or perpetuation of public office and power by persons related to one another (House Bill Nos. 463; 1642; 14). It also refers to politically dominant families which produce successions of political leaders not only during two or three decades, but, in numerous cases, even for generations (Simbulan, 2005). A 'dynastic' relationship is said to exist when a person, who is a spouse of an incumbent elective official or a relative within the second civil degree of affinity or consanguinity of an elective official runs for an elective office simultaneously with and for the same office which the incumbent elective official is holding within the same local government unit, except barangay, or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official (House Bill Nos. 463; 1642; 14).

Since the inception of the Philippines as an independent state at the twilight of Spanish colonization, the existence of an elite group of family-based oligarchs has been manifested. These elite leaders emerging from the obscurity of provincial politics, figured out as agitators in the crusade for political independence against the American colonizers. When the elections for the first Philippine Assembly was held in 1907, these local elites maneuvered to entrench themselves and their kin in Philippine electoral politics until the country's right to self-rule.

It must be noted, however, that these elites who assumed a national character when political parties were legitimized, were basically leaders of local factions composed of landowners - *hacenderos*, the *ilustrados* and the remnants of the Spanish *principalia* who, by then, transformed themselves into civil servants and municipal officials. Due to the prohibitive (and almost, exclusive) nature of the electoral process at the time – the presence of literacy and property requirements- elections became a competition among the elites and their kinsmen - the "haves" while their personal followers - the "have-nots", were watching in the margins waiting to benefit from the "spoils of the game". Such a situation, where wealth and social status buttressed by a vast patronage network

determine victory at the polls, lends support to the thesis that in its early state, the Philippines is, indeed, a *cacique* democracy (Anderson, 1988).

The highly instructive literature on Philippine electoral politics provide empirical proof to the dominance of landed and family- based local factions, which formed into a constellation of alliances and networks of dyadic ties, to capture the reins of power both at the local and national levels of government (Lande, 1964; Lacaba, 1995; McCoy, 1994; & Coronel, et al., 2004). Thus, much of the post-war politics, albeit until Martial law was declared in 1972, can be characterized by the dominance of two political parties that alternated control over the government, but remained indistinguishable in terms of ideology and program since they were basically amalgamations of local factions which represented parochial and particularistic interests.

When the 1986 “People Power” revolution in EDSA ended the nearly twenty years of Marcos constitutional authoritarianism leading to the restoration of democratic politics, it has been observed that the Philippine political landscape has been replete with clans or families who had dominated or continued to reign, succeeding one after the other, in both local and national levels of government (House Bill 1642, 2000). The Institute for Popular Democracy, which examined the results of the first Congressional elections in May 1987 under the post-1986 EDSA regime, concluded that the restoration of electoral politics also pave way for political clans to reassert themselves “as the real source of power” in Philippine politics, just like old times (Gutierrez, et al. 1992). Results of the survey revealed that 166 congressmen, or 83 percent of House membership, were from established “political clans”, as were 56 percent of the local officials elected in 1988.

The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in one of its recent publications, *The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress* shows empirical evidence on the persistence of political dynasties in Philippine politics in the post-1986 EDSA period. Data from the study indicated that from the 8th to the 12th Congress, spanning a brief period of 12 years, “two-thirds of the legislators are members of political families, 70 of these are second and third-generation politicians, and nearly all of them have multiple relatives in public office”(Coronel, 2004:47). These figures remain the same even if party-list representatives, who were first elected in 1998, are included.

In an earlier study of women politicians and their achievement in local politics, Tapales (2002) points to kinship as a primary factor for the entry of women in the local arena. Data obtained by the study in 1998 and 2001, showed that majority of these women leaders came from political families, or their husbands are members of political clans. In the same period, where there was a remarkable increase in the number of women local executives, clearly indicated that they were “breakers”, or wives and daughters of politicians (especially those elected in 1992 and 1995) whose maximum term of office ended. Some of these politicians merely “waited it out” before making a political comeback, while others successfully sought higher elective or appointive office.

Thus stating the obvious, Filipino politicians regard elective office, not as a public trust, but a family heirloom: to be inherited and circulated only among the members of the same family - as if competence and qualifications are genetically transferable from one sibling to the other. Indeed, political dynasties reflect an internal contradiction in a fledging democracy such as the Philippines. No less than the Constitution explicitly prohibits their existence, since they not only stifle meaningful competition but preclude

equal access to public service as well. Art. II, Sec. 6 of 1987 Constitution states that, “the State shall guarantee access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties *as may be defined by law*” (italics mine). Despite the efforts of some progressive leaders in Congress, several enabling bills (i.e., introduced in 1999, 2000 and 2001) prohibiting this brand of politics, had been thrown out to the “recycle bin” by the majority of the members of the legislature at the first instance they were introduced.

To date, there are still pending bills in the Congress such as Senate Bill No. 12 and HB No. 44, both aim to prohibit dynastic succession in local elective positions. The reason is obvious. As shown by the Institute of Popular Democracy and Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism studies, political dynasties dominate Congress. And for them to enact a law that would lead to their demise and their kin in local politics is next to committing political suicide. Thus, two decades after the 1986 EDSA “people power” revolution, political dynasties continue (and, will continue) to exert a pervasive influence on Philippine politics. This is contrary to the pronouncement of keen observers of multi-party electoral democracy that the 1986 EDSA revolution ushered in an era of “new politics”. As has been argued from the outset, political dynasties, no doubt, are an effective way of monopolizing and perpetuating power.

But, how is this possible? What factors contribute to the emergence of this form of familial politics leading to some sort of “dynastic” governance, and the entrenchment of the political family especially in the localities? One explanation, as this study argues, points to the fact that family-based politics of the elite in the provinces is founded along an elaborate system of patronage highly dependent on pork barrel allocations and the spoils system. This system of patronage is a form of constituency service, which consists of material goods and services distributed by the leader to his political supporters in a personalized way. It works in two-ways: first, as a reward for their continuing political support; and second, as an incentive for the electoral support for future elections.

To a large extent, the current research study will attempt to provide valuable insights on the politics of patronage and dynastic governance in the Philippines by closely examining the dynamics of electoral politics in Iloilo City. To achieve this, the study will look into how local *leaders* (leaders), particularly, *barangay* officials perceive this practice of political patronage as well as the persistence of kinship as basis for recruitment in local elective positions, in the hope of establishing empirical proof as to what extent the politics of patronage engenders ‘dynastic’ governance in local politics.

Anchoring on rational choice perspectives to further elucidate the dynamics of the patron-client framework as an explanatory tool, the study will attempt to expand theoretical analysis as to the changing character of Philippine electoral politics after the 1986 EDSA ‘revolution’, viewed from the lens of ‘grass-root’ *leaders*- the *barangay* officials. This, therefore, requires a reexamination of the nature of Philippine elections, and the various theoretical perspectives used to explain its essential characteristics.

Philippine Elections and the Politics of Patronage

A perusal of the literature on Filipino electoral processes lends empirical support to the fact that, Philippine elections are less as the means of the public to hold governments to account, and more as instruments of patronage (Arugay, 2005). Needless

to say, elections usher only a change of leaders (*and necessarily, political patrons*) but not genuine societal change since they are neither mechanisms to exact accountability, nor opportune events for voters to evaluate policy issues and positions, and decide on the qualifications as to who is most competent to govern (Kerkvliet, 1997).

It has been further noted that retrospective evaluation of the incumbents' actions and decisions are in the backburner since what is pivotal are kinship-based relations, and the existence of political machines that provide immediate rewards and inducements to voters (Hutchcroft, 1991; Arugay, 2005). It is for this reason that neither politicians nor voters regard elections as barometers for performance evaluation of leaders in order to effect change through the electoral process. Rather, it is looked upon as a "democratic dressing" (Kerkvliet, 1997) since what really determines electoral victory is the effective use of patronage resources: cash, goods and personalized services. It may even include some form of coercion and intimidation or worse, violence (Sidel, 1995 & McCoy 1994).

Moreover, most voters often adopt an instrumental approach towards elections, treating it as a chance to redeem something for themselves with no expectations of getting some longer-term return for their vote (Brillantes, 1992). Though, most voters recognize the exploitation that this vicious cycle brings yet, many are still drawn into this highly unequal form of exchange especially the poor and unlettered. These twin-factors of ignorance and poverty, indeed, can be debilitating. This is the case of the electorate in the local areas and in the countryside- who have become so vulnerable to the influences and control of leader(s) coming from political families – only because the latter acted as their patron in times of great need - which seems to come almost on a daily basis.

Clearly, patronage politics as one political analyst puts it, is an expression of class relations, a product of a class society where the *few who command wealth and property* are privileged to fight it out for the political loyalties of the *many who command nothing* but their labor power (Magno, 1989). This analysis thus suggests that, as long as poverty and other forms of social inequalities persist in the localities, the system of patronage - propagated and perpetuated by "dynastic" politicians- deepens and becomes pervasive; making it more difficult for democratic processes and institutions of accountability to consolidate in order to strengthen Philippine democracy in the post-1986 EDSA period.

Why Iloilo?

At outset, it has been argued that the politics of patronage propagated and nurtured by family-based politicians thrives because of the persistence of intense social inequalities and mass poverty, which seems to be prevalent and widespread in the rural and urban areas in the provinces and towns.

It is therefore of no coincidence that Iloilo City has been chosen as the target area for the study. It is not only the leading city in the island of Panay but likewise one of the most populous (est. 400,000 slightly smaller than Metropolitan Cebu) and urbanized areas in the country with a considerable number of urban poor and squatter households (IBON 2002). Though, Iloilo leads other provinces in the island of Panay in terms of area and development, government data indicates that among ten provinces in the Philippines, the province has one of the largest numbers (est. 108,518) of poor families (NSCB 2003; ADB 2005).

A chartered city since 1937, Iloilo began electing its local officials– city mayor, vice-mayor and councilors in 1955 - with Rodolfo Ganzon as the first elected city mayor. At present, Iloilo City is a regional center and major port of entry in Western Visayas.

As of the 2000 government census, the city's total population stood at 366, 391 distributed among 72,218 households. Iloilo City is politically divided into six (6) districts, namely: Arevalo, City Proper, Jaro, La Paz, Mandurriao and Molo. The six districts are further divided into one hundred eighty (180) barangays- the smallest unit of governance in the local level. As a chartered city, Iloilo is constituted as a lone district, thus represented by a congressman in the lower house of Congress.

A close perusal of the City's long political history since the American colonial period would reveal that there had been no political family which was able to dominate the city's local politics though there is ample evidence that certain political alliances of families and factions, i.e. Lopezes, Ybiernas', Jocson's, Garganera's, and Ganzon's, among others- consistently held the reins of local power in various periods. What is, however, more pronounced was the almost "token" election of the son of a three-term Congressman as lone Representative for the city in Congress, after his father was appointed to a Cabinet position in present administration. Though, it is quite early to make some predictions, it can be argued that these are strong manifestations for dynasty building in local politics. It is obvious that the young Representative, who first run and won as city councilor, made use of his father's elaborate political machine and the family name to get elected. The same patronage network- which involves the officials of the 180 barangays in the city - who acted as wards and campaign leaders of this political alliance - was used by the former city mayor who served from 1992 to 2001, and the incumbent local chief executive who is up for election for his third term.

The foregoing discussions, shows a clear indication of an emerging pattern of recruitment and political succession in local politics. What is not clear; however, are the important variables that may adequately explain how and why political families dominate electoral politics in the provinces. Though, the study maintains that the practice of political patronage by political families results to the 'circulation' of elective office among kinsmen, more evidence is needed to establish the prevalence and extensiveness of this practice and its consequences. If indeed, the network of patronage machines has been an effective tool for the success of these local politicians, how extensive and efficient these political machines have been, and more importantly, how do Ilonggos especially local officials and their *liders* perceive the existence of this elaborate network?

Moreover, how do Ilonggos perceive the election of politicians coming from the same family? To what extent, does the electorate's acceptance of this condition contribute to the resilience of political families in local politics? Finally, what are the implications of the existence of these phenomena on local politics and governance? These are among the important questions that this research study purports to answer.

Thus, the current study, which seeks to investigate the dynamics of electoral politics in Iloilo, is, but a modest attempt, to develop new theoretical and empirical approaches in looking at the politics of patronage and dynastic governance - hoping to enrich the existing literature.

Objectives of the Study

This study examines the dynamics of politics in Iloilo City by looking into 'Ilonggo' perceptions on the system of political patronage, the extent it is practiced by

local politicians, and how these conditions influence their views about dynastic politics in the local level.

This investigation also aims to:

1. determine the political, demographic, socio-economic characteristics of barangay officials of the selected study districts in Iloilo City, and their involvement in civic and political organizations;
2. describe the system of political patronage as part of the dynamics of local politics in Iloilo City as perceived by barangay leaders;
3. examine the extent of political patronage as it is practiced by local officials in the Iloilo City;
4. determine the respondents' perception towards political dynasty;
5. determine the relationship between the respondents' political, demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as monthly income, occupation, level of education, involvement in civic and political organizations, and having been a ward leader or not, and their perceptions toward political patronage;
6. determine the relationship between the respondents' political, demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as monthly income, level of education, involvement in civic and political organizations, and having been a ward leader or not, and their perceptions toward the extent of political patronage;
7. determine the relationship between the respondents' political, demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as monthly income, level of education, involvement in civic and political organizations, and having been a ward leader or not, and their perception towards political dynasty;
8. determine the relationship between the respondents' perceptions on political patronage and the extent of political patronage;
9. determine the relationship of respondents' perceptions on political patronage, and their perception towards political dynasty in Iloilo City politics; and
10. determine the relationship between the respondents' perceptions on the extent of political patronage and their perceptions toward political dynasty;

Hypotheses of the Study

This study advances the following hypotheses:

1. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics such as household size, age, sex, civil status, monthly income, occupation, level of education, and involvement in civic and political organizations and their perceptions toward political patronage.
2. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics such as household size, age, sex, civil status, monthly income, occupation, level of education, and involvement in civic and political organizations, and their perceptions toward the extent of political patronage.
3. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics such as household size, age, sex, civil

status, monthly income, occupation, level of education, and involvement in civic and political organizations, and their perceptions toward political dynasty in Iloilo City politics.

4. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' perception on political patronage and the extent of political patronage.
5. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' perception on political patronage, and their perception towards political dynasty in Iloilo City.
6. There is a significant relationship between the respondents' perceptions on the extent of political patronage and their perception towards political dynasty in local politics.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The study of voters' perceptions and behavior has been given much attention by political scientists and researchers in the Western democracies. Anthony Downs (1957) in his *Economic Theory of Democracy* elucidated that party positions and policy pronouncements are determined or shaped by the preferences of voters, who are regarded as "rational" decision-makers, always considering "maximum" utility out of the choices they make. This is known as rational choice theory.

The theory maintains that, "when faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome" (Elster, 1989 in Ward, 2002). For rational choice theorists, individuals are the basic unit of analysis; they are rational, efficient, and instrumental utility-maximizers who seek to maximize personal utility net of cost alone (Hay, 2002). In a similar vein, rational choice institutionalism -a variant of rational choice theory- argued that political institutions (defined as stable, valued, recurring pattern of behavior) influence behavior (Huntington, 1968; Goodin, 1996) affecting the 'structure of a situation' in which individuals select strategies for the pursuit of their preferences (Ostrom, 1982).

If applied to voting or political behavior, this theory may be able to provide an explanation why voters, especially the poor and illiterate ones, tend to favor or support politicians who are able to provide public services in a personalized and individual manner regardless of the fact that they only derived short-term benefits.

Thus, using this theory as guide, the study will attempt to demonstrate that political behavior or electoral choice is largely 'structured' or 'shaped' by the 'situation' in which people, in this study, barangay officials, find themselves. It has been argued that individual political behavior is largely a function of social structures. As such, social class, geographic location, gender, consumption and production, location and religion, among other variables, all have known correlations, of greater or lesser strength, with voting behavior (Harrop & Miller, 1987).

A psychographic study on Filipino voting behavior and views conducted by the Institute of Political and Electoral Reforms (1995) seems to validate how "rational" voter's views and perception can be. The study concluded that there are three most important factors which determine how the Filipino electorate votes, namely: (1) the candidate's public image which the voters may *easily identify* with, (2) the endorsement of *traditional network and organizations* which include family, church and ward leaders, and (3) the personal characteristics of candidates that can be of *benefit* to the voter. This implies therefore that Filipino behavior towards politics and governance is largely

determined by traditional patronage network of popular politicians, which the voter can easily identify with since they are able to provide material benefits.

An earlier study by the Third World Studies Center of the University of the Philippines (1989) which examined voting behavior from the framework of *patron-client relationship* found that these dyadic ties still shape political behavior and perception. The study argued that, this specific form of power arrangement which involves the informal linkage between a political leader, the patron, who is able to provide material goods and services for his political followers, the clients, who in return for the benefits received from the former, reciprocate by rendering personal support and loyalty to the patron (Magno, 1989).

The schematic diagram below further clarifies this theoretical framework, which the study will adopt, to wit:




Figure 1. The Patron-Client Framework


The framework above suggests that the system of patronage works in two ways to benefit two actors, though the exchange could be “unequal” to a certain extent. On the one hand, the voter, (represented by political supporters and ward leaders in this study) seeks to maximize utility of the support (vote) and loyalty he had given to the politician and his family. On the other hand, the politician seeks to maximize the political returns of public investment in the form of constituency services to loyal supporters and followers to increase the probability of his reelection. The politician, through his pork barrel allocations, delivers these constituency services, in the form of material goods and benefits, in a personalized manner (Golden, 2000; Finan, 2003).

This study hypothesize, that the system of patronage, as illustrated above has a direct bearing on the emergence and entrenchment of political dynasties. For in the long term, the individual (voter or supporter) becomes indebted to the politician and his family thereby creating a relationship of dependence. The patron-client framework has been

used by various scholars who studied Philippine politics particularly those which focused on political factions, kinship politics and ‘dyadic’ ties in local politics (Lande, 1964; Scott, 1972; Machado, 1974; Fegan, 1994; Wurfel, 1988). Two recent studies on political patronage- one, examined the relationship of patronage politics, bureaucracy and corruption in post-war Italy (Golden, 2000) and the other, analyzed how local development in federal Brazil was adversely affected by the allocation of public funds that is largely determined by patronage politics (Finan, 2003) made use of a similar theoretical model but labeled it as “core-supporter” model, or “principal-agent” framework.

Conceptual Framework

To establish the plausibility of the foregoing propositions, the study adopts a conceptual framework to show the relationship among variables, to wit:



As shown in the diagram, Ilonggo perception on ‘dynastic’ politics is assumed to be influenced to a significant extent by their perceptions toward political patronage and the extensiveness of its practice in local politics. Conversely, these perceptions on

political patronage and its extent are also influenced by the socio-economic and political characteristics of the respondents.

Operational Definition of Variables

Political dynasty/dynastic politics. It is referred to as “the concentration, consolidation, or perpetuation of public office and power by persons related to one another” in local politics. The current study will investigate whether respondents espoused a positive or negative perception toward political dynasty.

Political patronage. The study defines this as a form of constituency service that serves the electoral needs of incumbent politicians. It is conceptualized as the ‘individuation’ and personalization of what are elsewhere packaged as pork barrel allocations, where pork barrel allocations involve targeting benefits to a specific electoral district.

Perceptions on Political Patronage. It refers to how the respondents view the system of political patronage in local politics - whether it is positive or negative. To measure the positive or negative perception of respondents, a five-point scale with the following categories: 5 - Strongly Agree, 4 – Agree; 3 – Undecided; 2 – Disagree; 1 – Strongly Disagree will be used. The scores assigned to each category will be summed up based on the number of items selected to measure perception. The respondents’ total scores will then be grouped into three, to wit: 8-16 =Negative perception; 17-31=Undecided/Neutral; 32-40= Positive perception. Item analysis will be used to examine respondents’ perception on political patronage.

Extent of political patronage. It refers to the degree to which the respondents perceive the use of political patronage and similar practices among local politicians to win electoral support. This will be determined by examining the extent to which ‘patronage’ projects and programs have contributed to the election or reelection success of the local politician who initiated/implemented and funded the project. A five-point scale with the following categories: 5 – To a great extent, 4 – To some extent; 3 – Uncertain/Not Sure; 2 – To a lesser extent; 1 – Negligible. The scores assigned to each category will be summed up based on the number of items selected to measure the extent of political patronage. The respondents’ total scores will then be grouped into five categories, to wit: (1-8) Negligible; (9-16) Lesser extent; (17-24) Uncertain; (25-32) Some extent; (33-40) Great extent. The responses will also be analyzed per item or indicator.

Perception on Political Dynasty/Dynastic Politics. In the study, this is viewed as the attempt of politicians to dominate local politics, either by alternating power with other family members- spouse, son or daughter and other siblings, or by supporting the election of their next-of-kin into public office to entrench their family in power. The study will focus on measuring the respondents’ perception on political dynasty whether it is positive or negative using a five-point scale with the following categories: 5- Sure to Win; 4 – Likely to Win; 3 – No Effect; 2 – Not Likely to Win; 1 –Will not Win. Each category will be assigned a particular score, which will be summed up based on the number of items selected to measure perception. The total scores for each category will then be grouped into three, to wit: (10- 23.3)=Negative perception; (23.31-36.6) =Neutral/Undecided;

(36.61- 50.0)= Positive perception. The responses will also be analyzed per item or indicator.

Socio-Economic and Political Characteristics. In this study, these will include household size, sex, age, civil status, monthly income, occupation, level of education, and involvement in socio-civic and political organizations. All of these will be considered as antecedent variables. They will be measured using frequency distribution and measures of central tendency.

Household Size. It refers to the number of family members living together in one house.

Sex. It refers to the respondent's gender categorized as male or female.

Civil status. Refers to a personal marital status whether single, married, widow, widower, legally separated or co-habiting without the benefit of marriage.

Monthly Income. Refers to the estimated gross monthly income of respondent from all sources.

Level of education. Refers to the degree of educational attainment - elementary, high school, college and post-graduate level, informal education –TESDA, NMYC

Involvement in Civic and Political Organizations. Refers to the respondents' membership (whether active or inactive) in community organizations and political parties such as Rotary Club, TSKI, party-list organizations, etc.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

This research project which aims to examine Ilonggo perceptions on the politics of patronage and dynastic governance is among the few studies in local politics that attempts, in a modest way, to shed light on the factors that may be able to explain the prevalence of this brand of politics in the local political arena. To a large extent, its findings will provide Filipino scholars and university-based researchers, who endeavor to understand the dynamics of Philippine politics valuable theoretical and empirical insights that can help improve their methods and approaches in investigating local issues and problems. It is important to note, that a close examination of the literature on local politics would reveal that there is a dearth of empirical studies of this kind, particularly one that conducts a field investigation to ascertain the relationship of factors using both quantitative and qualitative measures. On the whole, through survey and in-depth interviews, the study hopes to establish reliable empirical measures of people's perception towards local electoral politics, and more importantly, on political patronage and dynastic politics.

Being exploratory in nature, the study can be a rich source of base-line data on the realities of electoral politics and governance in Iloilo in view of increasing the quality of data and analysis especially among local researchers. The pertinent information that the study may disclose will also be able to assist researchers and scholars to further pursue studies on family-based oligarchies and patronage in order to expand the level of knowledge on the subject.

The study is also expected to raise the electorate's consciousness regarding the consequences of dynastic governance and patronage politics, especially the impact of these practices on their lives as participants of a democratic society. More importantly, its findings can help guide local leaders and well-meaning groups in civil society to adopt

programs that will effectively educate and empower people, helping them to make informed decisions in the choice of political leaders.

For research–funding academic institutions such as Central Philippine University, the findings of the study, being exploratory in nature, can be a rich source of base-line data especially on the perceptions of Iloilo voters toward local politics and governance. Through its research arm, the University Research Center, CPU may serve as a repository of primary data generated from local studies like this, which may provide the community with the necessary information on the realities of Philippine electoral politics. Thus, acting as a “think-tank”, the URC can help guide policymakers, both local and national levels, other local leaders and politicians in the formulation of laws and programs that will reform the negative practices and behavior of the dominant actors in the system.

It is further hoped that the findings of the study may provide empirical evidence that may enlighten and convince the majority of the members of Congress that implementing the constitutional policy imposing a ban on political dynasties, and other laws regulating campaigning and election spending need to be acted upon with urgency and dispatch for this is what the nation’s interest dictates.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The major task of the proposed study is to examine the dynamics of electoral politics and governance in Iloilo City, two decades after the EDSA ‘people power’ revolution in 1986. By and large, the post-1986 EDSA period (1986-2006) is a turning point in the development of Philippine politics for it was expected to usher an era of ‘new politics’ - a politics of issues dominated by programmatic parties that can provide the electorate with alternative choices on policy positions - and not personalities.

On the contrary, what has been observed is the resurrection of the post-war pattern of kinship-based recruitment and electoral succession among politicians who rely heavily on patronage politics. Such is the case in Iloilo, where this brand of politics has become prevalent, arguably, because of its acceptance by the Ilonggo electoral as a political norm in the choice of local leaders since the first local elections under the new constitution. Thus, by focusing on Ilonggo perceptions toward the politics of patronage and dynastic governance in the past two decades, the study may be able to establish support for the argument that the dynamics of local politics in the Philippines remains heavily dependent on ‘traditional’ mechanisms: machine, money and family to achieve electoral victory, despite the expansion of political participation brought about by the restoration of competitive and democratic elections in 1986.

A survey of the respondents – the barangay officials of the selected districts - using a structured survey questionnaire will be conducted to gather the data on their perception towards political patronage, its extent and their perceptions toward political dynasty. Though, the survey will only cover a sample population of the target respondents, it is expected to provide a more representative view of the opinions of the cross-section of the Ilonggo electorate. Since the research will primarily delve into studying the perceptions of respondents in Iloilo towards political patronage and political dynasty as its main variables, it is therefore recommended that future studies on political patronage and political dynasty be expanded in other areas and to include other variables

not tackled in this research. Since no baseline study has yet been conducted particularly in Iloilo, the results of the study can be made a pro-forma for similar studies covering other cities or provinces later on.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This review of related literature highlights the role of oligarchic political families in local politics, how they achieve and maintain power through electoral competition, and its consequent impact on the development of the Philippine state. It provides a narrative of how landed elite-controlled local factions, built on a vast network of kinship and patronage, emerged as dominant actors in the national political arena of the Philippine past, and why the same actors continue to assert their influence on electoral politics, especially in the localities, in the Philippine present. The various approaches, theoretical discourses and empirical studies on Philippine local politics, especially those that examine the role of kinship and patronage ties to achieve success in elective office, as well as the changing patterns of political recruitment and electoral support have been given ample space in the discussion. The literature review also pays attention to empirical studies by foreign scholars on the politics of patronage and its impact on development in order to draw theoretical and methodological frameworks for the current research.

The Political Family in Philippine Politics

The elite family as the leading actor in the nation's socio-economic and political life has dominated the national historical development of the Philippine state, which traces its roots at the close of the nineteenth-century. Though, local in origin and based on highly unstable factional alliances, these elite families "have provided a strong element of continuity to the country's economic and political history" (McCoy, 1994:1) as a consequence of their quest to gain political ascendancy. In fact, the history of Philippine democratic politics and its ever-changing character is also a vivid political narrative of the attempt of successive political families to 'circulate' power and perpetuate it among themselves in both national and local levels of government.

In her *Politics in the Philippines*, a pioneering study on the dynamics of Philippine electoral politics, Jean Grossholtz argued that the family is the "strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands, and whose communal values are often in conflict

with the impersonal values of the institutions of the larger society” (1964:86-87). Thus, for Grossholtz, the way to understand Philippine democratic politics is not by looking at its formal institutional structures but rather the dynamics that underlie it - especially characterized by the propensity of Filipino leaders to engage in the transactional politics of bargaining and compromise to pursue familial and parochial interests.

In the same vein, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (1988) noted that the nature and dynamics of Philippine politics is determined by the centrality of the family in Filipino society based on bilateral kinship. This kinship ties, often extended to the remotest relative, even fictive ones, and reinforced by a strong pattern of trust and reciprocal obligations provides a pragmatic ideology that greatly shaped the individual’s political behavior and decision-making. For instance, the traditional Filipino value of *utang na loob* or debt of gratitude, motivates individuals to repay favors at great personal cost – in the trustful expectation that others would reciprocate (Wurfel, 1988). Among non-kinsmen, however, assistance and favors rendered to a family member are to be reciprocated by the entire family of the recipient. Though, difficult to quantify, those debts of gratitude received in times of crisis, cannot be fully repaid. When translated into political terms – debts of gratitude in exchange for votes - these patterns of trust and mutual obligation strengthen the ties between the patron-candidate and client-voter.

In *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, Alfred McCoy further argues on the significance of a ‘familial approach’ to Philippine politics, and offers four hypotheses: “first, family oligarchies are a significant factor in Philippine history; second, it is the relations between these families that influence Philippine politics; third, elite family networks bring factionalism into the political arena; and finally, the interaction between powerful rent-seeking families and a correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic” (1994: 19). To be sure, the family as the basic autonomous unit of Filipino society, thus apart from the state apparatus, has been regarded as its “most enduring political unit and the one into which, failing some wider principle of organization, all other units dissolve” (Fegan, 1994). This is characteristic of a polity where interest groups and ideologically- based organizations seem to be absent, and in which political competition is defined along ethno-linguistic considerations if not kinship ties as a basis for interest articulation and aggregation.

Thus, kinship-based politicians who coalesced with other families into factions that are highly fluid and unstable have dominated power struggles in local elective offices in Philippine provincial politics. This was explicitly noted by O.D. Corpuz, who wrote: “Since the 1900s, the elite families in the town not only dominated but monopolized political activity while the rest of the people were followers or spectators and had no advocates. Politics was the contest among the local elite families for the positions of influence and prestige, and as such politics began and ended with the families that owned land, that had the money and connections for business and enterprise and that sent their sons on to higher education” (1989:543-544). This observation still holds true at present, though, there has been substantial changes in the character of the elite and their ways of wealth accumulation brought about by the country’s changing political economy.

In a perceptive study of the Filipino socioeconomic elites, Simbulan (1965) came up with a list of 169 politically dominant families who monopolized elective and appointive offices in the government covering the period 1946 to 1963, with at least three officials per family. The study showed that ‘dynastic’ families have been the source of

the country's topmost leaders including seven presidents, two vice-presidents, 42 senators and 147 representatives. Citing Simbulan's study, Coronel (2004), in a recent book about Filipino legislators, noted the persistence of political families as a 'political caste' as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of the membership of Congress since its revival in 1988, originated from political clans who had been in politics in the past forty years. Although, more entrepreneurial, Western-educated and politically sophisticated leaders have replaced many of the traditional land-based oligarchy, these 'new' generation of politicians are, nonetheless, products of 'dynastic' succession.

Examining the case of dynastic politics of the Ecleo family in Dinagat Island in Surigao Del Norte, Marites Vitug's scholarly account is enlightening yet carries a caveat: "The danger in perpetuating families in politics, as shown by the Ecleos, is that competition for elective posts is stifled since running for office is circumscribed by family ties, not by competence or skill. The playing field becomes extremely narrow, and continuity in politics is assured by the family name and the clout that goes with it" (1995: 57). Through a combination of patronage politics and religious fanaticism, the Ecleos were able to manipulate the faithful followers, mostly poor and illiterate, of the cult-like Philippine Benevolent Missionaries Association, which Ruben Ecleo, Sr., the family's patriarch founded in the 1960s, and has now become a formidable political machine that perpetuate them in Surigao provincial politics.

A more vivid account of how elite families treat public office, once won, as an exclusive family enterprise is provided by Alfred McCoy: "Once entrenched, the influential politician often works to bequeath power and position to their children, in effect seeking to transform the public office they have won into a private legacy for their family. For all politicians, provincial or national office is inevitably ephemeral. But private wealth gained during their term in power, if substantial, can be passed on, giving succeeding generations the means to compete for office" (1994:24-25).

Indeed, political families have found a new way of accumulating private wealth – that is, through the ballot box. As such, electoral competition especially in the local level, could be equated with the politics of wealth accumulation among rival political families. There is, then, no doubt to Vitug's rather succinct conclusion that: "Once political families begin, the momentum is difficult to stop. Worse, when factionalism and conflict take place among these families, a more important thing gives in: the development of the province" (1995:58). But, this is not only true in Surigao del Norte's case -for this has become a marked feature of local politics in the entire country, which has left scholars and students of politics in a quandary while searching for explanation. Thus, a cursory review of the theoretical discourses on the study of Philippine politics will help improve scholarly analysis of how, and to what extent, these 'new' dynastic families play their role in the local political arena at a historical juncture where political participation have expanded due to the restoration and strengthening of democratic institutions.

Theoretical Discourses in the Study of Philippine Politics

Patron-Client Framework: Clientelism and Kinship Politics

Filipino scholars on Philippine politics including many of their foreign counterparts have offered theoretically informed explanations on the dynamics of family-based politics, which seems to prevail in the country for decades. It has been observed that until the 1990s, scholars have isolated factionalism and patron-client relationships as the main structures of Philippine politics.

Carl Lande (1964), who was the first to develop the patron-client framework in his classic work, *Leaders, Factions and Parties*, explains that the patron-client ties or dyadic contract built into rival political factions which make up unstable political alliances, basically serve as the social structural roots of Filipino political behavior. These traditional kinship-based dyadic ties, i.e., landlord-tenant are vertical bonds of mutual assistance based on kinship, and instrumental friendship between persons of greater socio-economic position and those of lesser means in society.

It has been noted by Rocamora (1995) that this quintessential patron-client model of landlord-tenant relations, also describes other kinds of political relationships such as between a politician-candidate and a supporter-voter. Utilizing the same theoretical model, James Scott (1972) in his analysis of rural politics in Southeast Asia, pointed out that this patron-client or vertical solidarity model of action, engenders a highly “factional quality of political competition, since similar patronage networks are built within contending units”. Thus, vertical bonds of loyalty and support link the ordinary folk to the economic elites who form the active participants in an oligarchic political order. Scott points out that this “special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving largely instrumental friendship” is highly dependent on a balance of reciprocity defined in terms of material benefits, i.e. goods and services in exchange for votes or political support that each party derived out of the relationship.

At the surface, patron-client dyads may be perceived as a natural consequence of a system of mutual assistance and benefit –between a prosperous patron and a needy client – yet under close scrutiny, one will discern that such exchange is a form of personal dependence inherently rooted in inequality and highly exploitative. As has been noted in this literature review, this is one major criticism of the patron-client framework – its failure to take into consideration the inherent inequality that is built-into this ‘face-to-face’ relationship between the politician-patron and the client-voter.

Thus, patron-clientelism presupposes an imbalance of power between the parties since the client or voter, who has entered an unequal exchange relation, is not in fact, able to reciprocate fully (Schmidt et. al. 1977). This results to a cycle of dependence on the part of the client yet a corollary increase in the power and prerogatives of the patron. As dependency becomes prevalent, the level of exploitation also heightens, creating a vicious cycle of unequal exchange based on material considerations with short-term benefits. But, what factors bring about this system of personal exchange that further aggravate conditions of economic, social and political inequalities?

As similarly noted by Lande (1964), certain structural conditions seem to promote patron-client networks such as – “the persistence of marked inequalities in wealth, status, and power which are accorded some legitimacy; the relative absence or collapse of effective, impersonal guarantees, i.e., public law, for physical security, and position – often accompanied by the growth of semi-autonomous local centers of personal power; and finally, the inability of either kinship units or the traditional village to serve as effective vehicles of personal security or advancement” (Scott, 1972:8).

Indeed, in developing societies such as the Philippines where chronic poverty engenders other forms of inequalities due to the absence of effective mechanisms to implement social justice, i.e., redistributive policies, and the lack of guarantees in the basic personal freedoms under the rule of law, patron-client relationships are rendered legitimate, and even evoke a sense of loyalty and affection among those who benefit from it. To a large extent, these conditions also explain why elite political families – being the most economically well-off and competent to provide leadership in the localities - perform “a broad range of economic, social and political functions” (McCoy, 1994:9).

Lending support to this argument, Sheila Coronel in *The Rulemakers* writes that: “The Filipino family, after all, is not just a network of relatives; it is by default also a social safety net, an employment agency, a training school, and for those in politics, a political party. And because the government is unable to deliver social support services, i.e., health and employment insurance, educational assistance, livelihood support, etc., the Filipinos turn to their relatives for support” (2004:57). While harnessing patronage politics through dyadic ties, these elite families remained at the core of local factions operating as well-entrenched socio-political organizations, competing with the state organs for political dominance and loyalty.

Such a situation is typical among developing states of the Third World such as the Philippines which, according to Migdal’s ‘weak-state, strong- society’ thesis, suffers from a dilemma arising from its strength to penetrate and control society yet weak in effecting goal oriented social changes (Migdal, 1988). Insightful works of contemporary Filipino scholars especially sympathetic to Marxist class analysis posit that state weakness is a result of the fact that, despite its coercive power over society, it has remained ‘captive’ of vested and parochial interests of well-entrenched elites (Rivera, 1991; Bello, 2002). Thus, it can be argued that family-based patronage politics is a manifest response to the inability of the state - being weak in structure and mechanisms- to address the multifarious needs of the mass of the population, giving rise to some form of self-help mechanisms and institutions that only elite families can provide through a system of dyadic ties.

A recently published report entitled *Poverty in the Philippines* by the Asian Development Bank cites a study on elite perceptions of poverty based on interviews with 80 members of the Filipino political, economic, and social elite. The study found out that the “Filipino elite feels as sense of responsibility towards the poor, but this responsibility is met through the provision of assistance on a *patron-client basis* or through philanthropic activity, rather than a more substantive commitment to redistributive action led by the state, involving for instance, more elaborate social safety nets financed by higher taxes. The Filipino elite looks to the state to lead the fight against poverty yet they are deeply skeptical of the state’s capacity to lead this fight” (Clarke & Sison, 2003:237 *italics mine*). As further argued by the study, the Filipino elite attributes poverty to the inequitable distribution of resources, the prevalence of corruption and the persistence of ‘traditional’ (semi-feudal or oligarchic) politics. This argument thus suggests that the patron-client framework remains relevant as an analytical tool since it is through this form of exchanges that Filipino politicians and electorate can truly relate with.

Recent scholars, however, critiqued the patron-client framework since they focus on merely describing and isolating factionalism as a characteristic feature of Philippine political behavior, and do not probe deeper into what factors provoke factionalism, in the

first place. Thus, patron-client or dyadic ties are merely a reflection of behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system. The notion of *politica de familia*, or the traditional dynamics of Philippine society compel individuals to think in terms of family solidarity to the detriment of any other socio-political unit outside the family. As such, factionalism and patron-client ties are reduced to mere symptoms of kinship politics or *politica de familia*. Mina Roces (1990), in her study of the Lopez Family argues that, “kinship politics motivates individuals and families to run for public office, to make or break political alliances, to legislate on behalf of the family, and to expose the graft and corruption of those outside their family group in the press”. It therefore follows that the family’s desire to wrest political power to promote economic wealth, using kinship connections and the interlocking network of social obligations, is the “stuff” behind Philippine political behavior.

The Patronage Game: Liders and Patrons

Other scholars on Filipino politics, however, emphasized that the basic building block of Philippine political structure in the local levels is the patron-*lider*-client triad, which determines patronage exchanges rather than the more traditional ‘dyadic’ ties (Araneta and Carroll, 1970). This framework introduces another actor in the patronage game – the *lider*. Since personal obligations and debts of gratitude-oftentimes difficult to quantify - arise out of the politics of patronage, the need for an intermediary –the *lider* (leader) becomes necessary to forge and consummate patron-client exchange. A *lider*, is generally understood, to be a person who mobilizes voters on behalf of and/or gives the support of his followers to a candidate (Machado, 1974). Though, there exists a vertical relationship between the patron and client, it is interesting to note that between the *lider* and the recipient (the voter), the relationship may be of approximate or actual equality (Araneta and Carroll, 1970; Hollnsteiner, 1963). The various studies on local politics aptly described the crucial functions being performed by the *lider* as mutually complementary. He is both a spokesman and supporter of the politician-patron especially during campaign periods, constantly reminding his followers of the ‘good things’ the politician-patron has done for them. At the same time, the *lider* sustains his position of influence in the community by his ability and willingness to use his relationship with the politician to benefit his network of supporters. To the extent that the *lider* exerts pressure on the politician to produce a health center, a basketball court, a schoolhouse, a stretch of gravel road, jobs, and an array of personal favors (Villanueva, et.al. 1966) for his followers, he likewise makes sure that they follow his instructions for whom to vote.

Thus, for a politician to ensure victory at the polls, the development of an extensive network of *liders* in the locality whose loyalties were exclusive only to him is imperative. Such continuing support, however, requires that the politician-patron has to maintain ties with these *liders* on a regular basis between elections (Machado, 1974). These ties, mostly anchored on *compadrazgo* (Hart, 1977) are often forged through various means and social occasions such as acting as ‘ninong’ or sponsor in Church baptisms and weddings, being an ‘advocate’ as well as a regular donor or contributor to fund village activities and projects, or simply paying voters a visit in their homes and villages during fiestas, religious festivals and other informal gatherings in the community. In this way, the politician makes himself visible to people, making them feel that they are important to him, and are ‘one’ with them.

Similar studies on local politics in the Philippines, which utilized the patron–client and factional models to examine leadership transformation, recruitment patterns, and the emergence of political machines, also highlighted the role played by local *liders* in factional competition. Kit Machado (1974), in his survey of provincial politics in Batangas and Capiz observes that the decline of traditional factions and kinship–based patronage networks leading to the emergence of the professional politician could be largely attributed to the prevalence of political machines manned by village or barrio *liders* who translated political support into votes on the basis of personal and instrumental considerations.

The word “machine” connotes an organization capable of delivering a vote with mechanical regularity. Regular support for machine candidates was not based on issue commitments (Stone, 1996). The political machine was centrally about patronage, about the struggle to gain public office in order to control and distribute patronage. Machine politics did not revolve around a contest between champions of opposing sets of principles since ideology was secondary. Thus, political interaction with voters through machines was mainly about personal obligations and the exchange of favors (DiGaetano, 1988) because of friendship to the precinct *lider* or a common social identity.

Consequently, for a politician who wants to maintain the support of local *liders*, and their followers in the grass-roots level, he must see to it that there is a continuous and free flow of goods and services to the voters –an expensive but effective reminder that they (the voters) should keep their part of the exchange. The most logical effect then would be a “stable” but exploitative mode of exchange –where politicians are assured of the *lider-generated* support of voters to the extent that they (the politicians) play the role of a munificent patron. Oftentimes, politicians who are dependent on electoral machines target poor voters, thus they make special efforts to reach out to this marginal sector through materials rewards such as jobs, personal favors and assistance, exceptions and partiality in the administration of the law, and other forms of personal services. A classic statement by Plunkitt of Tammany Hall provides the reason: “The poor are the most grateful people in the world, and let me tell you, they have more friends in their neighborhood than the rich have theirs” (Riordan, 1963 in Stone, 1996).

To perform such a role, however, requires the accumulation of economic resources and political power that can only be possibly gained through public office, where one has discretion in the disposal of public funds and government resources to keep a patronage machine working. This is precisely the reason why successful politicians, once in power, would never relinquish their elective posts except to members of their family circle –“circulating” electoral office to the next-of-kin, thus leading to some form of “dynastic” governance. This brand of politics often leads to factionalism triggered by the rivalry among political families coveting the various elective posts especially in local contests. And in some cases, the struggle for dominance over local elective offices between these ‘dynastic’ families has been highlighted by violence and rent seeking (McCoy 1994; Sidel, 1995) viewed by some scholars as a prerequisite to the politics of accumulation and dynasty building.

The Factional Model: Bossism and Rent-seeking Politics

Employing the classic factional model as mode of analysis, McCoy (1994) in an edited collection of case studies on political families, focused on two characteristics of

family dynamics that have not been explored: *political violence* and *rent-seeking politics*. It has been argued that political violence is directly related to the intensely personal character of Philippine politics, especially at the local level (Rocamora, 1995) where political rivalry among clans to wrestle control of elective offices has been marred by killings and intimidation.

Rent-seeking politics, on the other hand, may be defined as the family's desire to gain business monopoly franchises from the state through patronage ties with the powerful leaders in the executive and the legislature. This takes place when restrictions on the market are imposed through state regulation and awarding of access to a favored few, i.e., clients and cronies, resulting to an essentially political competition (Buchanan, 1980 in McCoy 1994) among the political elites to gain control of a chunk of limited state resources. In his analysis of the politics of banking in the Philippines, Hutchcroft (1998), endorses this 'rent-seeking' behavior among Filipino business elites who most heavily rely on their relatives in political office.

Two recent works on the Filipino political family (McCoy, 1994; Roces, 1990) highlight the case of the Lopez Brothers, who started out as local entrepreneurs and politicians in Iloilo City and ended up as dominant figures in the country's political and business circles as a consequence of their ability to seek rents in the forms of contracts, licenses, franchises, etc., largely due to their close ties with successive Philippine presidents from Quezon to Marcos, and later Aquino. Though, the Lopezes seldom used violence to gain political access, they were regarded as potentially competent to wield it to achieve their political and economic goals.

The use of political violence and rent seeking to achieve political ends has been further corroborated by John Sidel's (1997) model of "bossism" in his study of Cavite and Cebu politics, which prioritizes violence as a marked feature of Philippine politics. Sidel argues that apart from patron-client ties, other features of electoral politics such as fraud, violence and vote-buying are some of the "impersonal and coercive mechanisms and resources" used by bosses to "entrench themselves in power, as seen in the widespread pattern of electoral fraud, vote-buying and violence" during campaigns and elections.

In one of his case studies of local politics, Sidel describes how Justiniano Montano, one of Cavite's strongmen (1935-1972) rose to power in Cavite politics, eventually achieving national prominence as a congressman and later senator through the use of violence and rent-seeking. He was described by Sidel as "a fearsome pugilist, and an aggressive interloper who depended for his success not only on bluster, bravado, and bullying but on the persistent threat and use of violence" (1994:112). While projecting himself as the "big man" of Cavite politics, Montano endeavored to create political and economic opportunities for his three sons by courting favors with sitting Philippine presidents. Though, Montano's success in politics could be attributed to his physical prowess and the use of violence, the use of same tactics failed him in his efforts to build a power base for lasting political dynasty.

Brian Fegan (1994) seems to support McCoy's and Sidel's theory and argues, "because politics is about competition for power, a model or theory that depends on exchange theory alone confuses what we would like politics to be with what politics is." Fegan, in his study of a peasant family in Bulacan whom he labeled as "entrepreneurs in votes and violence", emphasized that peaceful-exchange models distract social scientists

from addressing styles of political competition that Filipino popular journalists have long labeled “guns, goons, gold” or “force, fraud, and terror”.

The same theoretical perspective have been used in three other studies on individual politicians and political families found in McCoy’s edited collection, i.e., Michael Cullinane’s case study of warlord politics in Durano-dominated city of Danao in Northern Cebu Province, G. Carter Bentley’s account of Ali Dimaporo of Lanao, whom he referred to as ‘the archetypal Moro warlord’, and Jeremy Beckett’s incisive analysis of political families in Maguindanaon politics of Cotabato. These scholarly works illustrate how the political economy of a locality shapes the dynamics of political competition and wealth accumulation as well as the ‘significance of a family name as a political asset’ (Beckett, 1994) in local electoral politics.

In the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and the Institute for Popular Democracy’s *Boss: Five Case Studies of Local Politics in the Philippines*, the introductory article asserts that Philippine politics is dominated by ‘classes, bosses, goons and clans’, which characterized the politics of economic accumulation through electoral office, has been part of the language of everyday politics (Rocamora, 1995) especially in the local areas. Such language connotes a politics of survival or more bluntly, the survival of the fittest in a political jungle of violence and fierce struggles over the spoils of public office. As such, the three case studies on local politics in this edited volume were written with Sidel’s “bossism” framework in mind.

In effect, McCoy’s and Sidel’s reading of Philippine politics isolates violence, intimidation and coercion as key ingredients in the dynamics of kinship politics. It must be noted, however, that so far no direct evidence has been presented to make a convincing case that violence is the general rule and not the exception in the dynamics of kinship politics; and that the employment of violence was indeed able to sustain the longevity of political families in positions of power in local politics. Of course, this is not to say that there is no violence, it is just not typical.

Contemporary studies on Philippine politics argue that violence is not a requisite for electoral success or the longevity of families. As shown by studies of Danao, Sulu, and Lanao politics, where warlordism and violence seem widespread, “political bosses did not even govern through sheer terror alone but they were also beneficent patrons and paternalistic figures who were able to inspire both fear and reverence among their followers” (Coronel, 2004). She noted that, though, the case studies, i.e., McCoy’s and Sidel’s tend to overly stress the significance of violence and rent-seeking in the emergence and perpetuation of dynastic power, this framework is unable to explain the persistence of such families as the Rectos, Magsaysays and Tañadas, whose histories are not marked by either violence and rent seeking in politics (Coronel, 2004:51).

In the same vein, contemporary academic writers, who also criticized the politics of rents and violence, introduced moral preference into both description and analysis of the dynamics of Philippine politics, thus dismissing the use of force as an aberration (i.e., typical only of the Marcos regime, or Durano or Dimaporo-type warlordism) rather than acknowledging violence as an integral part of the political process in the Philippines. Other scholars also acknowledged that the dynamics of Philippine political behavior is much more complex than familism and patronage.

Benedict Kerkvliet (1995), who wrote his first book on The Huk Rebellion, observes that since 1986, elections in the Philippines have been more than mere vehicles

for patronage. Although, the symptoms of patronage politics are ever present in the ‘guns, goons, gold’ and the use of personal ties to gain the spoils of elective office, elections are also about legitimacy, fairness, and democratic processes. For Kerkvliet, therefore, elections have multiple meanings and cannot be reducible to patronage politics, violence, coercion, and intimidation. Moreover, Resil Mojares (1994) uses a case study of the Osmena’s of Cebu to argue that the family’s skill in combining “public benefit with private gain” explains their resilience in Cebu politics. Mojares observed that the history of the Osmena’s through three generations belies their classification as kingpins, as warlords, or as traditional patrons. It is due to their skills in the craft of politics, particularly electoral politics, and as economic managers that they remain major political subjects in local Cebuano politics and in the national arena as well.

Related Studies on the Politics of Kinship and Patronage

Latin American and other Western scholars have similarly conducted extensive studies on familial politics, patronage networks and family-based oligarchies which seem to offer a rich, theoretically informed literature on elite-family history that is applicable to the Philippines’ case. Linda Lewin (1979), writing on family-based politics in Paraiba State in Brazil, discovered that the private correspondence of the Paraiba local bosses and of the other state and national politicians defined local politics as “politica de familia”. In her work, she used the term to describe the way a family network shared regional political posts. For Lewin, there are two key variables that account for the extraordinary political power of Brazil’s family-based oligarchies – kinship and the state.

Lewin notes that as the small group of these families “continued to define a political elite” - the “parentela” (as she labeled it) – which prevailed in the absence of a strong state and class-defined society, offer the greatest individual security. It has been observed that despite the modernization of the society, elite families in Brazil’s northeast state maintained “the same landed monopoly of commercial agriculture and coercive manipulation of the rural labor force.”

Diane Balmori’s (1985) three-generation study of an Argentine family focused on familism in politics argued that “political actions, by deemphasizing individual behavior and the activities of political parties, are in favor of political behavior action of families”. Charles Harris (1975), who examined the politics of the Sanchez-Navarros Mexico’s powerful family, points out that “if there is one element that runs through the Sanchez Navarros’ political activities, it is pragmatism, for they were prepared to work with anyone who would work with them.”

In a recently published case study on political patronage and local development on Brazil, University of California-Berkeley based scholar, Frederico Finan (2003) investigates how political incentives or political patronage affect the allocation of public investments made by the members of the Chamber of Deputies - Brazil’s unicameral legislature. Results of the study show that federal deputies reward municipalities based on political support. Political motivations also influence the type of public work the municipality receives, even conditioning on its local needs.

Finan using a theoretical model known as “core-supporter” models developed by Cox and McCubbins (1986), and Dixit and Londregan (1996), Golden (2000), pointed out in his study that politicians prefer to allocate goods that are less excludable to municipalities such as public employment, where they received more political support.

He laments that though public investment increases per capita income, it also increased local income inequality.

In his study, Finan argued that politicians seeking to maximize the political return to public investments, target federal projects and programs to loyal constituents. His study showed that the degree of electoral support affects not only the probability that a deputy executes a public investment in a municipality, but also the size and type of project. It therefore follows that an increase in electoral support will also increase the probability that a deputy will reward a municipality. Moreover, Finan noted that a political career in Brazil is closely connected in “bringing home material benefits especially in the poorest regions where communities judge their deputies on what they bring home”. Hence, this seems to confirm the argument that the primary function of a deputy is getting resources; legislating comes second.

In another recent scholarly work, which utilized the “core-supporter” models or what she called “principal-agent” framework, Miriam Golden (2000), a University of California-Los Angeles based scholar examined the relationship between political patronage, bureaucracy and corruption in Italy. In her study of the Italy’s Chamber of Deputies, Golden argues that “Italian legislators exercised adequate control over the bureaucracy, and that the characteristics of the system to elicit such severe public disapprobation were the effects of practices- especially the extensive use of political patronage – that had been deliberately designed to enhance the reelection opportunities of parliamentary incumbents.” She, therefore, interpreted political patronage as the “individuation” of benefits that are usually allocated collectively.

Using her principal-agent model, she conceptualized political patronage as a form of constituency service that serves the electoral needs of incumbent politicians. Oftentimes, these personalized benefits are packaged as pork barrel allocations targeting specific, named clientele. She noted that voters seek to maximize utility, legislators seek to maximize the probability of reelection, and the bureaucrats seek to maximize the size of their agencies. Moreover, she observed that legislators other than collectively passing bills, also provide quasi-monopolistic “facilitation” services to constituents from their electoral districts. These services involve assigning staff members to help citizens deal with the bureaucracy with which voters increasingly come into contact as government services expand.

At the same time, the bureaucracy itself can help (or hinder) legislators in their facilitation activities, by providing information easily (or reluctantly) to citizens, and by playing its part in justifying the allocation of distributive (‘pork barrel’) policies to the district. Fiorina and Noll (1978) observed in a related study that legislators and bureaucrats have an incentive to produce government services in an excessively bureaucratized manner because to do so raises the demand for facilitation services.

The electoral process does not check this tendency because voters face a prisoner’s dilemma in choosing among candidates. If voters disapprove of excessive bureaucratization, electing a legislator who attacks bureaucratic inefficiency will be unlikely to alter the outcome of a majority-rule legislature, but will produce a less effective facilitator. Fiorina and Noll further noted that as the public bureaucracy grows larger, the importance of the performance of facilitation will grow, and a legislator who is a good facilitator will be increasingly likely to be reelected.

Understanding Local Electoral Politics in the Post-1986 EDSA Period:

The Need for Empirical Studies and Methodological Approaches

The foregoing discussions of the various studies in Philippine local politics and similar works in Latin America and Europe have inspired a lively and highly informative literature on the dynamics of family-based factionalism of the elite, the politics of kinship and patronage that can theoretically enrich understanding on the persistence of this brand of politics in the post-EDSA period.

There is no doubt that the existing literature especially McCoy's *An Anarchy of Families* (1994), and the PCIJ and IPD case studies, i.e., *Boss: Five Case Studies of Local Politics in the Philippines* (1995), *All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines* (1992), among others, does provide a remarkable account of the character of Philippine politics in the contemporary period, while affirming and updating the more systematic scholarly works done four decades ago, i.e., Lande's *Leaders, Factions and Parties* (1964), and Grossholtz's *Politics in the Philippines* (1964).

These studies, including David Wurfel's *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (1988) offer highly incisive analyses on how familial politics anchored on patronage-client relationships have shaped the nature of electoral politics and the development of Philippine democracy. The current study therefore aims to expand understanding of Philippine politics by inquiring into the continuing relevance of patronage networks and clientelist ties in the attempt to explain the dominance of dynastic families in provincial and municipal elections in the post-1986 EDSA period.

The Relevance of Clientelist Models in Analyzing Contemporary Politics

From a theoretical perspective, the foregoing academic studies contributed immensely in fine-tuning the otherwise fragmented and somewhat ill-defined paradigms used in analyzing the nature of Philippine politics. In spite of the fact, that these studies were mostly descriptive and historical in their approaches, they were able to provide ample and theoretically-informed explanation about the dynamics of Philippine electoral politics. Using the culturally-conscious but more "modern" versions of the patron-client framework, the current literature was able to elucidate the nature of the relationship of politicians and voters, leaders and followers, or elites and masses. It is worthy to note, however, that the "traditional" patron-client framework has been criticized on two counts: one, for its insufficient attention to the inequality that is inherent in the relationship between the politician-patron and the voter-client, since it emphasizes "valorized reciprocity, smooth interpersonal relationship, kinship and fictive bonds"; and two, that it has been replaced by more "modern" political relations (Rocamora, 1995) due to the changing political economy of Philippine elections.

A noted Filipino scholar made the same observation that "today voters can no longer be won solely by intimidation or by appealing to family loyalty or collecting on debts of gratitude" (Coronel, 2004) to give their support to a candidate during elections.

She cites an earlier study by Resil Mojares (1991) on the 1986 and 1987 local elections in Carcar, Cebu where he noted, that “class and clientelism do not neatly sum up voting behavior”. The study asserts that, “this shifting terrain of local politics is a result of the decline of traditional patrons, the more diversified economy and the demise of agriculture as the main source of livelihood in the localities.” Refutably, these criticisms suggest that the patron-client framework may no longer be a reliable theoretical tool in analyzing Philippine political dynamics especially in a period in the country’s development where the Filipino electorate enjoys a wider democratic space and perhaps, freer electoral environment.

Rocamora (1995) agrees that these criticisms are valid, yet he argues that this framework “remains *relevant* because it comes close to everyday political discourse among politicians and probably, still the majority of the people” (*italics mine*). Why is this so? This is because patron-client relationship is embedded in the political psychology of the Filipino electorate. A distinctly unique political culture which is anchored on an intricate system of reciprocity or *utang na loob* that binds the voter and the candidate even outside of election seasons.

Empirical data on local elections, though quite limited, does provide factual basis to support this view. In a perceptive survey of the campaign tactics in the 1987 congressional elections, Filipino political scientist Renato Velasco (1989) noted the prevalence of personalistic campaigning techniques, i.e., resorting to house-to-house visit and personal support organizations, which is a basic feature of the traditional patron-clientelist politics. He further notes that in this face-to-face campaign methods, the candidates often act like benevolent patrons or benefactors with lofty pledges if not granting actual favors to voters in exchange for the latter’s support. *Utang na loob* or reciprocity for favors received or given rather than formal sanctions on non-compliance of voters is invoked in this relationship.

The determining factor, then, for a candidate’s victory is how extensive these patronage networks or dyadic ties are, rather than the program or ideology that is presented to the electorate. For instance, a candidate in the 1988 local elections, perhaps lamenting on the revival of this brand of politics in the post-1986 EDSA period, opined: “There seems to be no escape from the ever-durable patronage system for people in the grassroots, even those with a certain degree of political sophistication, still hold the *utang na loob* value in them since they remember every single personal assistance given to them in their hour’s greatest need – those who helped them bury their dead, give money to buy medicine for a sick child, stood with them in the barricades when the community was being demolished, or gave them jobs through projects and community programs” (Gutierrez, 1988 in Velasco, 1989).

Evidence thus warrant that despite the democratization of the electoral process after almost two decades of authoritarian rule and the relative modernization of the Philippine economy, the nature of politician-voter relationship remains anchored on “traditional” dyadic ties of mutual exchange strengthened by the values of *pakikisama*, *utang na loob* and *compadrazgo*. But, what remains problematic is the question whether clientelist frameworks can be utilized to examine the emergence of dynastic politics in the post-1986 EDSA period. This is what the proposed study intends to accomplish: to investigate -using empirical measures- how the electorate in the local areas such as Iloilo

City, perceive political patronage and dynastic governance to support the plausibility of this theoretical framework.

Examining Local Politics: The Need for Empirical Studies and New Methodological Approaches

On the whole, it can be argued that, though the existing literature has improved the level of understanding of Philippine politics, it has not moved beyond the level of description and historical analysis. It has been observed that there is a lack of empirical studies on the dynamics of local politics, more particularly electoral politics of the post-1986 EDSA period, which has been characterized by the prevalence of patronage and the re-emergence of dynastic governance.

The adoption of the new Constitution in 1987, and the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, which decentralized national-local relations, cast local governments into the political limelight as a consequence of the shift of the locus of power - through devolution and autonomy - from the central government in Manila to the provinces. Thus, with its newly acquired powers and prerogatives over local resources, elective and, even appointive positions in local government have become more lucrative to attract stiff, and sometimes bitter and violent political competition among family-centered local factions.

With more than 80 percent of elective posts open for political competition at three-year intervals during the last two decades, Philippine elections were predominantly local in nature. Yet, as has been noted by Rocamora (1995), “much less attention has been devoted to local politics by media and academic studies”. He asserts that engaging the “local” in concrete struggles based on concrete conditions – that is, entering the people’s consciousness, and translating academic theories to the everyday language of politics –should be pursued by scholars who want to effect change by reforming electoral politics.

As such, studies on local politics should depart from what Rocamora calls, the “Manila-centric” view of Filipino politics, and focus instead on how the political dynamics and structures of the ‘local’ can serve as building blocks or explanatory tools to describe Philippine politics in the national arena. This is one of the primary considerations of the current study: to provide empirical data on these local “narratives” (as the postmodernist put it) especially on the relationship between the candidate and the citizen, so as to strengthen theorizing on the basic structures of Philippine politics.

Indeed, reading through the array of studies on Philippine electoral politics, and most of the works noted above, would tell us that there is a scarcity of local studies which attempt to examine the factors, i.e., the relationship of political patronage and dynasty-building, or more importantly, how the electorate perceive the prevalence of these practices and institutions, for the purpose of establishing some causal explanation as to the nature of local politics.

Current studies on Philippine politics such as the PCIJ’s recently published *The Rulemakers* provides explanation of the factors that contribute to the dominance of political families, or what Coronel (2004) referred to as the “7Ms of dynasty building”, which also identified machine or patronage as one factor. Despite the excellent discussion on the roles of patronage machines and *leaders* in the perpetuation of political families in

power, this study fails to establish empirical evidence that links the extensive use of patronage to the emergence and expansion of political dynasties in local politics.

Moreover, there is also a dearth of empirical evidence as to how and to what extent other actors in the patronage game, more particularly *barangay* officials who often act as ward *lidors* or “middlemen” perceive the system of patronage which serve as an important ingredient that cements this highly asymmetrical dyadic ties, resulting to the perpetuation of political families in the local political scene. Thus, the present study endeavors to investigate how do these *lidors* perceive the benefits derived from such arrangement, i.e., ‘protection’ or ‘material welfare’ through ‘targeted’ local programs and projects, and to what extent these programs contribute to the electoral success of the candidate-patron. The study will also attempt to find out whether the perception of *barangay* leaders (*lidors*) towards political patronage bears significantly on their perception as regards the persistence of ‘dynastic’ politics using quantitative and qualitative approaches.

As can be inferred from the literature on contemporary local politics, the limited studies suffer from some empirical and methodological limitations. In fact, most of the studies on Philippine politics, e.g., McCoy’s *An Anarchy of Families*, IPD and PCIJs *Boss*, or Roces’ *Kinship Politics*, are basically case studies of political families or a biographical account of the political life of one of its most successful members who have become politically powerful to be able to perpetuate a dynastic pattern of succession in local politics or influenced political events in the national level. There is no question that these case studies are well-researched, in-depth and theoretically-informed analysis, however, as case studies they remain discrete and inconclusive in their observations for they may be true only to the cases being focused upon, and thus quite incapable of generalization or “law-like” explanations which may be used in explaining other political phenomena.

It has been noted that case studies are essential for description, and are therefore, fundamental to social science (King, et al.,1994). Yet, this is also one major infirmity of studies on local politics in the Philippines. Due to the Filipino scholars’ propensity to focus on a detailed account of politics as they observed it, they fell short of providing causal explanation with regard to the occurrence of certain political phenomena, or the relationship of the factors, which produced these events, i.e., the prevalence of political patronage and its relationship to the persistence of dynastic politics.

A brief but incisive review of Filipino political scientist Ruth Lusterio (1996) of the PCIJ and IPDs *Boss: Five Case Studies of Local Politics in the Philippines* is instructive. “The essays”, she notes of the edited collection, “simply provide a description of the present political climate in the five areas of study but failed to discuss the methodology used, nor criteria for selecting the key informants of the cases.” She went on to argue that, “this attempt to study local politics in the Philippines suggests that there is a need for further research in this area to endeavor the development of a methodology which could contribute to the evolution of an appropriate framework in studying Philippine politics.” Thus, the proposed study may be considered as one modest, if not novel, attempt to contribute to the expansion of knowledge and theorizing about local politics in the Philippines through a method of inquiry that will be able to generate quantitative data to ensure a degree of “representative-ness” and statistical reliability of its findings.

Using the survey method to gather the perceptions of local *leaders* and politicians in Iloilo, the study hopes to establish quantitative measures supplemented by qualitative analysis, an empirical basis that may be able to explain the causal relationship between the practice of patronage anchored on the dyadic ties of politician and voter, to the ‘institutionalization’ of dynastic politics in local governance.

By employing these quantitative techniques in the treatment of data, the study expects to improve on existing theoretical perspectives in the hope of enriching empirical research and analysis in an area of study, which is, arguably, seldom inquired upon by students of Philippine politics.

Though this review of literature is far from exhaustive, we can infer one important fact, as Newt Gingrich once quipped: “all politics is local”. Indeed, the best way to better examine the nature of Philippine politics is by looking at the “hurry and strife” of electoral politics at the provincial and municipal levels, where the action really takes place.

This study is thus, both a modest attempt to “add” some ideas to the existing literature on this interesting social phenomenon, and an affirmation of the significance of local political dynamics and policy-decisions to the character of national politics, in the light of the rapidly changing Philippine political landscape during the last two decades following the restoration of democratic politics.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted primarily to examine the dynamics of electoral politics and governance in Iloilo City by looking into ‘Ilonggo’ perceptions on the system of political patronage, the extent it is practiced by local politicians, and how these conditions influence their views toward dynastic politics in the local level.

The study aimed to establish whether there are significant relationships between respondents’ socio-economic and political characteristics vis-à-vis their perception towards political patronage, the extent of its practice and their perception on political dynasty in local politics. The study further examined whether the respondents’ perception towards political patronage and the extent it is practiced by local politicians has a significant bearing on their perception on political dynasty. The study hypothesized that respondents’ positive perception on political patronage and the extent it is practiced by local politicians engenders a positive perception towards ‘dynastic’ politics.

Research Design

This study is a descriptive-relational research, which utilized both the quantitative and qualitative approaches as primary tools of investigation. In order to accomplish the

objectives of this study, a survey was conducted utilizing a structured questionnaire or interview schedule to gather the necessary information on the perceptions of barangay officials -punong barangays and barangay kagawads - representative of the sample barangays on the targeted districts in the city of Iloilo.

In-depth interviews of key informants, the Punong Barangays, were also conducted to supplement and corroborate the data obtained from the survey. All information gathered through the survey and in-depth key informant interviews constituted the primary data of the study.

The research study also utilized secondary data such as development plans, budgetary allocations, and policy speeches of leading local politicians. All these information were subjected to content analysis to further supplement and corroborate the findings of the survey and in-depth interview of key informants. The information obtained from content- analysis of secondary data was integrated with the responses culled both from the survey and in-depth key informant interviews.

Study Area, Respondents and Sampling Procedures

The study area covered the six districts of Iloilo City, namely: Arevalo, City Proper, Jaro, Lapaz, Mandurriao, and Molo. The target respondents of this study were the punong barangays and councilors (kagawads), representative of the 180 barangays, which composed the six (6) districts of the city. These barangay officials have been chosen for reasons that they are the front-liners in the delivery of basic public services as well as ward and precinct *liders* of leading politicians, both during the local and national election campaigns, and other election-related programs and activities.

To identify the respondents, the study utilized the cluster method using a simple random sampling technique. To determine the desired sample size, the formula by Fisher et al. (1991) was used.

Using the cluster method, three districts were chosen by simple random (from the list of districts) as clusters to represent the six (6) political subdivisions of Iloilo City. From these representative districts (e.g. City Proper, Lapaz and Jaro), the desired number of barangays was chosen by systematic sampling with a random start from the list of barangays in that district using a sampling interval.

After the sample barangays have been determined, their punong barangays(PB) automatically became the respondents of the study. While only half of the barangay kagawads (councilors) of these selected barangays were randomly picked as respondents using the list of all barangay kagawads (BK) from said barangays.

The table below shows the distribution of the total sample population:

| District | Barangays | No. of Punong Barangays | No. of Barangay Kagawads | Sample Size |
|----------|-----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
|----------|-----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|

| | | | | |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------|
| City Proper | 45 | 45 | 315 | 100 (22PB + 78 BK) |
| Jaro | 42 | 42 | 294 | 95 (21PB + 74 BK) |
| Lapaz | 37 | 37 | 259 | 80 (19 PB + 61 BK) |
| Total | 124 | 124 | 868 | 275 – target Respondents |

The key informants for the in-depth interviews were the 70 Punong Barangays of the selected barangays in the three target districts of Iloilo City.

Data Collection

The survey design was used in this study. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the researcher utilized an interview schedule supplemented by an in-depth interview guide to generate data on perceptions on political patronage and political dynasty.

After the target respondents have been identified and informed through a formal communication, the researcher and his trained assistants administered the survey questionnaires. This was done through the assistance of the selected *punong barangays* in Iloilo City after the exact number of respondents has been ascertained. The researcher via a letter of introduction also made a courtesy call with the Office of the City Mayor, and the president of the League of Barangays, for proper coordination with the local officials of the target areas.

To administer the survey, the researchers either visited the respondents in the homes or gathered them in the barangay multi-purpose hall at a designated time. In-depth interview with key informants were also conducted by the researcher and his assistants through personal visits in the respondents' house or office whichever was feasible and convenient to both.

The secondary data were obtained from records of the local government units, and from the Department of Budget Management for the pork barrel allocations of Representatives. Prior to the administration of the survey questionnaires, a pre-testing was conducted among barangay officials of a selected barangay in a town in southern Iloilo and in Jaro, Iloilo City. Pertinent revisions were made based on the results of the pre-test prior to the finalized instrument.

Data Processing and Analysis

The data generated from the survey were computer processed and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS+PC) version 10.0 for Windows. Simple descriptive analysis of data using the percentage distributions and measures of central tendency was used to analyze survey responses.

Chi-Square and Cramer's V were used as primary statistical tools to determine whether significant relationships exist between the respondents' perceptions toward political patronage, its extent, and their socio-economic and political characteristics particularly HH size, income, and level of education.

The same statistical techniques tools were also utilized to analyze whether significant relationships exist between the respondents' socio-economic and political characteristics particularly HH size, income, and level of education, and their perceptions on political dynasty or dynastic politics. The study employed Gamma as a statistical technique to test whether the respondents' perceptions toward political patronage is associated with the extent of political patronage.

Gamma was also utilized to determine whether there exists a significant relationship between the respondents' perception on political patronage and their perception on political dynasty. Finally, Gamma was also used to analyze whether the extent of political patronage has a direct bearing on the respondents' perception towards political dynasty in Iloilo politics.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This section discusses the results or findings of the study using tabular presentations of the data. It is divided into five parts. The first part highlights the significant data about the respondents' socio-economic, demographic and political profile. It also includes data with respect to their involvement in civic and political organizations, their length of service as political wards and the number of relatives the respondents have in public office, including positions they occupy. The second part discusses the respondents' perception towards political patronage, followed by the study's discussion on the extent of political patronage. The section concludes with a discussion of the barangay officials' perception on political dynasty in local politics.

Survey Respondents' Political Profile

The respondents in this study are the barangay officials of the selected districts in Iloilo City. As shown by the data in Table 1, one out of four (25.6 %) of the total 273 barangay officials surveyed, were *Punong Barangays* while the rest of the respondents (74.4 %) were *Barangay Kagawads*. About two-thirds (66.9%) of the barangay kagawads worked on full-time basis, while more than half (62.8%) of the barangay captains chose to render full-time service to their constituents. In terms of number of years in office, punong barangays, with an average of about 12 years in office, have been holding elective positions longer than the barangay kagawads whose mean number of years in office is eight years. Four out of ten (41.0%) respondents are from the district of Lapaz, while about 3 out of 10 (35.2%) are from Jaro district and the remaining 23.8 percent are from the City Proper.

Table 1. Distribution of Respondents According to their Political Characteristics (n= 273)

| Characteristics | f | % |
|--|-----|------|
| <i>Position</i> | | |
| Punong Barangays | 70 | 25.6 |
| Brgy. Kagawads | 203 | 74.4 |
| <i>Working as Full-Time Officials</i> | | |
| Punong Barangays | 44 | 62.8 |
| Brgy. Kagawads | 136 | 66.9 |
| <i>Mean No. of Years in Political Office</i> | | |
| Punong Barangays | 12 | |
| Barangay Kagawads | 8 | |
| <i>District of Origin</i> | | |
| Jaro District | 96 | 35.2 |
| Lapaz | 112 | 41.0 |
| Iloilo City | 65 | 23.8 |

Demographic Characteristics

The data in Table 2 below, which describes the demographic characteristics of the barangay officials show that in terms of age distribution, about less than half (48.0 %) of the respondents are over 55 years of age while more than a quarter (28.9 %) of them are above 45 but below 54 years of age. The remaining 16.5 percent fall within the 35- 44 years age bracket, while 4.4 and 2.2 percent of them fall between the 25-34 and 15-24 years age distribution, respectively. The mean age of 54 years, show that most of the barangay officials in the City of Iloilo are above middle aged. This means that most of them entered public life when they were in their mid-forties.

Six out of ten (61.5%) of the barangay officials are males compared to the four others (38.5%) who are females. This shows that city residents favor male candidates for barangay positions over women. Majority of them (79.5%) are married.

In terms of household membership, the respondents' household is composed of an average of six members, which indicates a medium-size family. The distribution of household membership also shows that 45.1 percent of the respondents belong to households with 5 to 7 members. About a third (33.7 %) of them have households composed of 2 to 4 members while only 17.9 percent have household membership over 8 family members.

Table 2. Distribution of Respondents According to their Demographic Characteristics (n= 273)

| Characteristics | f | % |
|-----------------|---|---|
|-----------------|---|---|

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------|
| Age | | |
| 55 and above | 131 | 48.0 |
| 45 -54 | 79 | 28.9 |
| 35- 44 | 45 | 16.5 |
| 25- 34 | 12 | 4.4 |
| 15- 24 | 6 | 2.2 |
| Mean Age | 54 | |
| Sex | | |
| Male | 168 | 61.5 |
| Female | 105 | 38.5 |
| Civil Status | | |
| Single | 31 | 11.4 |
| Married | 217 | 79.5 |
| Separated | 5 | 1.8 |
| Widowed | 20 | 7.3 |
| Household Size | | |
| 8 and above | 49 | 17.9 |
| 5- 7 | 123 | 45.1 |
| 2- 4 | 92 | 33.7 |
| Mean Household size | 6 | |

Socio-Economic Characteristics

The data on Table 3 below reveal that the barangay officials in Iloilo City are well-educated. More than a third (36.3%) of them hold a college degree; another third (31.5%) were able to avail a college education without earning a degree. One out of 4 (27.5%) have reached high school level schooling compared to an insignificant 4.8 percent who acquired elementary level training. The relatively high degree of formal education of barangay officials in Iloilo City can be attributed to the presence of many universities and colleges in the city, and the priority that urban Filipino families gave for siblings to acquire college education.

In terms of occupation, and when taken as a whole group, almost half (49.8%) of the respondents are working as full-time *barangay kagawads* while 16.1 percent are full-time *punong barangays*. Only about 1 in 5 (19.8%) is engaged in business or sales aside from being a barangay official with an insignificant number (1.8%) practicing their profession, i.e., engineer or teacher. It is quite interesting to note that after retirement, there are those who remained willing to render service to their corresponding barangays (4.0%) as shown by the presence of a number of pensioners.

It is, however, quite surprising to note as further shown in Table 3 that despite their college education, a little less than half (45.8%) of the barangay officials have incomes between Php 3,000- 6,000 a month, and 18.3 percent of them earning below Php 3,000 per month. The combined income of a third (35.9%) of the respondents shows that only 1 in 5 (22.7%) has a monthly income of above Php 9,000 per month. The data indicates that with the mean monthly income of Php 7, 231, most of the respondents still live below the poverty level. This can be partly explained by the fact that the bulk of the respondents' source of income, aside from engaging in small scale business, i.e., sari-sari

store, buy and sell (fish, fruits and vegetables), ‘e-load’, etc., really comes from their meager honorarium as barangay officials.

Table 3. Distribution of Respondents According to their Socio-Economic Characteristics (n= 273)

| Characteristics | f | % |
|--------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Educational Attainment | | |
| College graduate | 99 | 36.1 |
| College level | 86 | 31.5 |
| High school level | 75 | 27.5 |
| Elementary level | 13 | 4.8 |
| Occupation | | |
| Barangay Kagawad | 136 | 49.8 |
| Barangay Captain | 44 | 16.1 |
| Government Employee | 2 | 0.7 |
| Business/Sales | 54 | 19.8 |
| Practice of Profession | 5 | 1.8 |
| Farmer | 4 | 1.4 |
| Others | 14 | 5.1 |
| Retired(Pensioner) | 11 | 4.0 |
| Monthly Income | | |
| Php 15,001 and above | 21 | 7.7 |
| 12,001 – 15,000 | 17 | 6.2 |
| 9,001 – 12,000 | 24 | 8.8 |
| 6,001 – 9,000 | 36 | 13.2 |
| 3,001 – 6,000 | 125 | 45.8 |
| 3,000- and below | 50 | 18.3 |
| Mean Monthly Income Php 7,231 | | |

Respondents' Involvement in Civic and Political Organizations

Table 4 below describes the involvement of barangay officials in Iloilo City in civic and political organizations. As shown by the data, a significant majority (94.34 %) of the respondents belong to one (1) organization compared to 5.67 percent who are involved in two (2) or more organizations operating in the city. The data also shows that majority (51.6%) of the respondents are members of various civic and political organizations which operate in the city. All of the 70 (49.6%) punong barangays interviewed are members of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) in their respective districts. This is because membership in this political organization is automatically acquired by a punong barangay upon assumption of office.

The remaining barangay officials are active in civic and non-governmental organizations. Almost a third (29.0%) of other barangay officials are active in religious organizations, i.e., Couples for Christ, Knights of Columbus, etc., while less than a quarter (24.1%) are involved in socio-civic organizations i.e., Lions Club, Rotary, Senior Citizens, PTA, etc. It is quite sad to note that only a handful of the respondents (8.5%) take part in the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Table 4. Distribution of Respondents According to their Involvement in Civic and Political Organizations (n= 273)

| Indicators | f | % |
|---|-----|-------|
| No. of Organizations Involved In: | | |
| 1 | 133 | 94.32 |
| 2 or more | 8 | 5.67 |
| Type of organization (<i>Multiple Response</i>) (n=141) | | |
| ABC (Association of Brgy. Captains) | 70 | 49.6 |
| Religious Organizations (Couples for Christ, Women's Brigade, Knights of Columbus, etc.) | 41 | 29.0 |
| Civic Organizations (Fraternities, Lions, Rotary, Senior Citizens, YMCA, Erpats Org., Homeowners Organizations, Drivers Association, PTA, etc.) | 34 | 24.1 |
| NGO (e.g., TSKI, Haligi Foundation, AKBAYAN, etc.) | 12 | 8.5 |

Number of Relatives Holding Political Positions and the Nature of these Positions

The data in Table 5 below reveal that roughly one out of four (23.8%) of the barangay officials in Iloilo City have relatives holding public office in the local government both in the city and province with an average of at least two relatives in incumbent elective positions. It is worthy to note that, a considerable percentage of the barangay officials interviewed, are relatives either through blood or marriage of barangay officials in other barangays in the city, i.e., punong barangays (24.6%); barangay kagawad (46.15%), and SK Chairpersons (15.38%).

One in ten respondents intimated that they are related to the City Mayor (12.3%) and the City Councilor (12.3%). Only 6.15 percent disclosed that the Vice Mayor is their relative compared the 4.6 percent who revealed that they are relatives of the Congressman for the lone district of Iloilo City.

Table 5. Distribution of Respondents According to the No. of Relatives Holding Political Position and the Nature of these Positions (n= 273)

| Indicators | f | % |
|--|-----|-------|
| No. of Relatives Holding Political Position | | |
| None | 208 | 76.19 |
| 1-2 | 48 | 17.5 |

| | | |
|--|----------|-------|
| 3-4 | 12 | 4.39 |
| 5 and above | 5 | 1.83 |
| <i>Mean Number of Relative Holding Positions</i> | 2 | |
| Position of Relatives (MR) (n=65) | | |
| Congressman | 3 | 4.6 |
| Mayor | 8 | 12.3 |
| Vice Mayor | 4 | 6.15 |
| City Councilor | 8 | 12.3 |
| Provincial Board Member | 3 | 4.6 |
| Barangay Captain | 16 | 24.6 |
| Barangay Kagawad | 30 | 46.15 |
| SK Chairman | 10 | 15.38 |

Respondents who are Ward Leaders and Number of Years as Ward Leaders

As shown by the data in Table 6 below, a little less than half (45.1%) of the respondents had been ward leaders in their respective barangays serving at an average of 10 years since democratic politics was restored in 1986.

More than a third (34.9%) served as ward leaders for politicians between 1 to 5 years, less than a quarter (20.3%) for 6 to 10 years, a quarter (25.2%) for 11 to 15 years, and only one in 10 (14.6%) for 16 to 30 years. The data indicated that about 4 in every 10 barangay officials have been ward leaders from the time they began their terms of office as elected officials. And considering that the conduct of barangay elections have been postponed several times, the respondents were among the elected officials whose terms of office have been extended. This has been confirmed by the almost equal mean number of years they served as barangay officials and ward leaders for city politicians.

Table 6. Distribution of Respondents According To Whether They Had Been Ward Leaders and Number of Years Being Ward Leaders (n= 273)

| Indicators | f | % |
|---|-----------|------|
| Had been a ward leader | | |
| Yes | 123 | 45.1 |
| No | 150 | 54.9 |
| <i>Mean No. of years as ward leader</i> | 10 | |
| Number of Years as Ward leader | | |
| 1 to 5 years | 43 | 34.9 |
| 6 to 10 years | 25 | 20.3 |
| 11 to 15 years | 36 | 29.3 |
| 16 to 30 years | 18 | 14.6 |
| 46 years | 1 | 0.8 |

Public Officials the Respondents Will Most Likely To Approach for Their Problems

The data shown in Table 7 below reveal that the Punong Barangay remains to be the *most likely to approach* local government official by the respondents when they encounter problems related to their respective constituency. This is indicative of the more than half (54.9%) of the respondents identifying the barangay captain as the first person to approach whenever they have problems.

When the respondent barangay officials were categorized based on their positions, only a few (11.42%) of the punong barangays will approach their ABC district head (also a barangay captain) while almost 7 in 10 (69.95%) of the kagawads will consult their respective barangay captains. This corroborates the data that, indeed, the barangay captain remains as the person most likely to be approached by the respondents.

The City Mayor comes in second most likely to be approached local leader. The data indicate that more than a third (35.5%) of the barangay officials sought the assistance of the Mayor whenever they have governance concerns or for anything that affects their constituents.

Compared to other local officials in the City, the Congressman as the city's lone representative to Congress is the third most likely to be approached by barangay officials. As shown by the table below, 1 in 5 (22.3%) of the respondents will likely seek his help compared to the 13.2 percent who will see the City Councilor(s) or the Barangay Kagawad (12.1%) and the City Vice Mayor (5.9%) whenever they have problems related to the affairs of their respective barangays.

Table 7. Distribution of Respondents According to the Public Officials They Will Most Likely Approach for their Problems (n= 273)

| Public Officials Most Likely To be Approached | f | % |
|---|-----|------|
| Punong Barangay/Barangay Captain | 150 | 54.9 |
| Mayor | 97 | 35.5 |
| Congressman | 61 | 22.3 |
| SP Member or City Councilor | 36 | 13.2 |
| Barangay Kagawad | 33 | 12.1 |
| Vice Mayor | 16 | 5.9 |

Respondents Perception towards Political Patronage

This discussion provides an overview of the perceptions of barangay officials in Iloilo City toward political patronage in local politics. An 8-item questionnaire provided the indicator by which the respondents' perceptions were measured. The study utilized a five-point scale to measure the extent of these perceptions, to wit: SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; U = Uncertain; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. Overall, the study revealed that a high percentage of the respondents surveyed have a positive perception towards political patronage. As shown by their categorized responses in Table 8 below, 6 out of 10 (64.1%) respondents hold a positive view towards political patronage.

Table 8. Summary Table on the Distribution of Respondents According to Perception on Political Patronage (n=273)

| Perception on Political Patronage | f | % |
|-----------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Negative (8-18) | 2 | 7.0 |
| Neutral/Undecided (19-29) | 96 | 35.2 |
| Positive (30-40) | 175 | 64.1 |
| TOTAL | 273 | 100.0 |

Item Analysis of Respondents' Perception on Political Patronage

An item analysis of each of the specific indicators in this section is illustrative of the perception of the respondents towards political patronage.

When the respondents were asked how they perceive the role played by their political leaders, 43.6 percent *strongly agreed* with 42.1 percent *agreeing* that *other than representation, political leaders are expected to meet the needs and respond to the problems of their constituents as much as possible*. If we lumped these percentage points, the data show that 8 out of 10 (85.7%) of the respondents concede that the role of political leaders goes beyond mere representation.

On the issue whether the *national government should continue to allocate pork barrel funds to address the development needs of their localities and constituents so as to win their support*, the respondents also exhibited a relatively high degree of agreement. Less than half (42.5%) *agreed*, plus 1 in 4 (27.8%) *strongly agreeing* on the importance of continuing the allocation of pork barrel funds to win political support. A considerable percentage (15.8%) of the respondents remains undecided, while 1 in 10 (11.0%) disagrees.

There is also consensus among respondents as regards the issue whether *asking a public official for help in getting a job for one's self or for someone else – a relative or friend is perfectly all right*. Seven out of ten (69.2%), combining the percentage points of

those who strongly agree (21.6%) and those who agree (47.6%), of the respondents believe that there is nothing wrong with the Filipino practice of seeking a politician's help in getting a job for one's self or even in behalf of a relative or friend. However, the remaining 17.6 percent (13.2% *disagree*, 4.4% *strongly disagree*) of the respondents do not support this view. Others are still undecided (13.2%).

Majority (24.2% strongly agree, 39.6% agree) of the respondents, however, support the view that *a voter always thinks or feels obliged that he/she ought to vote for a public official who helped him/her get a job*. Collating these percentage points indicates that 6 out of 10 (63.8%) respondents concede that most voters who got their job because of the politician's help feel obligated to reciprocate by voting for this political patron. A considerable percentage (19.4% *disagree* plus 2.2% *strongly disagree*) of the respondents, do not support this view while 14.7 percent remains undecided.

In a similar vein, majority (65.9%) combining 21.6% *strongly agree* and 44.3% *agree*) of the respondents manifested that *soliciting the help of any local official (congressman, city mayor, vice- mayor, and local councilor) will likely expedite your business transaction with the bureaucracy*. One in five (20.2%) of the respondents, however, did not agree with the majority's view. The remaining 13.9 percent is undecided.

When they were asked whether *politicians must give due consideration to the voters or group of voters' political affiliation and loyalty when extending personal help or assistance*, almost two-thirds (64.1%), with 46.9% of the respondents who *agree*, together with the 17.2% who *strongly agree*) of the respondents intimated that it is important. This is in contrast to almost a quarter (24.1%), combining 17.9% who *disagree* and 6.2% who *strongly disagree*) of the respondents who think that political affiliation and loyalty should not be a determining factor for politicians in extending personal help or assistance to the voter.

There is also a high degree of consensus among the respondents on the issue that *political leaders should never turn down constituents and supporters who come to them for help*. This is supported by the data in Table 9 below which show that more than a third (37.4%) of respondents *strongly agree* and less than half (43.2%) *agree*, with this statement. Only an insignificant percentage (8.9%) does not support this view while 10.9 percent remains undecided.

On the issue whether *development projects such as infrastructure, livelihood, and income generating activities are among the most effective ways for political leaders to reward constituents for their electoral support*, a greater majority (84.6%), 42.1% *strongly agree* and 42.5% *agree* combined) of the respondents fully agrees with this statement. In contrast, only 10.2 percent of the respondents does not agree with the majority's view.

Table 9. Distribution of Respondents According to Perception towards Political Patronage (n=273)

| Items | SA | | A | | U | | D | | SD | |
|--|-----|-------------|-----|-------------|----|------|----|------|----|-----|
| | 5 | | 4 | | 3 | | 2 | | 1 | |
| | | % | | % | | % | | % | | % |
| 1. Other than representation, political leaders are expected to meet the needs and respond to the problems of their constituents as much as possible. | 119 | 43.6 | 115 | 42.1 | 29 | 10.6 | 7 | 2.6 | 3 | 1.1 |
| 2. The national government should continue to allocate pork barrel funds to address the development needs of their localities and constituents so as to win their support. | 76 | 27.8 | 116 | 42.5 | 43 | 15.8 | 30 | 11.0 | 8 | 2.9 |
| 3. Asking a public official for help in getting a job for you or for someone else –a relative or friend is perfectly alright. | 59 | 21.6 | 130 | 47.6 | 36 | 13.2 | 36 | 13.2 | 12 | 4.4 |
| 4. A voter always thinks or feels obliged that he/she ought to vote for a public official who helped him/her get a job. | 66 | 24.2 | 108 | 39.6 | 40 | 14.7 | 53 | 19.4 | 6 | 2.2 |
| 5. Soliciting the help of any local official (congressman, city mayor, vice-mayor, and local councilor) will likely expedite your business transaction with the bureaucracy. | 59 | 21.6 | 121 | 44.3 | 38 | 13.9 | 45 | 16.5 | 10 | 3.7 |
| 6. Politicians must give due consideration to the voters or group of voters political affiliation and loyalty when extending personal help or assistance. | 47 | 17.2 | 128 | 46.9 | 32 | 11.7 | 49 | 17.9 | 17 | 6.2 |
| 7. Political leaders should never turn down constituents and supporters who come to them for help. | 102 | 37.4 | 118 | 43.2 | 29 | 10.6 | 21 | 7.7 | 3 | 1.1 |
| 8. Development projects such as infrastructure, livelihood, and income generating activities are among the most effective ways for political leaders to reward constituents for their electoral support. | 115 | 42.1 | 116 | 42.5 | 14 | 5.1 | 17 | 6.2 | 11 | 4.0 |

SA = Strongly Agree

A= Agree

U = Uncertain

D= Disagree

SD=Strongly Disagree

Extent of Political Patronage

This section provides a detailed discussion of the extent of political patronage in local politics as it is perceived by the respondent barangay officials in Iloilo City. The study assumes that political patronage practices permeates in almost all areas of local governance. Thus, it can be measured using certain indicators, i.e., the extent to which local projects and programs (e.g., infrastructure projects, livelihood and income-generating projects, social welfare services, and personal assistance) have contributed to the election success of the politician who initiated, funded (or facilitated the acquisition of funds) or implemented the program/project, and whether these programs/projects are responsive to the needs of constituents or supporters.

The extent of political patronage, that is, whether it has indeed contributed to the election or reelection success of the local official (e.g., Representative, Mayor, Vice Mayor, SP Member, etc.) is measured using a five-point scale, to wit: 5 = To a Great Extent (GS); 4 = To Some Extent (SE); 3 = Uncertain/Not Sure (U/NS); 2 = To a Lesser Extent (LE); 1 = Negligible (N).

As shown by the data in Table 10 below, about a third (30.0 %) of the respondents said that the practice of political patronage has to *some extent* contributed to the election success of the local politicians in the City while 16.8 percent disclosed that it contributed to a *great extent* to the electoral success of these politicians. Less than half (44.4 %) said they were uncertain of the contribution of patronage to the election success of city politicians.

Table 10. Summary Table on the Distribution of Respondents According to their Perception on the Extent of Political Patronage (n=273)

| Extent of Political Patronage | f | % |
|-------------------------------|-----|------|
| Negligible (1-8) | 20 | 7.3 |
| Lesser Extent (9-16) | 40 | 14.7 |
| Uncertain (17-24) | 81 | 29.7 |
| Some Extent (25-32) | 82 | 30.0 |
| Great Extent (33-40) | 46 | 16.8 |
| TOTAL | 269 | 98.5 |
| Missing System | 4 | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Infrastructure Projects, e.g., Artesian wells, water hand pumps or 'jetmatics'

The data on Table 11 on *infrastructure projects* (e.g. artesian well or hand pumps or 'jet-matics') show that most of these projects have been either initiated by the City

Mayor (35.9 %), the Congressman (35.5 %), and by the Barangay Officials themselves (33.5 %). Still, the bigger bulk of the funding for these projects, according to the respondents, come from the Mayor's Office (43.8 %) and that of the Congressman's (40.1 %). Only a quarter (25.6 %) of the respondents said that these projects' fund came from barangay appropriations.

The respondents further disclosed that these projects were voluntarily given to them (48.0 %) while about less than half (41.0 %) says that they specifically requested for these infrastructure projects. Most of the respondents (93.8 %) perceive that infrastructure projects such as these, indeed, answer or respond to the needs of constituents or supporters.

When asked whether infrastructure projects contributed to the election/re-election success of the local official who initiated, funded and implemented it, majority of the respondents disclosed that it has contributed to a *great extent* to the election/reelection of the *Congressman* (56.8 %), and of the *City Mayor* (51.9 %). Less than half (42.4 %) of the respondents intimated that it has also contributed to a *great extent* to the election/reelection success of the *SP Member or City Councilor*, and about a third (33.9%) to the election/reelection of the *Barangay officials*.

Table 11. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Infrastructure Projects, e.g., Artesian Wells, hand-pumps or ‘jetmatics’
(n=273)

| | <i>Congressman</i> | | <i>City Mayor</i> | | <i>City Vice Mayor</i> | | <i>SP Member-City Councilor</i> | | <i>Barangay Officials</i> | | |
|--|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|---------------------------|------|---------------------------------|------|---------------------------|------|--|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | |
| Who Initiated <i>n=242 (multiple response)</i> | 86 | 35.5 | 87 | 35.9 | 7 | 2.3 | 60 | 24.8 | 81 | 33.5 | |
| Funded by <i>n= 242 (multiple response)</i> | 97 | 40.1 | 106 | 43.8 | 8 | 3.3 | 66 | 27.3 | 62 | 25.6 | |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 55 | 56.8 | 55 | 51.9 | 5 | 62.5 | 28 | 42.4 | 21 | 33.9 | |
| Some Extent | 27 | 27.8 | 37 | 34.9 | 1 | 12.5 | 25 | 37.9 | 23 | 37.1 | |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | 6 | 6.2 | 5 | 4.7 | 0 | | 5 | 7.6 | 6 | 9.7 | |
| Lesser Extent | 3 | 3.1 | 2 | 1.9 | 0 | | 1 | 1.5 | 1 | 1.6 | |
| Negligible | 6 | 6.2 | 7 | 6.6 | 2 | 25.0 | 7 | 10.6 | 11 | 17.7 | |
| Was the project specifically requested or given? (n=242) | | | | | | | f | % | | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 100 | 41.3 | | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 116 | 48.0 | | | |
| Both | | | | | | | 25 | 10.3 | | | |
| When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials’ constituents or supporters? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artesian Wells, hand-pumps or ‘jetmatics’ | Yes | | | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | | | No | | |
| | f | | % | | f | | % | | f | % | |
| | 256 | | 93.9 | | 8 | | 2.9 | | 8 | 2.9 | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Infrastructure Projects, e.g.,

Construction of roads, foot-bridges, street lights, drainage systems, foot-walks, waiting sheds, basketball courts, etc.

Data on Table 12 below show that more than two-thirds (67.4 %) of the infrastructure projects which have been identified by the respondents were initiated by the City Mayor's office. The greater bulk of the funding (72.7 %) also originated from the same office. More than a third of these projects were initiated (43.8 %) and funded (41.7 %) by the Congressman. Almost the same percentage of these projects was also initiated (47.8 percent) and funded (42.7 %) by the barangay officials.

Majority of the respondents (51.7 %) revealed that they specifically requested these infrastructure projects. A third (36.8 %) of respondents said that the local officials voluntarily gave these projects to them. A significant majority (96.7 %) of the respondents further disclosed that their constituents in the barangays need these infrastructure projects.

More than half (56.2 %) of the 194 respondents who disclosed that the City Mayor initiated and funded most of the infrastructure projects said that these projects contributed to a *great extent* to the election or reelection success of the city's chief executive. In a similar vein, of the 126 respondents who identified the Congressman as the one who initiated and funded these projects, more than half (59.5 %) of them said that these infrastructure projects also contributed to a *great extent* to the City Representative's electoral success. Table 12 also shows that a little less than half (46.5%) of the 114 respondents who identified the barangay officials as responsible for initiating and funding the projects disclosed that these infrastructure projects contributed to a *great extent* to the election success of these officials.

Table 12. Extent of Political Patronage As it Applies to Infrastructure *e.g., Construction Roads, footbridges, street lights, drainage systems, etc. (n=273)*

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | | |
|---|-------------|------|------------|------|---------------------------|-------|--------------------------|------|--------------------|------|-----|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | |
| Who Initiated <i>n=267</i> (multiple response) | 117 | 43.8 | 180 | 67.4 | 1 | 0.4 | 7 | 2.6 | 128 | 47.9 | |
| Funded by <i>n=267</i> (multiple response) | 126 | 47.1 | 194 | 72.7 | 2 | 0.7 | 8 | 3.0 | 114 | 42.7 | |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re- election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 75 | 59.5 | 109 | 56.2 | 2 | 100.0 | 2 | 25.0 | 53 | 46.5 | |
| Some Extent | 36 | 28.6 | 61 | 31.4 | | | 5 | 62.5 | 37 | 32.5 | |
| Uncertain/Not Sure | 9 | 7.1 | 11 | 5.7 | | | 1 | 12.5 | 9 | 7.9 | |
| Lesser Extent | - | - | - | - | | | | | 3 | 2.6 | |
| Negligible | 4 | 3.2 | 13 | 6.7 | | | | | 10 | 8.8 | |
| No answer | 2 | 1.6 | - | - | | | | | 2 | 1.8 | |
| <i>Was the project specifically requested or given? (n=267)</i> | | | | | | | f | % | | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 138 | 51.7 | | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 96 | 36.0 | | | |
| Both | | | | | | | 33 | 12.4 | | | |
| <i>When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters?</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Construction of Roads | Yes | | | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | | | No | | |
| | f | | % | | f | | % | | f | | % |
| | 264 | | 96.7 | | 5 | | 1.8 | | 3 | | 1.1 |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Livelihood and IGP, e.g., Provision of Stalls in Public Markets/Public Places

Data in Table 13 show that only 1 out of 5 (21.6 %) respondents identified livelihood and income generating projects particularly the provision of market stalls as among the important projects of the local officials in the City. Of the 59 who responded, a little less than half said that the barangay officials (49.2 %) and the City Mayor's office (47.4 %) initiated these projects. However, more than half (52.5 %) of them disclosed that most of the funds came from the Mayor's office while 42.4 percent identified the barangay as the source of funds.

Majority (55.9 %) of the respondents revealed that they specifically requested for the implementation of the said projects in their locality while 43.2 percent said that these projects were voluntary given to them. More than half (75.2 %) of the respondents also intimated that these kinds of projects are really needed in their barangays. Though only 21.6 percent of the respondents identified these implemented projects in their localities, a significant percentage said that these projects contributed to a *great extent* to the election of the barangay officials (64.0 %) and the City Mayor (48.4 %).

Table 13. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Livelihood and IGP, *e.g.*, *Provision of Stalls in Public Markets/Public Places* (*n*=273)

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | |
|--|-------------|------|---------------------------|------|-----------------|-------|--------------------------|-------|--------------------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n</i> =59 (multiple response) | 6 | 10.2 | 28 | 47.4 | | | 2 | 3.4 | 29 | 49.2 |
| Funded by <i>n</i> =59 (multiple response) | 5 | 8.5 | 31 | 52.5 | 1 | 1.7 | 2 | 3.4 | 25 | 42.4 |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re-election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 4 | 80.0 | 15 | 48.4 | 1 | 100.0 | 2 | 100.0 | 16 | 64.0 |
| Some Extent | 1 | 20.0 | 14 | 45.2 | | | | | 6 | 24.0 |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | | | 1 | 3.2 | | | | | 2 | 8.0 |
| Lesser Extent | | | | | | | | | 3 | 12.0 |
| Negligible | | | 1 | 3.2 | | | | | 3 | 12.0 |
| Was the project specifically requested or given? (<i>n</i> =59) | | | | | | | f | % | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 33 | | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 25 | 55.9 | | |
| Both | | | | | | | 1 | 43.2 | | |
| | | | | | | | | 1.7 | | |
| When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stalls in Public Markets/Public Places | Yes | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | No | | | | | |
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | | | | |
| | 205 | 75.1 | 21 | 7.7 | 34 | 12.5 | | | | |

*Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Skills Trainings, Seminars, i.e.,
Exposure and Field Trips, e.g., Lakbay Aral for Brgy. Officials*

As shown by the data on Table 14, half (50.5 %) of the respondents identified the “Lakbay-Aral” project, a form of exposure trip for barangay officials as part of the trainings and seminars they attended. A little less than half (46.4 %) said that the Congressman initiated this project. Almost the same percentage (44.2 %) revealed that most of the funds also came from the Representative’s office. A third (33.3 %) of them disclosed that City Mayor also initiated and funded (34.8 %) a similar project. About another third (31.2 %) said some funds came from the barangay.

When the respondents were asked how they were able to avail of this project, more than two thirds (68.9 %) of them disclosed that it was voluntarily given. Less than a quarter (24.6 %) said that they specifically requested the project. A significant majority (78.4 %) disclosed that the skills trainings and seminars such as the “Lakbay-Aral” project are indeed responsive to the needs of local constituents, in this case, the barangay officials themselves.

As to what extent did this contribute to the election/reelection success of the officials who implemented these types of projects, a little less than half (47.5 %) of the respondents said this contributed to a *great extent* to the electoral success of the Congressman. Four in every ten (41.7 %) respondents said this also contributed to a *great extent* to the City Mayor’s electoral success.

Table 14. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Skills Trainings, Seminars, i.e., *Exposure and Field Trips, e.g., Lakbay Aral for Brgy. Officials (n=273)*

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | |
|---|-------------|------|---------------------------|------|-----------------|-------|--------------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f. | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n=138 (multiple response)</i> | 64 | 46.4 | 46 | 33.3 | 1 | 0.7 | 5 | 3.6 | 38 | 27.5 |
| Funded by <i>n=138 (multiple response)</i> | 61 | 44.2 | 48 | 34.8 | 1 | 0.7 | 3 | 2.2 | 43 | 31.2 |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re-election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 29 | 47.5 | 20 | 41.7 | - | | 1 | 33.3 | 11 | 25.6 |
| Some Extent | 21 | 34.4 | 18 | 37.5 | - | | 2 | 66.7 | 13 | 30.2 |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | 4 | 6.6 | 3 | 6.2 | 1 | 100.0 | | | 2 | 4.6 |
| Lesser Extent | 4 | 6.6 | 1 | 2.1 | - | | | | 3 | 6.9 |
| Negligible | 2 | 3.3 | 7 | 14.6 | - | | | | 5 | 11.6 |
| No answer | 1 | 1.6 | - | - | - | | | | - | - |
| <i>Was the project specifically requested or given? (n=138)</i> | | | | | | | f | | % | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 34 | | 24.6 | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 95 | | 68.9 | |
| Both | | | | | | | 9 | | 6.5 | |
| <i>When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters?</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lakbay Aral for Brgy. Officials | Yes | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | | | No | | | |
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| | 214 | 78.4 | 22 | 8.1 | 30 | 11.0 | | | | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Social Welfare Service, e.g., Medical Assistance

Data in Table 15 reveals that a significant majority (93.0 %) of the respondents identified medical assistance as an important form of social welfare project implemented in their barangays. A significant percentage of the respondents disclosed that these projects were initiated (50.0 %) and funded (48.8 %) by the Mayor's Office. According to the respondents, less than half were initiated (44.4 %) and funded (41.7 %) by barangay officials. Only about a third was initiated (33.1 %) and funded (34.3 %) by the Congressman's Office.

More than two thirds (67.7 %) of the respondents said these projects were voluntarily given to them compared to a little more than a quarter (27.5 %) who intimated that they or their constituents specifically requested medical or educational assistance. A very high percentage (98.5 %) of the respondents said that social welfare projects such as medical assistance indeed answer the needs of their constituents.

More than half (56.5 %) revealed that the implementation of these projects contributed to a *great extent* to the election success of the City Mayor. Almost two-thirds (64.4 %) of the 87 respondents, as shown in Table 15, said that it also contributed to a *great extent* to the election/reelection of the Congressman. Two out five (46.2 %) of the respondents also revealed that these projects have contributed largely (great extent) to the electoral success of the barangay officials responsible for their implementation.

Table 15. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Social Welfare Service, e.g., Medical Assistance (n=273)

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | |
|--|-------------|------|------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------|--------------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n=254 (multiple response)</i> | 84 | 33.1 | 127 | 50.0 | 1 | 0.4 | 11 | 4.3 | 113 | 44.4 |
| Funded by <i>n=254 (multiple response)</i> | 87 | 34.3 | 124 | 48.8 | 1 | 0.4 | 11 | 4.3 | 106 | 41.7 |
| Whether Contributed to Election/Re election Success of Local Official?(multiple response) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 56 | 64.4 | 70 | 56.5 | 0 | | 5 | 45.5 | 49 | 46.2 |
| Some Extent | 23 | 26.4 | 41 | 33.1 | 0 | | 2 | 18.2 | 32 | 30.2 |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | 1 | 1.1 | 6 | 4.8 | 1 | 100.0 | 1 | 9.1 | 6 | 5.7 |
| Lesser Extent | 1 | 1.1 | 4 | 3.2 | 0 | | 1 | 9.1 | 6 | 5.7 |
| Negligible | 4 | 4.6 | 2 | 1.6 | 0 | | 2 | 18.2 | 13 | 12.3 |
| No answer | 2 | 2.3 | 1 | 0.8 | 0 | | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Was the project specifically requested or given? (n=254) | | | | | | | f | % | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 70 | 27.5 | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 172 | 67.7 | | |
| Both | | | | | | | 12 | 4.7 | | |
| When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Medical Assistance | Yes | | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | | No | | | |
| | f | | % | f | | % | f | | % | |
| | 269 | | 98.5 | 2 | | 0.7 | 2 | | 0.8 | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies To Social Welfare Services , e.g.,

Education: Scholarship for Children

Data in Table 16 reveal that a significant majority (69.9 %) of the respondents identified scholarship for children as an important form of social welfare project implemented in their barangays. Less than half (46.1 %) of the respondents disclosed that these projects were initiated by the Mayor's Office with almost equal number (46.6 %) saying that they were funded by the city chief executive. A third of the respondents said the projects were initiated (39.8 %) and funded (38.7 %) by barangay officials. Almost the same percentage said that they were initiated (33.5%) and funded (31.2 %) by the Congressman's Office.

About three-quarters (71.2 %) of the respondents said these projects were voluntarily given to them compared to about a quarter (24.6 %) who intimated that they or their constituents specifically requested medical or educational assistance. A high percentage (94.8 %) of the respondents said that social welfare projects such as educational assistance in the form of scholarship for children, indeed answer the needs of their constituents.

More than half (54.9 %) revealed that the implementation of these projects contributed to a *great extent* to the election success of the City Mayor. Almost two-thirds (62.1 %) of the 61 respondents, as shown in Table 16, said that it also contributed to a *great extent* to the election/reelection of the Congressman. A third (35.1 %) of the respondents also revealed that these projects have contributed largely (great extent) to the electoral success of the barangay officials responsible for their implementation.

Table 16. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies To Social Welfare Services , e.g., Education: Scholarship for Children (n=273)

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member- City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | |
|---|-------------|------|---------------------------|------|-----------------|-------|------------------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n=191 (multiple response)</i> | 64 | 33.5 | 88 | 46.1 | 1 | 0.5 | 10 | 5.2 | 76 | 39.8 |
| Funded by <i>n=191 (multiple response)</i> | 61 | 31.2 | 89 | 46.6 | 1 | 0.5 | 10 | 5.2 | 74 | 38.7 |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re-election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 38 | 62.1 | 48 | 54.9 | - | | | | 26 | 35.1 |
| Some Extent | 17 | 27.9 | 34 | 38.2 | 1 | 100.0 | 6 | 60.0 | 26 | 35.1 |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | 2 | 3.3 | 4 | 4.5 | - | | 4 | 40.0 | 3 | 4.0 |
| Lesser Extent | 2 | 3.3 | 2 | 2.2 | - | | - | | 3 | 4.0 |
| Negligible | 1 | 1.6 | 1 | 1.1 | - | | - | | 16 | 21.6 |
| No answer | 1 | 1.6 | | | | | - | | | |
| <i>Was the project Specifically Asked or Given? (n=191)</i> | | | | | f | | | % | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | 47 | | | 24.6 | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | 136 | | | 71.2 | | |
| Both | | | | | 8 | | | 4.2 | | |
| <i>When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters?</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Education: Scholarship for Children | Yes | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | No | | | | | |
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| | 259 | 94.8 | 5 | 1.8 | 4 | 1.4 | | | | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies To Personal Assistance: i.e., Burial Assistance - free coffins, funeral services

The data in Table 17 reveal that a significant majority (83.1 %) of the respondents have identified burial assistance such as free coffins, funeral services, etc., as among the most important forms of personal assistance provided by city officials to local constituents. Eight of ten (84.6 %) respondents said that these were initiated by the City Mayor. An almost similar percentage (87.2 %) said that most of the funds came from his office.

Were these personal assistance specifically requested? Majority (51.7 %) of the respondents said yes while more than a third (36.0 %) disclosed that the politicians voluntarily provided the personal assistance. There is a high degree of consensus (94.1%) among the respondents that burial assistance is indeed responsive to the needs of their constituents.

Of the 198 respondents who identified the Mayor as the major benefactor, slightly more than half (50.5 %) said that this kind of personal assistance contributed to a *great extent* to the electoral success of the local chief executive. Almost two-thirds (63.4 %) of the 41 respondents who disclosed that some of these assistance came from the Congressman, said that it also contributed largely (*to a great extent*) to his election or reelection. Less than half (41.7 %) of the 36 respondents who said barangay officials also provided burial assistance disclosed that the project also contributed to a great extent to these officials electoral success.

Table 17. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies To Personal Assistance: *i.e., Burial Assistance - free coffins, funeral services (n=273)*

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay | |
|--|-------------|------|--------------------|------|-----------------|-----|--------------------------|------|----------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n=227 (multiple response)</i> | 39 | 17.2 | 192 | 84.6 | 2 | 0.8 | 5 | 2.2 | 42 | 18.5 |
| Funded by <i>n=227 (multiple response)</i> | 41 | 18.1 | 198 | 87.2 | 0 | - | 4 | 1.7 | 36 | 15.8 |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re-election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 26 | 63.4 | 100 | 50.5 | | | 1 | 25.0 | 15 | 41.7 |
| Some Extent | 12 | 29.3 | 66 | 33.3 | | | 3 | 75.0 | 11 | 30.6 |
| Uncertain/Not Sure | 1 | 2.4 | 13 | 6.6 | | | | | 4 | 11.1 |
| Lesser Extent | - | - | 7 | 3.5 | | | | | 3 | 8.3 |
| Negligible | 2 | 4.9 | 12 | 6.0 | | | | | 3 | 8.3 |
| No answer | | | | | | | | | | |
| Was the project Specifically Asked or Given? (n=227) | | | | | | | f | % | | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 139 | 51.7 | | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 80 | 36.0 | | |
| Both | | | | | | | 8 | 12.4 | | |
| When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Burial Assistance - free coffins, funeral services | Yes | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | No | | | | | |
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | | | | |
| | 257 | 94.1 | 8 | 2.9 | 4 | 1.4 | | | | |

Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Other Forms of Personal Assistance: e.g.,

Recommendation/Job Referrals

As shown by the data in Table 18, two-thirds (66.7 %) of the respondents intimated that job recommendation/referrals is another form of personal assistance provided by local officials in the city. Less than half (48.9 %) of them identified the barangay officials and the Mayor's office (44.5 %) as the major sources of job recommendations or referrals. Only about a quarter (21.4%) of the respondents disclosed that their constituents obtained job recommendations/referrals from the Congressman's office. Almost half (49.5 %) of the respondents said that most of the funds (for the jobs itself) came from the Mayor's office.

Almost two-thirds (61.5 %) of the respondents revealed that these job recommendations or referrals were specifically requested by their constituents compared to a third (34.0 %) who said that they were voluntarily given by the local officials. The data also show that there is a strong agreement (92.7 %) among the respondents that their constituents greatly need these forms of personal assistance.

Among the respondents who identified the City Mayor and the barangay officials as important sources of job recommendations/referrals, less than half (45.6 %) for the City Mayor and 42.9 percent for the barangay officials, said that this contributed to a *great extent* to the two local officials' election/reelection success. More than half (53.7 %) of the less than a quarter (22.5 %) of the respondents who identified the Congressman as a source of job recommendations/referrals revealed that this also contributed to a *great extent* to his electoral success.

Table 18. Extent of Political Patronage As It Applies to Other Forms of Personal Assistance: *e.g., Recommendation/Job Referrals (n=273)*

| | Congressman | | City Mayor | | City Vice Mayor | | SP Member-City Councilor | | Barangay Officials | |
|--|-------------|------|------------|------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| Who Initiated <i>n=182 (multiple response)</i> | 39 | 21.4 | 81 | 44.5 | 0 | | 15 | 8.2 | 89 | 48.9 |
| Funded by <i>n=182 (multiple response)</i> | 41 | 22.5 | 90 | 49.5 | 0 | | 15 | 8.2 | 77 | 42.3 |
| Extent of Contribution to Election/Re-election of Local Official | | | | | | | | | | |
| Great Extent | 22 | 53.7 | 41 | 45.6 | | | 7 | 46.7 | 33 | 42.9 |
| Some Extent | 15 | 36.6 | 37 | 41.1 | | | 7 | 46.7 | 30 | 38.9 |
| Uncertain/ Not Sure | 3 | 7.3 | 7 | 7.8 | | | 1 | 6.6 | 8 | 10.4 |
| Lesser Extent | - | - | 2 | 2.2 | | | | | 1 | 1.3 |
| Negligible | 1 | 2.4 | 3 | 3.3 | | | | | 5 | 6.4 |
| No answer | | | | | | | | | | |
| Was the project Specifically Asked or Given? (n=182) | | | | | | | f | | % | |
| Specifically requested | | | | | | | 112 | | 61.5 | |
| Voluntarily given | | | | | | | 62 | | 34.0 | |
| Both | | | | | | | 8 | | 4.4 | |
| When fully implemented, will the project/program answer the needs of local officials' constituents or supporters? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Personal Assistance, i.e., Job recommendation/referral | Yes | | | | Uncertain/Not Sure | | | | No | |
| | f | | % | | f | | % | | f | % |
| | 253 | | 92.7 | | 9 | | 3.3 | | 7 | 2.5 |

Respondents Perception towards Political Dynasty

This discussion provides an overview of the perceptions of barangay officials in Iloilo City toward political dynasty in local politics. A 10-item questionnaire provided the indicator by which the respondents' perception will be measured. The study utilized a five-point scale to measure the extent of these perceptions, to wit: 5= Sure to Win; 4 =Likely to Win; 3 = No Effect; 2 = Not Likely to Win; 1 = Will not Win

A summation of the respondents' categorized scores reveals that Iloilo City barangay officials tend to view political dynasty or 'dynastic' politics positively. As shown by their categorized responses in Table 19, more than half (56.0 %) of the respondents surveyed have a positive perception towards political dynasty compared to 42.5 percent who remained neutral or undecided.

Table 19. Summary Table on the Distribution of Respondents According to their Perception on Political Dynasty (n= 273)

| Perception on Political Dynasty | f | % |
|---------------------------------|-----|-------|
| Negative (10-23.3) | 4 | 1.5 |
| Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6) | 116 | 42.5 |
| Positive (36.61-50.0) | 153 | 56.0 |
| TOTAL | 273 | 100.0 |

Item Analysis of Respondents' Perception on Political Dynasty or Dynastic Politics

An item analysis of each specific indicator in this section is illustrative of the perception of the respondents towards political dynasty.

Does a candidate carrying the surname of a prominent family have greater chances to an elective office, even if he is a newcomer? The respondents' answer to this question is affirmative. More than a third (41.0 %) of them said such a candidate is *Likely to Win*, while 1 out of 5 (22.2 %) intimated that he is *Sure to Win*. A quarter (26.7%) of the respondents, however, said that such a condition has *No Effect* on the candidate's electoral chances.

With regard to the family origin of political candidates, a little less than half (44.0 %) of the respondents believe that *political candidates who come from influential political families and are perceived to be "good" leaders are Sure to Win* in an electoral contest. More than a third (38.8 %) of the respondents also disclosed that such candidates with similar attributes are *Likely to Win* when they seek electoral office. Only 12.1 percent of the respondents think that possession of such traits has *No Effect* to a person's candidacy.

Almost half (48.7 %) of the respondents manifested that *a candidate running for public office who has a relative in incumbent elective or appointive position, i.e., father, mother, brother/sister, uncle or cousin is Likely to Win*. Another 17.9 percent says that such a candidate is *Sure to Win* once he seeks public office. However, a quarter (26.0 %) of the respondents disclosed that such a condition has *No Effect* on the candidate's chances in electoral competitions.

Moreover, when the respondents were asked regarding the electoral chances of *a contender for public office whose candidacy has been endorsed by a wealthy relative or a prominent politician*, only a third (36.6 %) of them believe that he/she is *Likely to Win* with 15.0 percent saying that he/she is *Sure to Win*. Significantly, another third (36.6 %) of the respondents are convinced that such endorsement by a wealthy relative or prominent politician has *No Effect* to his/her candidacy.

It is interesting, however, to note that *being a wife, son or daughter or in-law of an influential incumbent politician with huge resources and network of alliances* can greatly contribute to the electoral chances of the candidate. As shown in Table 20, a little less than half (46.5 %) of the respondents say such a candidate is *Likely to Win* while 1 in 5 (21.2 %) believes that she/he is *Sure to Win*. Only less than a quarter (24.5%) of the respondents says it has *No Effect* on a person's electoral chances.

Similarly, more than half (54.2 %) of the respondents believe that *a political leader with whom the voter has identified themselves due to his family's background and experience in politics* is *Likely to Win* an electoral contest for public office. Significantly, a third (30.4 %) of them is convinced that such a candidate is *Sure to Win* the public office he/she seeks to be elected. Only 10.6 percent of the respondents noted that such a condition has *No Effect* on the individual's candidacy.

There is, however, a strong consensus among respondents when they were asked about the election chances of a candidate who is *a relative of an influential political clan leader but who possesses personal traits such as "madaling lapitan, malinis na pagkatao, matulungin sa mga nangangailangan"*. As shown by the data on Table 20, more than two thirds (68.9 %) of the respondents are convinced that a person who possesses these traits is *Sure to Win* public office while more than a quarter (27.5 %) believing that he/she is *Likely to Win*. Combining these percentage points, nearly all of the respondents (96.4 %) agree that the individual's family background and good personal characteristics are determining factors for his/her "winnability" in electoral contest.

This is in contrast to the respondents' perception with regard to *a candidate coming from a well-established political family seeking election who is perceived to be corrupt*. Data in Table 20, reveal that the majority (53.5 %) of the respondents disclosed that such a candidate *Will not Win* a public office he/she is seeking. In addition, another 20.9 percent also says that he/she is *Not Likely to Win*. Only 16.8 % of the respondents believe that such a condition has *No Effect* to the candidate's electoral success.

More than a third (37.4 %) of the respondents think that *a candidate who was an "anointed" successor of an elder relative who is to retire from public office* is *Likely to Win*. A significant percentage, however, believes that such a condition has *No Effect* (38.5 %) to the person's candidacy in public office. Moreover, 10.3 percent of the respondents says that such a candidate is *Not Likely to Win*.

However, there is a significant difference as to the respondents' perception with regard to *a political candidate who has won successive terms in public office due to a large kinship*

network. As shown by the data on Table 20, about a third (33.0 %) says that such a candidate is *Sure to Win* and a little less than half (44.0 %) perceives that she/he *Likely to Win* if he/she seeks election to a public office. One out of 10 (17.2 %) respondents thinks that such a condition has *No Effect* on the candidate's electoral chances.

Table 20. Percentage Distribution of Respondents According to their Perception towards Political Dynasty (n=273)

| Items | Sure to Win 5 | | Likely to win 4 | | No Effect 3 | | Not Likely to Win 2 | | Will Not Win 1 | | TOTAL | |
|---|------------------|------|--------------------|------|----------------|------|---------------------------|------|-------------------|------|-------|-------|
| | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1. A candidate carrying the surname of a prominent family has greater chances to an elective office, even if he is a newcomer. | 60 | 22.2 | 112 | 41.0 | 73 | 26.7 | 20 | 7.3 | 8 | 2.9 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 2. Political candidates who come from influential political families and are perceived to be “good” leaders. | 120 | 44.0 | 106 | 38.8 | 33 | 12.1 | 12 | 4.4 | 2 | 0.7 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 3. A candidate running for public office who has a relative in incumbent elective or appointive position i.e., father, mother, brother/sister, uncle or cousin. | 49 | 7.9 | 33 | 8.7 | 71 | 26.0 | 14 | 5.1 | 4 | 1.5 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 4. A contender for public office whose candidacy has been endorsed by a wealthy relative or a prominent politician. | 41 | 15.0 | 100 | 36.6 | 100 | 36.6 | 22 | 8.1 | 9 | 3.3 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 5. Being a wife, son or daughter or in-law of an influential incumbent politician with huge resources and network of alliances. | 58 | 21.2 | 127 | 46.5 | 67 | 24.5 | 18 | 6.6 | 3 | 1.1 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 6. A political leader with whom the voter has identified themselves due to his family’s background and experience in politics. | 83 | 30.4 | 148 | 54.2 | 29 | 10.6 | 8 | 2.9 | 4 | 1.5 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 7. A relative of an influential political clan running for an elective position who possesses personal traits such as “madaling lapitan, malinis na pagkatao, matulungin sa mga nangangailangan”. | 188 | 68.9 | 75 | 27.5 | 7 | 2.6 | 2 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.4 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 8. A candidate coming from a well-established political family seeking election who is perceived to be corrupt. | 3 | 1.1 | 21 | 7.7 | 46 | 16.8 | 57 | 20.9 | 146 | 53.5 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 9. A candidate who was an “anointed” successor of an elder relative who is to retire from public office. | 21 | 7.7 | 102 | 37.4 | 105 | 38.5 | 28 | 10.3 | 17 | 6.2 | 273 | 100.0 |
| 10. A political candidate who has won successive terms in public office due to a large kinship network | 90 | 33.0 | 120 | 44.0 | 47 | 17.2 | 11 | 4.0 | 5 | 1.8 | 273 | 100.0 |

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was conducted to primarily examine the dynamics of electoral politics and governance in Iloilo by looking into ‘Ilonggo’ perceptions on the system of political patronage, the extent it is practiced by local politicians, and how these conditions influence their views toward dynastic politics in the local level.

The study aimed to establish whether respondents’ socio-economic and political characteristics are significantly related to their perception towards political patronage, the extent it is practiced by local politicians, and their perception on political dynasty in local politics. The study further examined whether the respondents’ perception towards political patronage and the extent it is practiced by local politicians has a significant bearing on their perception on political dynasty. The study hypothesized that respondents’ positive perception on political patronage and the extent it is practiced by local politicians engenders a positive perception towards ‘dynastic’ politics.

Research Methodology

This study is a descriptive-relational research. The survey method and in-depth interviews of key informants were utilized to gather both quantitative and qualitative data. Using an interview schedule, the study surveyed 273 barangay officials in three of Iloilo City’s six districts –Lapaz, Jaro and City Proper from October 2006 to January 2007. The respondents were chosen through cluster sampling using a simple random technique. These barangay officials had been chosen for reasons that they are the front-liners in the delivery of basic public services as well as ward and precinct *liders* of leading politicians, both during the local and national election campaigns, and other election-related programs and activities.

Of the 273 respondents, 70 were *punong barangays* and 203 were *barangay kagawads*. The *punong barangays* were the key informants in the in-depth interviews. The data was analyzed using SPSS. Chi-square and Gamma tests were used to determine the significant relationships between variables.

MAJOR FINDINGS

On Background Characteristics of the Respondents

Results of the study showed that the majority of the barangay officials in Iloilo City are males, in their mid-50s, married, and are well-educated. One in three has a college degree. Majority of them are full-time barangay officials, with a quarter engaged in business or sales, practice of profession and retired government employee which gives them a mean monthly income of only Php 7,231.00 to maintain a family of six, on the average. Majority of the respondents are involved in various political, i.e., Association of Barangay Captains, religious, i.e., Couples for Christ and civic organizations. Membership in NGOs is minimal. Less than

half of them served as ward leaders for an average of 10 years, which is equivalent to the number of years they were holding public office. Most of the respondents have at least two relatives holding political positions in the local level.

The data also showed that the Punong Barangay compared to the City Mayor and Congressman, is the foremost local official to be likely approached by the respondents for their constituents' needs, problems and other governance concerns.

Perceptions on Political Patronage

The study shows that the barangay officials in Iloilo City tend to have a positive perception towards political patronage in local politics. The respondents disclosed that the job of local officials goes beyond mere representation. As local officials, they are expected to meet the multifarious needs of constituents and respond to their problems as much as possible to get electoral support to win elections.

Extent of Political Patronage

The study reveals that the extensive use of patronage has contributed to the election success of local officials in the city particularly the mayor, congressman and barangay leaders. The data indicate that local projects and programs especially in the form of infrastructure, social welfare services, and personal assistance have largely contributed to the election success of the politician who initiated or implemented and funded these programs or projects.

Perception on Political Dynasty or 'Dynastic' Politics

The study found out that the barangay officials in Iloilo City positively view the existence of political dynasty or dynastic politics in the local level. Respondents believe that candidates for public office who come from a prominent political family especially if members of that family have performed well in public office, possess good personal characteristics, and identify themselves with the voters or have proven their worth in public office for a long time, have greater chances of electoral success. However, respondents disclosed that candidates coming from political families who are perceived to be corrupt will not win elections.

Perception on Political Patronage and Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics

Chi-Square and Gamma tests show that the respondents' socioeconomic and political characteristics such income, educational achievement, membership in civic and political organizations, and having been a ward leader or not are not significantly related to their perception towards political patronage.

Extent of Political Patronage and Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics

The study also revealed that the respondents' selected socioeconomic and political characteristics such as level of income, educational achievement, membership in civic and political organizations, and having been a ward leader or not had no influence on their views regarding the extent to which political patronage is practiced in local electoral politics in Iloilo City.

Perception on Political Dynasty and Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics

Moreover, the study found out that the respondents' perception towards political dynasty is not significantly associated with their income, educational achievement and membership in civic and political organizations. However, it is worthy to note that respondents' view on 'dynastic' politics is positively influenced by their experience as a ward leader of local politicians in the city. Interestingly, none of the ward leaders espoused a negative view on political dynasty.

Perception on Political Patronage and Extent of Political Patronage

The study also disclosed that those respondents who espoused a positive perception on political patronage also tend to favorably view its extensive practice in electoral politics in Iloilo City. Gamma tests indicate that respondents' perception in political patronage is strongly associated with the extensive practice of patronage politics.

Perception on Extent of Patronage and Perception on Political Dynasty

The study revealed that the practice of political patronage among Ilonggo politicians is extensive. Statistical analysis of data using Gamma shows that respondents' perception on political patronage is significantly related to their perception on dynastic politics.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the salient findings of the study, the following conclusions and inferences are derived:

1. As shown by the study, barangay leadership in the City of Iloilo has been dominated by male leaders, in their mid-50s, high school and college graduates and work as full-time barangay officials. This shows that city residents favor male candidates for barangay positions over women. On the other hand, the relatively high degree of formal education of barangay officials in Iloilo City can be attributed to the presence of many universities and colleges in the city, and the priority that urban Filipino families gave for siblings to acquire college education.
2. In terms of income, however, the study found out that most of the respondents still live below the poverty level. Part of the explanation is the fact that the bulk of the respondents' source of income, aside from engaging in small scale business, i.e., sari-sari store, buy and sell (fish, fruits and vegetables), 'e-load', etc., really comes from their meager honorarium as barangay officials.
3. The study showed that 'Ilonggo' perception (as represented by barangay officials in the study) towards political patronage tend to be positive or favorable. This is due to the fact that most of these barangay leaders are convinced that their job as local officials in the City is not only limited to mere representation but also they are expected to meet the multifarious needs and respond to any imaginable problem which confronts their constituents in order to get electoral support to win elections.
4. There is also no doubt, based on the findings of the study that the extensive practice of patronage has greatly contributed to the election success of the congressman, city mayor, barangay captains, and other local officials in Iloilo City's electoral politics. This is the main reason why politicians chose to implement projects that have immediate, tangible 'personal' impact on constituents including those that are highly 'visible' such as infrastructure, social

welfare services and personal assistance. Even though, many of these programs and projects do not respond to the long-term needs and problems of constituents, and have only a ‘fleeting’ impact on their lives, many of them have been grateful to their benefactors, hence they reciprocate these acts with loyalty and political support.

5. The findings also show that the barangay officials hold a positive view towards the existence of political dynasty or ‘dynastic’ politics in local politics. This is anchored on the belief among barangay officials that candidates for public office who come from prominent political families, especially when members of that family have performed well in public office during their incumbency, possess good personal characteristics, and ‘identify’ themselves with the voters or have proven their worth as public officials for a long time have greater chances of electoral success. Of significant note, however, is the assertion made by the barangay officials that local politicians who come from political families, but are perceived to be corrupt, will never win public office. This implies that being a member of a political clan cannot fully guarantee a politician’s electoral success. He must also exhibit personal integrity and honesty.

6. The tests for association indicate that the respondents’ socioeconomic and political characteristics do not have any significant bearing to their perception on political patronage and the extent it is practiced by politicians in Iloilo City’s electoral politics.

7. In a similar vein, respondents’ selected socioeconomic and political characteristics, except for those who have been ward leaders, were found to be not significantly related to their perceptions toward political dynasty in local politics. The strong positive association between the respondents’ perception toward political dynasty and their political background as ward leaders can be attributed to the fact that as ward leaders for a considerable period of time, barangay officials have established rapport and ‘trust’ with their ‘patron’ who comes from a political family.

8. The findings show that respondents’ perception on political patronage is significantly related to their perception on ‘dynastic’ politics. This means that those respondents who tend to view patronage positively also hold a similar view towards political dynasty. This lends support to the thesis that patronage practices of local politicians engender a positive view towards political dynasty because of the ‘beneficial’ exchange that occurs between the client (the constituent) and the patron (politician/local official) long before elections or during election season.

9. The study also shows that respondents’ positive perception on political patronage is strongly associated with the extent of political patronage. Conversely, the extensive practice of political patronage is strongly associated with the respondents’ positive perception toward political dynasty or ‘dynastic politics. This is because the ‘practice’ of patronage is anchored on short-term, ‘needs-based’, material benefits provided in a ‘personalized’ way by the *patron*. In the Filipino cultural and economic context, this is viewed to be ‘good’ because it highlights reciprocity and trust.

10. By and large, the study validates the hypothesis that the ‘Ilonggos’ positive perception towards political patronage leads to its more extensive practice – a practice that ensures the electoral success of a politician (including his *siblings*) as long as he is able to sustain it. For as long as local politicians are able to provide short-term benefits to their constituents and ensure the continuous flow of these goods and services, political loyalty and electoral support can be expected. Thus, it can be inferred from this study, that politics in Iloilo City is largely determined by patronage practices of local politicians who *necessarily* come from ‘dynastic’ political families.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The findings of the study imply that electoral politics in the Philippines is still characterized by extensive patronage networks and the dominance of political families. Hence, it remains to be highly ‘personalistic’ rather than issue-oriented. This is a consequence of the faulty electoral system, i.e., voting mechanisms (e.g. write-in ballot system) and campaign and spending mechanisms that we continue to practice which ensures the election success of ‘popular’ and moneyed candidates.

Such a situation provides a strong justification for policy reforms in the electoral and political arenas. Priority should be given to electoral and political reforms that will ultimately abolish the write-in ballot system, and replace this with a party-list vote or a bloc voting system where voters need not be required to undergo the grueling process of writing more than a dozen names in the ballot every election year. In this way, candidates will have to focus on party platforms and issues rather than patronage politics to promote their individual candidacies.

The strengthening the party-list system by increasing its percentage share in the House of Representatives’ composition is one significant reform that can have a substantive impact on the electoral process and more importantly, on the weak and fragmented political party system in the Philippines. Such changes, when institutionalized may pave the way in changing the character of political parties, the quality of the electoral process, and politician-voter engagements. Moreover, the Congress and the COMELEC need to pursue more vigorous policy reforms especially with regards to party financing, campaign spending and continuous voter education.

Finally, the enactment of the enabling law that will give life to the constitutional policy which prohibits political dynasties or individuals related to one another to seek public office simultaneously or in succession should be given priority in the legislative agenda. It is hoped that with the advent of a ‘new’ breed of well-educated, intellectually sophisticated and progressive-minded members of political clans in Congress, and with the persistent lobby from civil society and progressive party-list representatives, such constitutional prohibition can become a reality in order to put an end to this destructive political aberration in our democratic way of life.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are presented based on the major findings and conclusions of the study:

1. Since the current study covered only the barangay officials in Iloilo City as respondents, and did not include the ordinary Ilonggo voters, it is recommended that further studies be pursued to include a sample of the general voter population in the City or more significantly, the Province of Iloilo.
2. Moreover, because the present study focused only on the perceptions of barangay officials on political patronage, the extent it is practiced by local politicians and their perceptions on political dynasties, other researchers should also attempt to look into the level of knowledge,

attitude and values of Ilonggo barangay officials to have a more meaningful understanding of Ilonggo political behavior particularly after the 1986 EDSA ‘people power’ revolution.

3. Finally, given sufficient funding and ample time, scholars and researchers on Philippine politics should consider replicating this study in other cities and provinces in the Philippines as well as examine other significant variables (especially those which the current study did not consider) to expand our understanding of these phenomena in Filipino electoral politics in the local level.

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