

**ILONGGO PERCEPTIONS ON THE EXTENT
OF PATRONAGE PRACTICES AND THEIR
ATTITUDES TOWARD INTRA-FAMILIAL
SUCCESSION IN ILOILO**

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ABSTRACT

The study examined politics in Iloilo by looking into Ilonggo voters' perceptions of patronage practices of local politicians, and how these conditions influence their attitude towards dynastic politics or intra-familial succession in the local level. A total of 384 respondents were surveyed through face-to-face interview. Chi-square and Gamma tests were used to determine the significant relationships between variables. Findings of the study reveal that the use of patronage has contributed to the election success of the Governor, Congressman, Mayor and Punong Barangay to Some Extent (40.8%) and to a Great Extent (18.3%). One in four (24.5 %) of the respondents were Not Sure or Uncertain of its effect while 11.8 percent noted that its effect is Negligible. With regard to their attitude towards 'dynastic' politics or intra-familial succession, one in five (22.1%) among the Ilonggo voters holds a positive attitude compared to three-fourths (74.5 %) who exhibit a Neutral Attitude towards these politicians. These findings thus suggest that the Ilonggo voter perceived that the extensive use of patronage has generally contributed to the election success of local politicians in the Province.

INTRODUCTION

After four successive presidential elections and more than a dozen electoral 'turn-overs' in both local and barangay positions since 1986, political families have become formidable structures in local politics. Aptly referred to as political dynasties, this phenomenon is viewed as an anathema to the Filipino democratic way of life and is characteristic of the patronage system of politics that has been a hindrance to national development (Nachura in HB 463, 1999) for it stifles meaningful political competition and electoral choice.

A political dynasty is said to exist when a member of a politically dominant family, by consanguinity or affinity, holds a local elective office simultaneously with other immediate members of the same family or occupies the same position immediately after the term of the incumbent elective official has ended to ensure political succession and continuity in office of said political family for generations (Fegan, 1994; Simbulan, 2005; Dal Bo, 2008; Feinstein, 2009). In essence, it is the concentration, consolidation, or perpetuation of public office and power by persons related to one another (HB Nos. 463; 1642). A key factor to the evolution and persistence of this pattern of political recruitment and succession in local politics is the extensive use of political patronage - considered as an important strategy for political mobilization and obtaining electoral support. Patronage refers to a condition where there is a trade of votes and other partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits, i.e., jobs, goods, and services as well as cash, which constitute the object of the exchange between patrons and clients (Roniger, 1994; Piattoni, 2001).

Why this brand of politics and mode of political recruitment and succession have persisted in local electoral politics is the primary question which the current study seeks to explore and explain.

Specifically, the study aims to examine Ilonggo voters' perceptions on the extent of patronage practices as well as their attitudes toward dynastic politics or intra-familial succession. Does their positive perception on the practice of patronage significantly influence their attitude towards dynastic succession, thereby unwittingly cultivating a system of 'dynastic' patrons in local governance? To what extent does the practice of patronage contribute to the persistence of intra-familial succession in local politics in Iloilo?

The main thesis of the study claims that the extensive practice of patronage politics among local politicians is strongly associated with the prevalence of dynastic or intra-familial succession in local politics. Simply put, the greater extent patronage practices are employed by local politicians, the higher the prevalence of intra-familial succession over local elective offices.

Objectives of the Study

The study examines politics in Iloilo Province by looking into Ilonggo voters' perceptions on the extent of political patronage as it is practiced by local politicians, and how these conditions influence their attitude towards dynastic politics or intra-familial succession in the local level. Specifically, this study aims to:

1. Determine the socio-economic, demographic and political characteristics of the respondents of the study;
2. Determine the extent of patronage practices as perceived by Ilonggo voters;
3. Determine the Ilonggo voters' attitude towards dynastic or intra-familial succession in local politics;
4. Determine the relationship between the respondents' socio-economic, demographic and political characteristics such as household size, age, sex, civil status, monthly income, occupation, location of

- residence, level of education, involvement in socio-civic and political organizations, and having served as ward leaders, and their perceptions toward the extent of patronage practices by local politicians;
5. Determine the relationship between the respondents' socio-economic, demographic, and political characteristics such as household size, age, sex, civil status, monthly income, occupation, location of residence, level of education, involvement in socio-civic and political organizations, and having served as ward leaders, and their attitude towards dynastic politics or intra-familial succession; and,
 6. Determine the relationship between the extent of patronage practices as perceived by the respondents and their attitude towards the dynastic politics or intra-familial succession in local politics.

Theoretical Framework

The patron-client relationship (PCR) framework first developed by Carl Lande was also utilized. It explains that the patron-client ties or dyadic contract basically serve as the social structural roots of Filipino political behavior. These traditional kinship-based dyadic ties, i.e., landlord-tenant are vertical bonds of mutual assistance based on kinship (e.g. utang na loob), and instrumental friendship between persons of greater socio-economic position and those of lesser means in society.

The schematic diagram in Figure 1 further clarifies the PCR framework. The diagram in Figure 2 shows the assumed relationship between the variables examined in the study, hopes to establish the validity of the foregoing propositions.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

To a large extent, the findings of the study hope to benefit the following prospective audiences:

Researchers and Academics. The findings of the study can be a rich source of baseline data on the realities of electoral politics and governance in Iloilo in view of increasing the quality of data and analysis especially among local researchers. The pertinent information that the study may disclose will also be able to assist researchers and scholars to further pursue studies on family-based oligarchies and patronage in order to expand the level of knowledge on the subject.




Figure 1. Ensures the continuous flow of "privatized" goods/services




Figure 2. Assumed Relationship among Variables

Students, Voters, Community Leaders, and Civil Society Groups. The study can raise the electorate’s consciousness regarding the consequences of dynastic politics and political patronage, especially the impact of these practices on their lives as participants of a democratic society. The findings can help guide local leaders and well-meaning groups in civil society to adopt programs that will effectively educate and empower people, and help them make informed decisions in the choice of political leaders.

Government Officials and Policy-Makers. The findings of the study may provide empirical evidence to help enlighten and convince members of Congress that implementing the constitutional policy on political dynasties, and other laws regulating campaigning and election spending need to be acted upon with urgency and dispatch for the interest of the nation.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The current investigation primarily focuses on the dynamics of local politics in selected areas in Iloilo Province by looking into Ilonggo voters’ perceptions on the extent of patronage practices, as an independent variable and their

attitudes toward dynastic politics or intra-familial succession, as the dependent variable. Moreover, the study also attempted to establish whether or not there exists a significant relationship between the two variables.

The study primarily utilized the survey design using an interview schedule to gather the data on the study variables. Though the study covered only a sample of the population, this methodology is expected to provide a more representative view of the opinions of the cross-section of the Ilonggo electorate.

METHODS

Research Design

The study utilized a one-shot survey design as a primary tool of investigation. The survey was conducted utilizing a structured interview schedule to gather the responses of Ilonggo voters from the sample barangays in the Province of Iloilo.

The Study Area and Respondents

The study area covered the sample barangays located in the selected towns (or component city) randomly chosen from the list of municipalities in Iloilo province. The target respondents were Ilonggo voters and the sample size of 384 registered voters out of the total 1,257,607 (NSCB, 2010) in the Province of Iloilo.

Sampling Procedure

Using a combination of multi-stage and simple random sampling techniques, five (5) municipalities of the province were chosen by simple random, sampled from the list of municipalities or towns (and city) based on their grouping by Congressional districts, and two sample barangays were chosen from the list of barangays located in the selected municipalities.

The sample population or survey respondents were chosen from the list of registered voters in the sample barangays using a systematic random sampling technique. The sample size was determined using the sampling formula in Parel, et. al's (1978) with 0.05 sampling error.

Data Collection

A structured personal interview was scheduled to generate data on the study variables. The personal interviews were conducted in the homes of the respondents or their workplaces, whichever was feasible and convenient to them.

Data Processing and Analysis

The data generated from the survey was computer processed and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS+PC) version 17.0 for Windows. Simple descriptive analysis of data using the percentage distributions and measures of central tendency (means and median) were used to analyze survey responses.

Chi-Square and Cramer's V were used as primary statistical tools to determine whether there was a significant relationship between the respondents' perceptions on the extent of patronage practices, and their socio-economic,

demographic, and political characteristics particularly HH size, income, level of education, etc.

The same statistical tools were utilized to analyze whether a significant relationship existed between the respondents' socio-economic and political characteristics particularly HH size, income, and level of education, and their attitudes toward dynastic politics or intra-familial succession.

Gamma was used to test whether the respondents' perceptions of the extent of patronage practices was associated with their attitudes toward dynastic politics or intra-familial succession.

Finally, Chi-Square was used to analyze whether the extent of patronage practices as perceived by the respondents had a direct bearing on their attitudes toward dynastic or intra-familial succession in Iloilo politics.

RESULTS

Survey Respondents' Profile: District of Origin, Age, Sex, Civil Status, and Household Size

Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents according to their profile that includes the district of origin, age, sex, civil status, and household size.

Socio-Economic Characteristics

Table 2 presents the distribution of respondents according to their socio-economic characteristics such as educational attainment, occupation and monthly income. Results show that majority of the respondents (43.8 %) finished high school, 58.0 % are working, 65.15% have regular monthly income, and among those who have

monthly income, 49.73% earns between ₱3,000.00 – ₱6,000.00 per month.

The data indicate that with a mean monthly income of ₱4,948 most of the respondents who are working or are engaged in some kind of work, live way below the poverty level.

Table 1. Distribution of Respondents according to their District of Origin, Age, Sex, Civil Status, Household Size (n= 384).

Indicators	f	%
District of Origin		
1 st District	115	29.95
2 nd District	53	13.80
3 rd District	49	12.76
4 th District	72	18.75
5 th District	95	24.74
Age		
18- 30	85	22.1
31- 40	78	20.3
41- 50	95	24.7
Above 50	126	32.8
Mean Age: 44		
Sex		
Male	117	30.5
Female	267	69.5
Civil Status		
Single	52	13.5
Married	293	76.3
Living-In	15	3.9
Separated	4	1.0
Widowed	20	5.2
Household Size		
1-3 members	107	27.86
4-6 members	197	51.30
7 and above	80	20.83
Mean Household size: 4.89 or 5		

Respondents' Involvement in Socio-Economic, Civic and Political Organizations

Table 3 presents the involvement of the voters in Iloilo Province in socio-economic, civic and political organizations. Half (52.87 %) of the respondents are members of various socio-economic, civic and political organizations which operate in the Province of Iloilo, and the remaining 47.13 % have no organizational involvement.

Table 2. Distribution of Respondents According to Socio-Economic Characteristics (n= 384).

Characteristics	f	%
Educational Attainment		
Post-Graduate	2	.05
College graduate	78	20.3
College level	49	12.8
High school level	168	43.8
Elementary level	87	22.7
Occupation (Multiple response)		
Farmer/Fishing	58	15.0
Business/Sales (sari-sari store, vending, etc.)	73	19.0
Practice of Profession(teaching, government/private employee)	24	6.0
Barangay Official	24	6.0
Barangay Worker (BNS, BHW, Tanod)	17	4.0
None/Unemployed	161	41.9
Monthly Income		
Php 15,001 and above	12	3.12
12,001 – 15,000	10	2.60
9,001 – 12,000	13	3.4
6,001 – 9,000	24	6.3
3,001 – 6,000	64	16.66
3,000- and below	127	33.07
No Income	134	34.89
Mean Monthly Income: ₱4,948.00		

Among those who are actively involved in organizations, 44.3 % belong to civic-political organizations, 42.3 % are actively involved in socio-economic organizations, and the remaining 13.29 % are either members of non-governmental organizations (8.37 %) and religious organizations (4.92 %).

The data show that a typical *Ilonggo* voter is active in organizations which either promote economic well-being or advance their political and civil rights.

Table 3. Distribution of Respondents According to their Involvement in Civic and Political Organizations (n= 384).

Indicators	f	%
No Organizational Involvement	181	47.13
With Organizational Involvement	203	52.87
Type of Organization (MR) (n=203)		
Socio-Economic Organizations (KALIPI, 4Ps, Farmers Association, Women's Organization)	86	42.3
Civic-Political Organization (Senior Citizens, PTA, party-list organization, Liga ng Barangay, etc.)	90	44.3
NGO (e.g., TSKI, Local coop, waterworks, Guardians)	17	8.37
Religious Organizations (Couples for Christ, Women's Brigade, Knights of Columbus, etc.)	10	4.92

Extent of Political Patronage

Table 4 shows that almost two-thirds (59.1 %) of the *Ilonggo* voters said that the practice of political patronage has to a *Some Extent* (40.8 %) and to a *Great Extent* (18.3 %) contributed to the election success of the local politicians in the province.

A quarter (24.5 %) of the respondents said that they were *Uncertain or Not Sure* of the contribution of patronage practices to the electoral fortunes of local politicians, and 11.4 % disclosed that the contribution of patronage practices

to the electoral success of these politicians, if any, is *Negligible*.

Table 4. Summary Table on the Distribution of Respondents According to Perception on the Extent of Political Patronage (n=306).

Extent of Political Patronage	f	%
Great Extent	56	18.3
Some Extent	125	40.8
Uncertain	75	24.5
Lesser Extent	14	4.6
Negligible	36	11.8
TOTAL	306	100.0

Respondents Attitude towards Dynastic Politics or Intra-Familial Succession

A summation of the respondents' categorized scores on Table 16 reveals that 22.1 % of *Ilonggo* voters have a *Positive Attitude* towards 'dynastic' politics or intra-familial succession. A significant majority (74.5 %) exhibits a *Neutral Attitude or was Undecided* whether or not to vote for candidates belonging to "dynastic" families, and 3.4 % have a *Negative Attitude* towards dynastic politicians.

Table 5. Summary of the Distribution of Respondents by Attitudes towards Dynastic Politics or Intra-Familial Succession (n= 384).

Attitude towards Dynastic Politics	f	%
Negative (10-23.3)	13	3.4
Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6)	286	74.5
Positive (36.61-50.0)	85	22.1
TOTAL	384	100.0

Extent of Political Patronage and Education

Table 6 shows whether or not there is a significant relationship between the respondents' perception of the extensive practice of patronage in local politics and their educational achievement. The Gamma of .023 with a *p*-value of .738 at the .05 level of significance reveals no significant relationship between the respondents' education and their perception towards the extent of political patronage. Thus, respondents' educational achievement has nothing to do with their perception toward the extent of political patronage.

Extent of Political Patronage and Income

Table 7 reveals a significant relationship between the respondents' perception of the extent political patronage and their income. Chi-Square value of 38.725 with a *p*-value of .007 at the .05 level of significance indicates a significant relationship between the *llonggo* voters' income and their perception of the extent of patronage.

Table 6. Distribution of Respondents according to Perception of Extent of Political Patronage and their Level of Education (n=306)

Extent of Political Patronage	Level of Education								TOTAL	
	College Graduate		College Level		High School Level		Elementary Level			
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%		
Negligible	7	10.37.4	5	12.8	13	9.9	11	16.2	36	7.4
Lesser Extent	5	25.0	-	-	7	5.3	2	2.9	14	14.9
Uncertain/Undecided	17	38.2	9	23.1	31	23.7	18	26.5	75	30.1
Some Extent	26	19.1	19	48.7	56	42.7	24	35.3	125	30.5
Great Extent	13		6	15.4	24	18.3	13	19.1	56	17.1
TOTAL	68	100.0	39	100.0	131	100.0	68	100.0	306	100.0

Gamma = .023

p = .738

Table 7. Distribution of Respondents According to Extent of Political Patronage and Level of Income (n=205)

Extent of Political Patronage	Income												TOTAL	
	P15,000 & above		P12,001- P15,000		P9,001- P12,000		P6,001- P9,000		P3,001- P6,000		P3,000 and below			
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Negligible	1	11.1	5	50.0	-	-	2	9.1	2	4.2	10	9.3	20	9.8
Lesser Extent	3	33.3	1	10.0	-	-	1	4.5	2	4.2	5	4.7	12	5.9
Uncertain Extent	2	22.2	1	10.0	3	22.7	5	22.7	12	25.0	19	17.8	42	20.5
Some Extent	2	22.2	2	20.0	3	45.5	10	45.5	22	45.8	49	45.8	88	42.9
Great Extent	1	11.1	1	10.0	3	18.2	4	18.2	10	20.8	24	22.4	43	21.0
TOTAL	9	100.0	10	100.0	9	100.0	22	100.0	48	100.0	107	100.0	205	100.0

Chi-Square = 38.725

p= .007*

The data reveal that respondents whose monthly income falls below P6,000.00 felt that project such as infrastructures, i.e., roads, bridges, streets, drainage, etc., implemented by local politicians do contribute to *Some Extent* (45.8 %) and to a *Great Extent* (20.8 %) to the electoral chances of concerned local officials as similarly perceived by respondents who have the lowest income.

This finding suggests that a poor or poorer *Ilonggo* voter is more inclined to support a politician or candidate who is a dispenser of patronage.

Political Patronage and Membership in Socio-economic, Civic, Political and Religious Organizations

Table 8 reveals that 47.3 % of the respondents who are not members of socio-economic, civic and political organizations felt that the practice of patronage has an effect to *some extent* on the electoral chances of local officials, 34.6 % of those belonging to organizations hold a similar view, and 28.0 % among the non-organization members is *uncertain/undecided* about its effect.

The Chi-square value of 15.995 with a *p*-value of .003 at the .05 level of significance shows that a significant

relationship exists between the respondents' membership in socio-economic, civic and political organizations and their perception towards the extent of patronage. This finding implies that the *Ilonggo voter* recognizes the extent to which patronage affects the electoral fortunes of local officials, regardless of the nature of his or her organizational involvement.

Table 8. Distribution of Respondents according to their Perception of Extent of Political Patronage and their Membership in Socio-Economic, Civic, Political and Religious Organizations (n=306).

Extent of Political Patronage	Membership in Socio-Economic, Civic and Political Organization					
	Member		Not a Member		TOTAL	
	f	%	f	%	f	%
Negligible	27	17.3	9	6.0	36	11.8
Lesser Extent	10	6.4	4	2.7	14	4.6
Uncertain	33	21.2	42	28.0	75	24.5
Some Extent	54	34.6	71	47.3	125	40.8
Great Extent	32	20.5	24	16.0	56	18.3
TOTAL	156	100.0	150	100.0	306	100.0

Chi-Square = 15.995

p = .003

Attitude Toward Dynastic Politics and Level Of Education

The Gamma value of .024 with a p-value of .800 at .05 level of significance shows that respondents' perception on the extent of political patronage is not significantly related to their level of educational achievement. Table 9 shows that respondents manifest a *neutral or undecided* attitude (quite high among High School educated at 79.2 %) towards dynastic politics regardless of their educational achievement, and only 26.4 % exhibit a *positive* attitude towards dynastic politics. In other words, respondents' level of education does not determine or influence their attitude towards dynastic politics.

Attitude toward 'Dynastic' Politics and Income

Table 10 reveals that *respondents* who belong to the lowest income bracket were *Neutral or Undecided* (73.2 %) whether or not to support a member of a dynastic family running for office, but 22.8 % of the respondents belonging to the same income group hold a *positive* attitude towards dynastic politicians. Significantly, the no income group holds a *negative* attitude towards dynastic politics.

The Gamma value of .148 with a *p*-value of .173 at .05 level of significance shows that no significant relationship exists between the respondents' attitude towards dynastic politics and their level of income.

Attitude towards dynastic politics and membership in socio-economic, civic, political and religious organizations

Data in Table 11 reveal that respondents, whether members (76.8 %) of socio-economic, civic and political organizations or not (71.8 %), are *Not Sure* whether or not to support a candidate coming from a dynastic family. The Chi-Square value of 1.183 with a *p*-value of 0.404 at .05 level of significance reveal that no significant relationship exists between the respondents' attitude towards 'dynastic' politics and their involvement in socio-economic, civic and political organizations. Respondents' attitude towards dynastic politics is not influenced by their organizational involvement.

Extent of Political Patronage and Attitude towards Dynastic Politics

Table 12 shows that 66.7 % of the respondents' combined scores reveal that *Ilonggo* voters felt that the use of patronage has to a *Greater Extent* (25.0 %) and to *Some Extent* (41.7 %) determine the election success of local

officials. The same group holds a *Positive* attitude towards dynastic politics. Furthermore, 56.3 % of their combined scores, were *Not Sure or Undecided* whether to support a candidate coming from a dynastic family.

Table 9. Distribution of Respondents According to Attitude towards Dynastic Politics and Level of Education (n=384)

Attitude towards Dynastic Politics	Level of Education								TOTAL	
	College Graduate		College Level		High School Level		Elementary Level			
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Positive (36.61-50.0)	21	26.3	11	22.4	30	17.9	23	26.4	85	22.1
Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6)	54	67.5	37	75.5	133	79.2	62	71.3	286	74.5
Negative (10-23.3)	5	6.3	1	2.5	5	3.0	2	2.3	13	3.4
TOTAL	80	100.0	49	100.0	168	100.0	87	100.0	384	100.0

Gamma = .024

p = .800

Table 10. Distribution of Respondents According to Attitude towards 'Dynastic' Politics and Income (n=252)

Attitude Towards Dynastic Politics	Income												TOTAL	
	P15,000 & above		P12,001-P15,000		P9,001-P12,000		P6,001-P9,000		P3,001-P6,000		P3,000 and below			
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Positive (36.61-50.0)	4	33.3	7	70.0	2	15.4	7	29.2	14	21.9	29	22.8	63	25.2
Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6)	7	58.3	3	30.0	11	84.6	17	70.8	46	71.9	95	73.2	179	70.8
Negative (10-23.3)	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6.3	5	3.9	10	4.0
TOTAL	12	100.0	10	100.0	13	100.0	24	100.0	64	100.0	129	100.0	252	100.0

Gamma = .148

p = .173

Table 11. Distribution of Respondents According to Attitude towards Dynastic Politics and Membership in Socio-Economic, Civic, Political and Religious Organizations (n=384)

Attitude towards Dynastic Politics	Membership in Socio-Economic, Civic, Political and Religious Organizations				TOTAL	
	Member		Not a Member		f	%
	f	%	f	%		
Positive (36.61-50.0)	42	20.7	43	23.8	85	22.1
Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6)	156	76.8	130	71.8	286	74.5
Negative (10-23.3)	5	2.5	8	4.4	13	3.4
TOTAL	203	100.0	181	100.0	384	100.0

Chi-Square = 1.183

p = 0.404

Table 12. Distribution of Respondents According to Perception on the Extent of Political Patronage and Attitude Towards Dynastic Politics

Extent of Political Patronage	Attitude towards Dynastic Politics						TOTAL	
	Positive (36.61-50.0)		Neutral/Undecided (23.31-36.6)		Negative (10-23.3)		f	%
	f	%	f	%	f	%		
Negligible	10	13.9	25	11.3	1	8.3	36	11.8
Lesser Extent	1	1.4	13	5.9	-	-	14	4.6
Uncertain/Undecided	13	18.1	59	26.6	3	25.0	75	24.5
Some Extent	30	41.7	90	40.5	5	41.7	125	40.8
Great Extent	18	25.0	35	15.8	3	25.0	56	18.3
TOTAL	72	100.0	222	100.0	12	100.0	306	100.0

Chi-Square = 7.857

p= .448

One in four (26.6 %) who remains *Uncertain/Undecided* about the effects of patronage practices on the election chances of local officials also hold the similar attitude towards dynastic politics, and a negligible number of respondents hold a *Negative* attitude towards dynastic politics.

The Chi-Square value of 7.857 with a *p*-value of .448 at .05 level of significance indicates no significant relationship between respondents' perception on the extent of patronage and their attitude towards dynastic politics. This finding

suggests that the practice of patronage cannot clearly account for the *Ilonggo* voters' ambivalent attitude towards dynastic politics or intra-familial succession.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Based on the salient findings of the study, the following conclusions and inferences are derived:

1. The study shows that typical *Ilonggo* voters in the Province of Iloilo are female, in their mid-40s, married and quite well-educated, having reached college level or obtained a college degree. Despite their college education, most of the respondents still live way below the poverty level due to lack of employment opportunities and a regular paying job. The bulk of the respondents' source of income comes from engaging in small-scale business, i.e., sari-sari store, buy and sell, fishing/ farming, and other forms of employment which fail to provide economic security. Thus, even their involvements in organizations, e.g., KALIPI, 4Ps are motivated by these economic considerations.

2. The study shows that the *Ilonggo* voters perceived that the extensive use of patronage has generally contributed to the election success of local politicians in the province – the Governor, Congressman, Mayor, and *Punong Barangay*. These findings validate a previous study on political patronage in Iloilo City by Saquibal (2008) that local politicians are more inclined to implement projects that have “immediate, tangible ‘personal’ impact on constituents especially those that are highly ‘visible’ such as infrastructure, e.g., roads, artesian wells, and water hand pumps, social welfare services, and personal assistance”. They have served as functional ‘promotional’ tools for the local officials from where to draw their political strength and support comes election time.

3. In terms of attitude towards dynastic politics, the *Ilonggo* voters exhibit a *generally ambivalent* attitude toward candidates from 'dynastic' families. Considering the fact that a negligible percentage of the respondents have a negative attitude towards dynastic politicians, the *Ilonggo* voters would be more inclined to support candidates, especially "dynastic" politicians, who exhibit good personal qualities and performance or record of accomplishments while in public office. Conversely, the findings also suggest that their choice of candidates is influenced by some other factors, as already mentioned, rather than by "just" being members of political families.

4. Except for their levels of income and organizational involvement, the tests for association indicate that the *Ilonggo* voters' socioeconomic and political characteristics do not have any significant bearing with regard to their perception on the extent of patronage practices in local electoral politics in Iloilo Province. Indeed, income has a bearing on the respondent's perception towards patronage politics precisely because the poor often are the recipients of patronage projects.

5. On the contrary, the *Ilonggo* voters' socioeconomic and political characteristics were not significantly related to their attitudes toward dynastic politics or intra-familial succession in local politics. The findings suggest that the *Ilonggo* voters' attitude towards 'dynastic' politicians is not influenced nor determined by their educational achievement, income and involvement or membership in socio-economic, civic, political and religious organizations.

6. The test for association indicates that the *Ilonggo* voters' perception of the extent of patronage does not have any bearing on their attitude towards dynastic politics. *Ilonggo* voters believe that the practice of patronage largely contributes to the electoral success of local politicians yet, they exhibit a *generally ambivalent* attitude but definitely not

a *negative* one with respect to candidates from 'dynastic' families.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are presented based on the major findings and conclusions of the study:

1. The current study which covered the general *Ilonggo* voting population in the Province of Iloilo as respondents, only included a limited number of barangay and local officials, thus it is recommended that further studies be pursued to include a considerable sample of elected local officials.

2. Since the data were gathered primarily through a survey, thus limiting itself to quantitative results and analysis, it would have been meaningful if in-depth interviews of key informants were pursued.

3. Finally, given sufficient funding and ample time, scholars and researchers on Philippine politics should consider replicating this study in other cities and provinces in the Philippines as well as examine other significant variables (especially those which the current study did not consider) to expand our understanding of these phenomena in Filipino electoral politics in the local level.

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