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THE ILONGO "REVOLUCIONARIOS" AND THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION

Henry F. Funtecha*

The revolutionary era in Iloilo Province can be divided into four distinct periods: the first, a period of active, pro-Hispanic loyalism from August 1896 when the Tagalog revolution began until August 1898 when the Spaniards surrendered to the Americans; second, a period of preparation and linking up with Malolos from August 1898 to October 1898; third, a period of brief local autonomy from November 1898 to January 1899, when a U.S. Army expeditionary force landed in Iloilo; and, finally, a period of sporadic fighting in 1899 and beyond as the U.S. military tried to establish control.

Ilongos Protested Against the Luzon Uprising

When the Katipunan revolution broke out in August 1896, the Ilongo elite responded with protestations of outrage and moving evocations of pro-Spanish loyalty. In fact, only a few days after news

of the Luzon uprising reached Iloilo, the Jaro Ayuntamiento or municipal government — comprised entirely of Ilongos — convened a special session to pass a resolution condemning the act of rebellion and calling those who were responsible for it as "ungrateful".¹ They, at the same time, assured the Spaniards of the "unshakable" loyalty of the Ilongos.² Many even enlisted as loyal volunteers in the different towns of the province committed to preserve Spanish hegemony.

Convinced by the outpouring of loyalty that there was a fundamental distinction between the "criminal Tagalog rebellion" and the "purity of patriotic love which animates the Visayan heart", the local Spanish community organized the Loyal Volunteers or "voluntarios" in the various municipalities of the provinces. They also initiated the establishment of the Ilongo Volunteer Battalion of 500 natives and a large

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¹For a full text of the Ilongo resolution, see *El Porvenir de Visayas* (Iloilo), September 7, 1896, p.1.

²Following the lead made by the Jaro Ayuntamiento, other Iloilo towns passed similar measures, some even surpassing Jaro in their expression of support and loyalty to the Spaniards.

ly Spanish officer cadre.³ The Ilongo Volunteer Battalion was supported by regular financial contributions from the Ilongo elite or "ilustrado" class.⁴ After its arrival in Manila in early 1897 it became the largest native unit serving with Spanish forces against Aguinaldo's troops in the battleground of Cavite and established a distinguished combat record.

As a reward for the "valiant" service rendered by the Ilongo Volunteer Battalion, Queen Maria Cristina of Spain issued a Royal Decree on June 11, 1897 awarding Iloilo City the perpetual title "Muy Leal" (Very Loyal).⁵

The Battalion's return to Iloilo City in April 1898 was the occasion for parades and outpourings of pro-Spanish patriotism by the city's

Spanish and Ilongo elite communities.⁶

Ilongo Reaction to Spanish Defeat in Manila

The sinking of the Spanish fleet by the U.S. Asiatic Squadron and the subsequent surrender of the Spaniards to the Americans in Manila changed the attitude of the Ilongos towards the Spaniards. They no longer believed in the "invincible banner" of Spain.⁷ Thus, realizing that they can also put an end to Spanish power in Iloilo Province, the Ilongo elite organized a revolutionary committee.⁸ This committee immediately sent out agents to secure funds for the purchase of arms and ammunitions. It also sent secret emissaries to the other provinces of Panay and the Visayas, and endeavored to establish a link with Malolos.⁹

³El Eco de Panay (Iloilo), December 4, 1896, p. 1; also, El Porvenir . . . , November 28, 1896, p. 1.

⁴Letter from the Archbishop of Jaro, December 24, 1896, Molo Parish Church, Iloilo City. The contributors included Felix de la Rama, Eugenio Lopez and members of most of Iloilo's urban ilustrado families. See Federacion de Monteverde y Sedano, *Campaña de Filipinas: La Division la Chambre* (Madrid: Hernandez y cia, 1898), pp. 102-108; also, El Eco . . . , March 16, 1897, p. 3.

⁵El Eco . . . , June 22, 1897, p. 3; June 23, 1897, p. 12; October 26, 1897, p. 21.

⁶El Eco . . . , April 26, 1898, p. 3.

⁷El Porvenir . . . , September 7, 1896, p. 1.

⁸The forerunner of this revolutionary committee was the "Comite Conspirador" which was formed in March 1898 in Molo, Iloilo. It was under whose orders and plans the revolutionary movement in Panay was initiated, principally at Iloilo. See P.I.R. - Exhibit 1186. P.I.R. refers to "Philippine Insurgent Records", mostly in Spanish, compiled in John R.M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*, 5 volumes (Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971).

⁹P.I.R. - Exh. 1198 - Letter of Roque Lopez, President of the Iloilo government, to Emilio Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 5, 1898.

Transfer of the Spanish Capital to Iloilo

Meanwhile, as a result of the Spanish debacle in Luzon, the capital of the Spanish government in the Philippines was transferred to Iloilo in October 1898. With the evident purpose of saving the Visayas and Mindanao from the fate that had befallen Luzon, Gen. Diego de los Rios, the last Spanish governor-general of the Philippines, asked the mother country to grant some of the reforms¹⁰ demanded by representative citizens of Iloilo. When some of the remedies were finally granted only a few "ilustrado" leaders in Iloilo were satisfied. The flame of rebellion was too far spread for them to have any effect. The Ilongos, especially the masses, wanted independence above all else.

General Uprising

As agreed upon by the Ilongo leaders, the general uprising in the province took place on October 28, 1898. On this day onward several interior towns of the province were

liberated. To the surprise of the Spaniards, the "voluntarios" who were supposed to suppress the revolution should it come, declared themselves "revolucionarios" and had the Spaniards placed under custody as prisoners.¹¹

By the first week of November only Jaro, Molo and Iloilo City remained in the hands of the Spaniards.¹² Thereupon, the Revolutionary Government asked for their immediate evacuation by the Spanish troops, besides the sum of ₱12,000 as indemnification from the Spanish Government for the houses burned by the Spanish soldiers during their skirmishes with the "revolucionarios".¹³ General de los Rios acceded to the evacuation of Jaro and of La Paz but asked for Molo to remain as a neutral post with Spanish troops, "not as guards but as guests" owing to the lack of quarters in Iloilo City.¹⁴ On November 21 Jaro was delivered by the Spanish government to the Ilongos.¹⁵

¹⁰The principal reforms demanded were the expulsion of the friars and of the guardia civil and the granting of autonomy.

¹¹Epifanio Concepcion, *Memorias de un Revolucionario* (Iloilo City: National Press, 1949), pp. 12-20.

¹²P.I.R. - Exh. 1198 - Lopez to Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 5, 1898.

¹³P.I.R. - Exh. 1197 - Letter of J. Hernandez, Commissioner of War of the Iloilo government, to E. Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 4, 1898.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵P.I.R. - Exh. 1196 - Minutes; also, Exh. 1198 - Lopez to Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 5, 1898.

Ilongos Forewarned About the Americans

While the Ilongos were remarkably gaining ground in their move to dislodge the Spaniards from their province, another enemy was preparing itself in Manila to sail to Iloilo. This prompted Aguinaldo in early November 1898 and again in late December of the same year to send instructions to the Ilongos, telling them 1) not to recognize the sovereignty of the U.S. government, 2) to fire against the Americans in case they attempt to land in Iloilo, and 3) to dig trenches in preparation for American bombardment.¹⁶

Significantly, the same instructions told the Ilongos to select uneducated persons to take charge of attacks, if necessary, with bolo arms.¹⁷ Clearly, this was an open policy to exploit the masses to spare the "ilustrados" from fighting.

Establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas

To give a semblance of unity and provide authority to the revolutionary movement, the Revolutionary Government of the Visayas, which was envisioned to be federal in nature, was formally inaugurated in Santa Barbara, Iloilo on November 17, 1898. Roque Lopez served as president and Martin Delgado was appointed as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army in Iloilo. The government was organized to insure a regular course to the revolutionary movement.¹⁸ In this occasion the Filipino flag was raised for the first time in Iloilo Province.¹⁹ The existence of the Revolutionary Government was made known to Malolos and to the towns and provinces of the Visayan islands.²⁰ The Iloilo government recognized the Malolos Government and adhered to it,²¹ although at

¹⁶P.I.R. - Exh. 1208 - Instructions, Malolos, December 25, 1898.

¹⁷Ibid.; also P.I.R. - Exh. 1209 - Document addressed to the Provincial Presidente or to the Military Chief of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, from E. Aguinaldo, signed by R. Lopez, President of the Iloilo government, December 25, 1898.

¹⁸P.I.R. - Exh. 1190 - Minutes, November 17, 1898; Exh. 1198; Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (Manila: Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Foundation, 1969), p. 130.

¹⁹Concepcion, *Memorias . . .*, pp. 19-20.

²⁰P.I.R. - Exh. 1190.

²¹*La Revolucion*, Jaro (Iloilo), January 5, 1899; P.I.R. - Exh. 1191 - Letter from Ilongo officials to Aguinaldo, December 5, 1898; Exh. 1194 - Minutes, Santa Barbara, November 20, 1898; Exh. 1192 - Document addressed to the local chiefs of the towns, signed by Fernando Salas, Secretary General of the Iloilo government, November 18, 1898; Exh. 1198 - Letter of Roque Lopez, President of the Iloilo government to Emilio Aguinaldo, December 15, 1898; Exh. 1196 - Minutes, Jaro, November 21, 1898, signed by R. Lopez and Vicente Franco plus 16 others.

first the Ilongos preferred a federal set-up to the unitary form established in Luzon.²² In fact a long protracted negotiation between Iloilo and Malolos occurred before the Iloilo government was dissolved and was replaced by a Politico-Military Government in accordance with the instructions from the central government in Luzon.²³ This was in September 1899, almost eleven months after the establishment of the federal set-up of government in Iloilo. Gen. Martin Delgado was appointed as Politico-Military Governor of the province.

Fear of the Ilongos of American Intention

By the first week of December 1898 the Ilongo "revolucionarios" were already worried of American intention with regards to Iloilo and Panay, as a whole. This was aggravated by the fact that not one of the armed expeditions sent by Aguinaldo from Luzon had landed

yet on the shores of Panay.²⁴ The Ilongo leadership at this time felt that they had no sufficient elements with which to repulse the Americans.

The traditional enmity of the Ilongos for the Tagalogs was not sufficient to prevent their cooperating with the latter in the central government in Luzon, especially because of the American threat. It is evident that the Ilongo leaders consulted Aguinaldo and Mabini as to what the former should do in the event of an American landing.²⁵

Spanish Offer for Negotiations

Meanwhile, with the Spanish Army being besieged by the revolutionary troops in the positions which they held in Iloilo City and in Molo, and being threatened by a decisive attack,²⁶ the Spanish government in Iloilo opened up negotiations with the "revolucionarios".²⁷

²²P.I.R. – Exh. 1197 – Letter of J. Hernandez to E. Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 4, 1898; Exh. 1212 – Document addressed to the inhabitants of the island of Panay, Jaro, January 5, 1899, signed by R. Lopez and Francisco Soriano. For a detailed discussion of other issues involved between Iloilo and Malolos, see P.I.R. – Exh. 1225 – Malolos, unsigned copy, either prepared for the signature of E. Aguinaldo or else a retained copy of a letter sent by him.

²³P.I.R. – Exh. 1265 – Document addressed to the local presidentes of the towns, signed by Martin Delgado, September 23, 1899; also, Exh. 1264 – From General Headquarters of Santa Barbara.

²⁴P.I.R. – Exh. 1197 – Letter of J. Hernandez to E. Aguinaldo, December 4, 1898.

²⁵P.I.R. – Exh. 1198 – Letter of R. Lopez, President of the Iloilo government, to E. Aguinaldo, Jaro, December 5, 1898.

²⁶John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands* (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1899), p. 630.

²⁷P.I.R. – Exh. 1202 – Minutes, Jaro, Dec. 21, 1898.

Apparently, the Spaniards still wanted to salvage their authority. The main point of the Spaniards was "to bring about harmony and union between the Ilongo people and the Spaniards" in order to present a common front against the Americans.²⁸ This overture, however, did not elicit any favorable reaction on the part of the Ilongos. They knew that they could command their price at this time and there was no turning back. Therefore, the Spaniards could not do anything but to agree to the terms set by the Ilongo "revolucionarios." The outcome of the negotiations was the evacuation of Molo and Iloilo City by the Spanish troops and the subsequent occupation thereof by the revolutionary troops on December 24 and 26, 1898, respectively.

The American Entrance Into Iloilo Harbor

The victory of the Ilongo "rev-

olucionarios" was short-lived. On December 28, only three days after Iloilo City was occupied by the native troops, the American warships under Gen. Marcus Miller appeared at the Iloilo harbor.²⁹ This military expedition was sent to Iloilo from Manila on petition of foreign businessmen and merchants in Iloilo who asked for American protection in the face of the fighting between the native and Spanish troops.³⁰

Despite the vehement refusal of the Ilongos the Americans could have landed immediately through their superior military force, if not for the pending treaty with Spain which Pres. William McKinley wanted to go through the U.S. Senate. Miller had specific instructions to be conciliatory and to avoid conflict with the Ilongos.³¹ American troops, therefore, had to stay on board their transports for 44 days.³² This event is referred to by

²⁸P.I.R. - Exh. 1196 - Minutes of the Meeting, Jaro, November 21, 1898; also Exh. 1203 - Minutes of the Meeting, Jaro, December 22, 1898.

²⁹For the composition of the American Expeditionary Force, see P.I.R. - Exh. 1219 - January 19, 1899, signed by Apolinario Mabini; also, Foreman, *Philippine Islands*, p. 631.

³⁰Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army, in *Annual Reports of the War Department*, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 64; also, Philippine Information Society, *Facts About the Filipinos*, Vol. I, No. 10 (Boston, September 15, 1901), pp. 82-83. Hereafter referred to as *P.I.S.*, Facts.

³¹James H. Blount, *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1968), p. 152. Blount was an officer of the U.S. Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899; later served as U.S. District Judge in the Philippines, 1901-05; also, *War Department Report*, Part 2, 1899, pp. 55, 59, 79.

³²Blount, *American Occupation*, p. 155.

American writers as the "Iloilo Fiasco."

Meanwhile Gen. Delgado ordered all troops in the interior towns to converge at the city. So quick was the response to his orders that within the short period of three days since the arrival of the Americans, 12,000 men, 2,500 of whom were well-armed, had come to the city.³³

Malolos, on its part, made it clear that it was ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempted to take forcible possession of Iloilo or any Visayan island under its jurisdiction.³⁴

The Iloilo Fiasco augured well for the Ilongos. It swelled the ranks of the "revolucionarios" who were willing to fight the enemy. Blount, writing about this, states:

The Iloilo fiasco did indeed furnish to the insurgent cause aid and comfort at the psychological moment when it most needed encouragement to bring things

to a head. It presented a spectacle of vacillation and seeming cowardice which heartened the timid among the insurgents and started among them a general eagerness for war which had been lacking before.³⁵

The Outbreak of War and the American Landing at Iloilo

As a result of the outbreak of the Filipino-American War in Luzon, General Miller finally received his long-awaited order to take Iloilo on February 10, 1899.³⁶ On the morning of February 11 the Americans heavily bombarded Iloilo City. This was followed by the landing of American marines in the city and its subsequent occupation. The suburb towns of Molo, La Paz, Jaro and Mandurriao also fell shortly thereafter.

Moving out to the interior, however, was a different story. American advance was hindered by the stiff resistance put up by the Ilongo "revolucionarios".³⁷ In fact it was

³³Report of Gen. Elwell S. Otis (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 61.

³⁴P.I.R. - Exh. 1205 - Letter of Apolinario Mabini to President Aguinaldo, December 24, 1898; P.I.R. 186.10 - Letter to Galiciano Apacible, Malolos, January 6, 1899; Apolinario Mabini, *La Revolucion Filipina*, Tomo Primero (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931), p. 246; Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines - Past and Present* (New York: Mac-Millan Co., 1914), p. 137.

³⁵Blount, *American Occupation*, p. 155.

³⁶Annual Reports of the War Department, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 104.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 107; P.I.R. - Exh. 1239 - Addressed to E. Aguinaldo, from M. Delgado, Iloilo, March 25, 1899; P.I.R. - Exh. 1225 - To Aguinaldo, from Leandro Fullon, Antique, March 31, 1899.

not until November 1899 that the Americans succeeded in occupying the other principal towns of Iloilo. But even then, due to insufficient troops, the Americans were not able to establish immediately effective control over these outlying areas and some of them reverted to Ilongo hands for some time. Even in areas that were reportedly under the effective jurisdiction of the Americans, U.S. troops were continuously harrassed by the Ilongo "revolucionarios" who organized themselves into guerilla columns.

The Ilongo Guerillas .

The remaining revolutionary elements in Iloilo that were organized into guerilla units in the early part of 1900 were given official sanction by General Aguinaldo when he signed General Order No. 202 to the Philippine Army, reiterating the freedom of all guerilla commanders "to attack any detachment or post of the enemy, and continually molest the same."³⁸

Aguinaldo and other Filipino leaders believed that the stronger the demonstration they made of opposition to the United States continuing in the Philippines, the greater the certainty of American public opinion insisting upon with-

drawal of sovereignty.

Thus, in 1900, the natives in arms against the Americans in Iloilo had even redoubled their efforts at harrassing the latter so that it was no longer safe for the Americans to move from one municipality to another. No less than the commanding general of the Americans' Visayas Operations, Gen. Robert P. Hughes who succeeded Miller, had admitted the gravity of the American position. He wrote in one of his reports, dated August 16, 1900:

It is not safe for three men to go out on any road in Panay. If bridges were built, they would burn them down, as they have done in the few instances where we have to build . . . the people with rifles are just as persistent as they were fourteen months ago.³⁹

There was no doubt at all that the Ilongo revolutionary leaders, especially General Delgado, had the support of men and non-combatants alike. It will be remembered that in September 1900, General Hughes reported: "The people of the island (Panay) are a unit against us."⁴⁰

Thus, despite the arrival of add-

³⁸Quoted in Elihu Root, *Military and Colonial Policy of the United States*, p. 51, cited by W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*. Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), p. 112.

³⁹Contained in the Diary of Events from August 23, to September 21, 1900, in P.I.S., Facts, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 93.

itional American troops operating in Iloilo Province, resistance even increased in intensity due to frequent guerilla activities.

Towards the end of 1900, conditions in Iloilo and in Panay, in general, became so bad that General Hughes, writing on December 25, says:

The whole population has been rank insurrectos from hide to heart, and all have been contributing to the support of the course in one way or another according to their ability.⁴¹

Measures Employed by the Americans to Weaken Resistance

To weaken resistance to their rule the Americans initiated the policy of attraction by inviting Ilongo leaders to join the U.S. controlled government. Good positions with good salaries were offered, especially to those who renounced their association with the resistance movement.⁴² Obviously, however, the invitation to join the American government was limited only to

the "Iustrados".

Also, there is plenty of evidence that the Americans employed threat and violence in forcing people to submit allegiance to the American flag. Such threats and violence as confiscation of property, subjecting people to torture or forcing them to flee to the mountains, reconcentrating them in specified villages, and even death were commonly resorted to if the people did not recognize American sovereignty and take an oath of allegiance before two witnesses. Cases of whole towns and barangay communities razed to the ground by the Americans were recorded.⁴³ Reports of extortion, torture and murder in Iloilo even leaked to the United States that mass meetings of protests against the suppression of truth about Iloilo, in particular, and the Philippines, in general, were held in Boston in the early 1900's.⁴⁴

It is important to note that among the first ones to abandon

⁴¹Ibid., p. 33.

⁴²P.I.R. - Exh. 1260 - Document addressed to Emilio Aguinaldo, from 35 signatories, Santa Barbara (Iloilo), August 1, 1899.

⁴³P.I.R. - Exh. 1306 - To Sr. Juan Somociera, President of the Katipunan of Santa Barbara, from P. Mondejar, Guerilla Chief, November 30, 1900; Exh. 1307 - Addressed to "My Dear Com-patriots", from Martin Delgado, December 2, 1900; Exh. 1312 - Document dated April 7, 1901.

⁴⁴Two celebrated cases reported were: 1) the extortion of the amount of P30,000 and murder of a priest of Molo through the alleged secret orders of General Hughes; 2) torture of a Filipino doctor of Jaro and alleged extortion for \$38,000. See *Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines*, Faneuil Hall, Thursday, March 19 (Boston, March 1903), no page number.

the cause well before the surrender of their guerilla units and sought an accommodation with the U.S. civil government were those who had extensive sugar "haciendas" in Negros. They were concerned with the survival of the sugar industry and their personal interests in it.⁴⁵ With only a few exceptions, the Ilongo officer cadre that remained in the field against the U.S. Army until 1901 were local town leaders with small or medium landholdings in the interior of Iloilo.

It must be stated here that many of those who took an oath of allegiance to the U.S. government were not at all sincere. This lack of sincerity, no doubt, was known to the Americans, but it suited their purpose. The presentation of thousands of documents acknowledging their sovereignty aided in convincing their government back home of the subjugation of the Ilongos.

What hastened further the taking of oath of allegiance to the U.S. government was that those who failed to do so were not only excluded from office, but were also disenfranchised.⁴⁶ This certainly put a high premium on the taking of the oath.

Resistance Continued Despite the Surrenders

Despite the surrender of many of the prominent "revolucionario" leaders, especially in late 1900, the resistance against the Americans continued. The younger and bolder spirits among the Ilongos remained faithful, engaging in many battles and much hiking, many of them unto death. But almost from the very start the Ilongo resistance to the Americans was undermined by many factors,⁴⁷ among them were: inadequate funds and supplies, lack of cooperation and coordination among military commanders in the field, antagonism between the Ilongo troops and the Tagalog expeditionary troops, and public disorder. Topping this list of course was the willingness of the "ilustrado" class in Iloilo to collaborate with the enemy, turning into loyal allies of the latter.

By December 1900 the desire for peace had grown so strong among the "ilustrados" in Iloilo that a circular letter was written by the leading citizens, urging General Delgado to surrender. The letter explained that the fight was futile and would be lost in the long run

⁴⁵ P.I.R. - Exh. 1284 - Addressed to the General of the Government of Occupation, March 1, 1900; Exh. 1281 - To the Local Presidente, Tigbauan, January 31(?), 1900, from Pio Claveria, Delegate of the Military Government; Exh. 1289 - To the Guerilla Chief, Nicolas Roces, from Francisco Jalandoni, Acting Chief of Staff, June 1, 1900.

⁴⁶ P.I.S., Facts, p. 85.

⁴⁷ A detailed discussion of these factors is treated by the writer in a separate article.

and that the early surrender of the general-in-chief would save many lives.⁴⁸

It is important to note that among the eight signatories to the circular all but one were former prominent leaders of the nationalist movement in Iloilo. Heretofore they were considered irreconcilables and the change in their attitude was most important to the Americans, even if not entirely sincere. The Americans were hopeful that such change in attitude would lead to an effective pro-American movement in Iloilo.

The circular succeeded in getting Delgado, together with his men, to surrender on February 2, 1901 in Jaro.⁴⁹ His surrender produced a profound effect in the pacification of Iloilo and the whole of Panay. Together with the efforts of the influential propertied men in Panay, the rank of surrenderees to the

Americans swelled in number.

By the end of 1901 it was expected that peace was attained, especially as a result of the surrender of the last prominent Ilongo "revolucionario", Col. Quintin Salas. But the reports of the U.S. War Department, the Philippine Constabulary, which was organized to campaign for the maintenance of peace and order in the archipelago, and the Governor of the Province of Iloilo from 1901 to 1904 show that the expectation for peace was illusory.⁵⁰ Resistance which the Americans dubbed as "outlawry" persisted in the province, as well as in other parts of Panay. It was precisely because of this "outlawry" or "banditry" that, despite the organization of the Philippine Constabulary in the island, the Americans still had to maintain a strong military presence in the area through the retention of garrisons.⁵¹

⁴⁸For the full text of the letter, see P.I.S., Facts, pp. 59-61.

⁴⁹For a detailed account of the surrender of General Delgado, see Diary of Events from December 29, 1900 to January 12, 1901, in P.I.S., Facts, pp. 91-92.

⁵⁰Report of Maj. C. J. Crane, Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Visayas, Iloilo, September 10, 1901, in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*, Part 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 435; Report of the Third District, Philippine Constabulary, Iloilo, June 30, 1904, in the *Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904*, Part 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 93-95; Report of the Governor of the Province of Iloilo, Raymundo Melliza, Iloilo, August 23, 1904, in *Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904*, Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 505.

⁵¹The U.S. War Department reported that Camp Jossman on the island of Guimaras had 10 companies of infantry and 3 companies of Philippine Scouts, while Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City had a garrison of 2 companies of infantry. See Reports of Division and Department Commanders, in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1904*, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904); also, Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. I, p. 191.

The leaders of the supposed "outlaws" were men like Torribio, Sano and Oto of Iloilo; Ompong and Pitoc of Antique; and Julian Vertosa of Capiz, who had established a name for themselves after the surrender of the "ilustrado" leadership of the resistance movement in Pa-

nay. The question is, were these men plain outlaws, or did they assume the mantle of leadership of the movement after such men like Delgado, Salas, Fullon and others went over to the American side? A study on the lives of these men is therefore necessary.

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RURAL ELECTRIFICATION: ITS EFFECTS ON PEOPLE'S SOCIOECONOMIC LIFE AND ASPIRATIONS*

Venancio B. Ardales

Background and Rationale of the Study

Just like any developing country, the Philippines has acknowledged the importance of electricity in its over-all development. Its leaders believe that power is necessary not only as a vital service to Filipino households but also as an indispensable catalyst for social, economic and individual reforms. For this and many other reasons, rural electrification became a priority in the infrastructure programs of the government.

Rural electrification in the country started in 1962. It was designed primarily to bring the benefits of electricity to the rural masses by providing the needed power for income-generating industries and irrigation systems for increased agricultural production. The program now enjoys the financial and technical assistance of the United States

for International Development (USAID) and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) of the United States.

The province of Iloilo is one beneficiary of the rural electrification program of the government. The Iloilo Electric Cooperative, Inc. I (ILECO I) was legally established on June 21, 1971 with a general objective to help hasten the development of the province and of the region. Its operations officially started on November 26, 1974. As of 1978, the ILECO I records show an area coverage of 15 municipalities which have a total population of 46,130 persons. Two other ILECO plants, the ILECO II & III, service the other towns of the province.

After seventeen years of operations, it seems fitting to assess the results of the program so far. Thus this evaluation study which would tell whether the large amount of

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money, the time, talent and efforts expended on this costly project were well spent, whether the project produced a proportionate desired effect, and whether the project proceeds and is implemented accordingly as planned.

Theoretical Framework and Objectives

This study was based on the theory that, given the project area's socio-economic, political structure, environmental and other exogenous factors, rural electrification will interact with other developmental outputs like agricultural, industrial, and social development programs. The interaction will result in social, economic as well as demographic changes.

The changes that are generated by the interaction of the rural electrification with other factors are observable at two levels; namely, the community and the household.

On the above model, this investigation was designed to meet the following general objectives:

1. To find out whether the socio-economic situations and levels of aspiration of people in energized communities like Miagao are better or higher than those of people in non-energized areas like Banate.
2. To know whether users of electricity have higher socio-economic status and levels of

aspiration than the non-users who live within the service area of the electrification project.

3. To determine whether energized communities are more socially and economically progressive than the non-energized communities.

Procedures

The exploratory comparative design was used in this study. This called for the purposive selection of Banate, a non-energized town and Miagao, a municipality which had had electrification for about four years. These sample towns were comparable in terms of geographical location and in terms of the primary and secondary occupations of their inhabitants. The study design also called for the purposive selection of three barangays in each town. Their selection was based on accessibility in terms of proximity of the three barangays in each municipality to each other or to the poblacion; cooperativeness of the barangay captain, and long exposure to electricity in the case of energized sample barangays.

Two groups of respondents cooperated in this study. These were the 415 heads of sample households and the 26 opinion leaders of the communities under study. The former were chosen at random while the latter were purposively selected. Sample house-

holds in Miagao were categorized into Users and Non-users of electricity. The latter group was further classified as Non-adoptors and In-accessibles. The samples from both towns were also classified according to their area of residence; namely, poblacion and barangay.

Two sets of interview schedules were used. A structured schedule was used for the household heads. An unstructured and less standardized type was employed for the opinion leaders who represented different institutions and communities.

Data analyses include the following:

1. Comparison of the economic situations and aspiration levels of the respondents and their households by municipality, by area of residence, that is, between poblacions and between sample barangays, and by use or non-use of electricity;
2. comparison of the socio-economic conditions and levels of aspiration of the respondents and their households in Miagao sample areas by area of residence; and
3. comparison of the social and economic conditions of the energized sample communities of Miagao and the non-energized sample communities of Banate.

Descriptive statistics were used for the profile of the respondents and their households and for comparison purposes. To find out how one group differs from another in aspects on which they were compared, the significance of the difference between their means, between their medians, or between their proportions was computed using z-tests for uncorrelated samples at .05 level of significance. To determine change over time in the perception of the respondent about the adequacy of their incomes, a two-tailed t-test for correlated samples was employed using a .05 level of significance.

Significant Findings

Results of the study reveal the following significant findings:

1. Sample households in energized Miagao poblacion were far more progressive than those in the non-energized poblacion of Banate. They were found to have higher incomes, higher levels of living, greater social participation, higher level of education, higher levels of aspiration than their Banate counterparts. However, their perceptions of their future incomes and life situations were not any better than those in Banate poblacion.

Over half of the sample in Miagao poblacion associated the availability of electricity

city with the improvements in their life situations.

2. Sample households in the energized Miagao barangays were better than their Banate counterparts only in terms of level of living and educational attainment of the household head. Their levels of aspiration were not any higher than those of Banate samples. They were found to be more pessimistic about their future incomes than the Banate samples. Their perceptions of their future life situations were not any better than those of their Banate counterparts.

Only a little over ten per cent of the respondents in Miagao sampled villages associated electrification with the improvements in their living conditions.

- 3 By municipality, the samples in Miagao were more progressive than those in Banate only in terms of level of living, level of social participation, and education of the household head. Their levels of aspiration were higher but they were more pessimistic about their future incomes and life situations than those in Banate.

Of the total Miagao sample, only twenty per cent associated electrification with the improvements in their living conditions.

4. Users of electricity proved to be far more progressive than the Non-users. They were found to have greater household and per capita incomes, higher levels of living, greater social participation, higher educational attainment, and higher levels of aspiration than the Non-users. Moreover, they were more optimistic about their future household incomes and life situations than the Non-users.

Thirty one per cent of the total Users and only five per cent of the total Non-users whose life situations have improved associated electrification with the change in their living conditions.

5. Electricity Users in Miagao poblacion were found to have higher incomes, higher levels of living, greater social participation, and higher levels of aspiration than their counterparts in the sample villages.

Fifty-five per cent of the Users in the poblacion and only eleven per cent of those in sample villages associated electrification with the improvements in their life situations. Electricity, they revealed, provides them with relatively cheap motive power for their household utilities. It provides energy for some enterprises in their communi-

ties, particularly in the poblacion, which raised the level of employment in the area and which in turn increased the incomes of the people.

6. The total sample in Miagao was exposed to electricity for a little over two years on the average; 2.7 years for the poblacion sample but only 1.7 years for those in the villages. The income of the household and the education of the household head were strongly associated with the adoption of electricity. Electricity was perceived by all respondents to be important in providing cheap motive energy to electrical appliances/equipments and businesses, and in making possible the night time activities, economic and otherwise.

Poor economic condition is the major reason for the non-adoption of electricity. The majority of the non-adoptors expressed their desire for electricity connection in their houses.

More than half of the sample in non-energized Banate have plans to install electricity in their homes once it is made available to them.

7. All opinion leaders in sample areas of the towns claimed progress in the communities and institutions they represented. In the case of Miagao

institutions and communities that were considered, many of the changes were associated by the respondents with electrification. However, opinion leaders differed in their assessment of the socio-economic conditions of their people. Eighty per cent of the Miagao opinion leaders and only 36.4 per cent of those in Banate claimed improvements in the socio-economic life of the people in their respective communities.

The opinion leaders in Banate were all enthusiastic about the coming of electricity to their communities which they believe will contribute greatly to the development of their institutions and communities.

But many complained about the inconveniences of power failure, particularly in the barangays, which they said, together with the lack of capital and expertise, slow down the progress of their communities.

Recommendations

In the light of the nature and results of this study the following are suggested:

For Policy Makers

Results reveal that the poblacion sample benefited more from the electrification project than the barangay dwellers. Since the main

target of this development project are the rural poor, the majority of whom reside in the villages, the electric service system in these areas should be improved. Immediate attention should be given to the complaints of the respondents, particularly the Users of electricity about the frequent power failure and the inadequate power supply in the barangays.

Moreover, it was found that the economic factor is the major reason for the non-adoption of electricity.

The same reason and the lack of expertise were also the constraining factors which prevented many people from starting even a small-scale business or home industry. It is suggested, therefore, that a loan service system on easy terms and which does not require much paper work and red-tape, and a team of experts on, say, the operation or management of enterprises, be made available to the people. These and many others, interacting with electricity, will greatly enhance the living conditions of the rural folks, particularly the poor.

Results of the study point out that household Users of electricity and communities exposed to electrification have enjoyed benefits from the project, though still limited, considering the short period of their exposure to electricity. It is strongly suggested, therefore, that the electrification project be maintained and supported and, as much

as possible, be made available to the entire populace of the country.

For Research Methodology

The lack of baseline data forced the investigator to rely heavily on respondents' retrospections in assessing the changes that occurred since electrification. Thus, the evaluation of changes over time is rather weak. It is recommended, therefore, that baseline information be obtained in areas before their electrification. These would provide bases for the proper evaluation of the changes caused by electrification, alone or in interaction with other factors.

Moreover, a project like electrification has two observable effects — the immediate and those which require a longer period of time to be pervasive. It is suggested then that a prospective study over time be made on the impacts of rural electrification. A continuous monitoring approach will also be helpful in providing in-depth and contextual knowledge of the specific changes caused by electrification in interaction with other rural development projects and other community factors.

It is also suggested that a large-scale study which should include more respondents and more areas be made so as to have a better perspective of the effects of the electrification project.

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN WOMEN'S EMANCIPATION AND THEIR FERTILITY AND BETWEEN EMANCIPATION AND OTHER VARIABLES

Elma S. Herradura

This was a sub-study done on data gathered from four areas in Iloilo; an agricultural community (Lambunao); a fishing community (Estancia); a semi-industrial community (Passi) and a "services" community (Iloilo City). The data were obtained from questionnaires accomplished in connection with the fertility studies funded by the Aboitiz Foundation, at Central Philippine University, in 1977.

Though this sub-study was made mainly to determine the association between women's degree of emancipation and their fertility (number of pregnancies), it was also an attempt to compare the degree of emancipation of women of different ages, SES, level of schooling, and place of residence.

An emancipated woman in this study is one who has "a mind of her own." She has confidence in her competence and in the quality of her ideas, so she feels free to voice her opinions and feelings.

To determine the degree of emancipation of the women, their responses to the following questions were rated. These ratings were then added to get an emancipation score.

Item 10.17 Important decisions involving family problems should be made by

- A. The father, as head of the family.
- B. Both the father and mother in consultation

If the respondent agrees completely that the decision be made only by the father, she is given 0 point. If she agrees with it only partially, she is given 1 point. If she agrees completely that the decision should be made by both father and mother in consultation, she gets 3 points; if only partially, she gets 2 points.

Item 10.29 If a girl's parents object to her marriage to one whom they do not like,

- A. the young couple should get married just the same (if they are not minors.)
- B. the girl should obey her parents.

If the respondent completely agrees that the young couple should get married (Alternative A), she gets 3 points; if she partially agrees with it she gets only 2. If she completely agrees that the girl should obey her parents (Alternative B), she gets 0; if she agrees only partly with Alternative B, she gets 1 point.

Item 10.a9 I can talk about national issues perhaps with more insight than other women I know.

If the R (respondent) says this is "de-

finitely true" in her case, she gets 3; if it is only "true", she gets 2 points. If she says such a statement is "not true," she gets 1; but if she says "definitely not true", she gets 0. A woman who takes active interest in and discusses national issues is likely to be one who is independent-minded and has broad interests beyond the family concerns; these are taken as marks of an emancipated woman.

Item 10.a 15 I usually don't hesitate to openly express my personal opinions in conversation/discussions.

If the R says it is "definitely true" that she does not hesitate to openly express her personal opinions, she gets 3 points; if she says "true" to this statement, she is given 2. If she says "not true", she gets 1; if she says "definitely not true", she gets 0.

Item 11.11 When choosing a husband/wife, one should in the order of importance

- A. follow the parent's advice
- B. get the approval of immediate relatives
- C. decide for himself/herself.

If the R ranks Alternative C first, she gets 3 points, if she ranks it second, she gets 2; if she ranks it third, she gets 1 point.

Table 1 gives the statistics on the emancipation scores of women in the three community groups. The barrio women obtained a median of 8.18, with SE of .195; their parameter median lies between 7.76 and 8.57.* The town women had a higher median (9.14) than did the barrio group. The SE of the town group being .21, their parameter median lies between 8.73 and 9.55. The city

group obtained the highest median, 9.67. With SE of .25, their parameter median is estimated between 9.18 and 10.16.

The difference of .96 between the barrio and town women was significant (CR=3.39). The bigger difference of 1.49 between barrio and city yielded a CR of 4.73. But the difference of .53 between the town and city groups yielded a CR of only 1.65. The town and city women did not differ very much in emancipation and egalitarianism; both groups were more emancipated than their barrio sisters.

TABLE I
STATISTICS ON EMANCIPATION SCORES
OF WOMEN IN THREE TYPES OF
COMMUNITIES

	Barrio	Town	City
No.	174	171	115
Mean	8.2	9.0	9.6
S.D.	2.05	2.15	2.11
S.E. _m	.16	.16	.20
Median	8.18	9.14	9.67
Difference between Medians	.96	.53	1.19*
C.R.	3.36	1.65	4.73*
S.E. _{med}	0.195	0.206	0.247
Estimates of Parameter Medians	7.76-8.57	8.73-9.55	9.18-10.16

* between city and barrio groups

* at the .95 level of confidence. This means that the odds are 95 to 1 in favor of the conclusion that the population median is between the two limits reported. These limits were determined with the use of the formula $Med + SE_{med}$. Only these limits and the SE_{med} are reported in the text and tables, not the product of $1.96 \times SE_{med}$.

Table II gives the statistics on the emancipation scores of the three age groups. The younger group had the highest median (9.32), with S.E. of .34. Their parameter median is estimated between 8.65 and 9.99. The middle group ranked second in emancipation scores. With their median 8.98 and S.E. of .19, their parameter median is between 8.61 and 9.35. The older group's median of 8.82 and S.E. of .19 place their parameter median between 8.45 and 9.19.

The difference of .34 between the younger and middle groups yielded a CR of .87. The difference of .16 between the middle and older groups gave a CR of only .59, while the difference of .50 between the older and younger groups resulted in a CR of 1.28.

TABLE II
STATISTICS ON EMANCIPATION SCORES
OF WOMEN IN THREE AGE GROUPS

	Younger	Middle	Older
No.	64	202	194
Mean	9.1	9.0	8.6
S.D.	2.19	2.16	2.16
S.E. _m	.27	.15	.16
Median	9.32	8.98	8.82
Difference between Medians	.34	.16	.50*
C.R.	.872	.59	1.28
S.E. _{med}	0.343	0.190	0.194
Estimates of Parameter Medians	8.65-9.99	8.61-9.35	8.45-9.19

* Between Older and Younger groups.

Age did not seem to be related to the degree of the women's emancipation.

Table III gives the statistics on the emancipation scores of the three SES groups. The low SES group obtained a median of 8.52 and SE of .146; their parameter median lies between 8.23 and 8.81. The median and SE of the middle SES group were 9.54 and .257, thus placing their parameter median between 9.03 and 10.05. The high SES group had a median of 10.8 and SE of .544; their parameter median is estimated between 9.74 and 11.86.

The difference of 1.02 between the low and middle SES groups resulted in a CR of 3.46. Between the middle and high SES groups there was a difference of 1.26 which had a CR of 2.1. A CR

TABLE III
STATISTICS ON EMANCIPATION SCORES
OF WOMEN IN THREE SES GROUPS

	Low	Middle	High
No.	326	112	21
Mean	8.6	9.3	10.5
S.D.	2.10	2.17	1.99
S.E. _m	.12	.20	.43
Median	8.52	9.54	10.8
Difference between Medians	1.02	1.26	2.28*
C.R.	3.46	2.1	4.07*
S.E. _{med}	0.146	0.257	0.544
Estimates of Parameter Medians	8.23-8.81	9.03-10.05	9.74-11.86

* Between High and Low groups.

of 4.07 was found for the difference of 2.28 between the high and low SES groups. It was clear that as the women rose in socio-economic status, they had more emancipation.

Table IV gives the statistics on emancipation scores of acceptors, non-acceptors, drop-outs and the unawares¹. The acceptors were the most emancipated

(median = 9.35), followed by the non-acceptors (median = 8.81), then by the drop-outs (median 8.6). The unawares were the least emancipated (median = 6.8). The acceptors' parameter median lies between 8.96 and 9.74. That of the non-acceptors lies between 8.4 and 9.22. The parameter median of the drop-outs is estimated between 8.05 and 9.16; that

TABLE IV
STATISTICS ON EMANCIPATION SCORES OF
WOMEN IN FOUR FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES

	Acceptors	Non-Acceptors	Dropouts	Unawares
No.	164	174	91	31
Mean	9.3	8.7		
S.D.	2.04	2.21	2.12	1.91
S.E. _m	.16	.16	.22	.34
Median	9.35	8.81	8.6	6.8
Difference between Medians	.54	.21	1.8	2.55
S.E. _{med}	0.20	.21	0.28	0.43
Estimates of Parameter Medians	8.96-9.74	8.40-9.22	8.05-9.15	5.96-7.64

Comparison of the Four Groups

Groups being Compared	Acceptors Non-acceptors	Acceptors Dropouts	Acceptors Unawares	Non-acceptors Dropouts	Non-acceptors Unawares	Dropouts Unawares
Difference between Medians	.54	.75	2.55	.21	2.01	1.8
C.R. of difference between Medians	1.86	2.20	5.425	.6	4.22	3.53

¹Acceptors are users of family planning methods; non-acceptors are non-users; drop-outs stopped using the methods after some use; and unawares are ignorant of family planning methods.

of the unawares is estimated between 5.96 and 7.64.

Four of the differences between groups were found significant. These were the difference of .75 before the acceptors and the drop-outs (CR = 2.20); the difference of 2.55 between the acceptors and the unawares (CR = 5.425); the difference of 2.01 between the non-acceptors and the unawares; and the difference of 1.8 between the drop-outs and the unawares (CR = 3.53). Three of these significant differences were in comparisons involving the unawares, indicating that the unawares clearly differed from the other groups in degree of emancipation.

The statistics on the emancipation scores of the six educational groups are given in Table V. The group of 67 wo-

men who had college degrees or higher appeared the most emancipated, with a median of 9.95 and SE of .29. Their parameter median lies between 9.38 and 10.52. But as can be seen in Table V, each educational group did not score consistently higher than the group immediately below it, so on the basis of the medians (or of the means), one cannot easily say that as their educational attainment increased, the women became more emancipated. For example, Group 5 got a slightly lower median (9.25) than the group below it (Group 4) which got a median of 9.41. The more surprising figure is the median of Group 1 (8.5). This is the group without any schooling¹; yet its median is higher than that of Group 2 (7.62) and that of Group 3 (8.13).

TABLE V
STATISTICS ON EMANCIPATION SCORES OF
WOMEN IN SIX EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
No.	10	68	195	93	27	67
Mean	8.4	7.7	8.8	9.16	8.6	10.00
S.D.	1.42	2.05	2.12	2.17	2.15	1.91
S.E. _m	.45	.25	.152	.225	.414	.233
Median	8.5	7.62	8.13	9.41	9.25	9.95
S.E. _{med}	0.56	0.311	0.190	0.282	0.518	0.292
Estimates of Parameter Medians	7.41-9.59	7.01-8.23	8.36-9.10	8.86-9.96	8.23-10.27	9.38-10.52

¹Probably the ten women who had had no schooling at all comprised a group too small to yield a median score truly indicative of their emancipation. (Ten is much smaller than the next smallest group, Group 5, which was composed of 27; the biggest group, Group 3 had 195). Or the ten women could have been the more emancipated of their group, hence audacious enough to agree to be interviewed despite their being unschooled.

The parameter median of Group 1 lies between 7.41 and 9.59; that of Group 2 between 7.01 and 8.23; that of Group 3 between 8.36 and 9.10; that of Group 4 between 8.86 and 9.96 and that of Group 5 between 8.23 and 10.27.

Despite the fact that each succeeding educational group did not consistently get higher emancipation scores, the analysis of variance did reveal an F of 9.48

(almost three times the required F for 5/400 df) on the emancipation scores of the six groups. The Duncan Multiple Range Test was applied in order to find out between which groups were the differences significant. Of the RP_2 differences, only the difference of 1.04 between Group 5 and Group 2 approximated the value required for significance at the .05 level of significance. Of the

RESULTS OF DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO
MEANS OF EMANCIPATION SCORES OF THE SIX
EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

Educational Group	6	4	3	1	5	2
\bar{X}	10	9.16	8.76	8.7	8.63	7.69
N	67	93	195	10	27	68

$\bar{N} = 32.79$
df = 31.79

$SE_m = 0.363$
With df = 31.79, tabled value for
 $RP_2 = 2.888$

RP_2 COMPARISONS (Critical value for $RP_2 = 1.0483$)

Groups Compared	Means being Compared (RP_2)	Difference	Significance
6 and 4	10 - 9.16	.84	Not S
4 and 3	9.16 - 8.76	.40	Not S
3 and 1	8.76 - 8.7	.06	Not S
1 and 5	8.7 - 8.63	.07	Not S
5 and 2	8.63 - 7.69	1.04	barely S

Tabled Value for $RP_3 = 3.035$

RP_3 COMPARISONS (Critical Value for $RP_3 = 1.1017$)

Groups Compared	Means being Compared (RP_3)	Difference	Significance
6 and 3	10 - 8.76	1.24	S
4 and 1	9.16 - 8.7	.46	Not S
3 and 5	8.76 - 8.63	.13	Not S
1 and 2	8.7 - 7.69	.01	Not S

four RP_3 differences, only the difference of 1.24 between Group 5 and Group 3 was significant. Of the three RP_4 differences, the difference of 1.3 between Group 6 and Group 1 was significant. The two RP_5 and one RP_6 differences were found significant.

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
EMANCIPATION AND
FERTILITY

The multiple correlation was computed to determine the proportion of the variance in fertility that was dependent

upon the extent of the women's emancipation. The R^2 or coefficient of multiple determination obtained was .045, which meant that 4.5% of the variation in fertility was associated with emancipation. Though this is a low R^2 , it indicates a greater association between fertility and emancipation than between fertility and the four cultural factors¹ as perceived by the women, or between fertility and the other psychological variables studied in the main investigation.

Tabled Value for $RP_4 = 3.131$

RP_4 COMPARISONS (Critical Value for $RP_4 = 1.1366$)

Groups Compared	Means being Compared (RP_4)	Difference	Significance
6 and 1	10 - 8.7	1.3	S
4 and 5	9.16 - 8.63	.53	Not S
3 and 2	8.76 - 7.69	1.07	Not S

Tabled Value for $RP_5 = 3.199$

RP_5 COMPARISONS (Critical Value for $RP_5 = 1.1612$)

Groups Compared	Means being Compared (RP_5)	Difference	Significance
6 and 5	10 - 8.63	1.37	S
4 and 2	9.16 - 7.69	1.47	S

Tabled Value for $RP_6 = 3.250$

RP_6 COMPARISONS (Critical Value for $RP_6 = 1.1798$)

Groups Compared	Means being Compared (RP_6)	Difference	Significance
6 and 2	10 - 7.69	2.31	S

¹The cultural factors studied in the main study were (a) awareness and receptivity of their social environment to birth control beliefs and practices; (b) receptivity of innovations and change; (c) the non-authoritarianism and (d) non-fatalistic tendencies of people around them.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Town and city women had greater emancipation than the barrio women.
2. The higher their socio-economic status, the more emancipated were the women.
3. Age was not associated with the extent of emancipation.
4. Acceptors tended to be more emancipated than any other "practice" groups. The least emancipated were the unawares.
5. The college graduates were more emancipated than the other educational attainment groups. The increase in educational attainment among the non-college graduates was not consistently accompanied by an increase in emancipation.
6. Though more closely associated with fertility than the other psychological variables, emancipation was not a very good predictor of fertility.

COMMENTS

Conclusions 1, 2, 4 and 5 (its first sentence) are not surprising. Life near the centers of population where there are more and better means of communication and more to communicate, and under conditions that allow greater freedom from the drudgery of physical labor, lends itself to a greater degree of emancipation, as defined in the second paragraph of this report. Though the degree of emancipation was not observed to increase with the increase in years of schooling, the college graduates were seen to be significantly more emancipated than the other groups with less schooling. This fact seems to show that a high level of education, represented by completion

of college work, conduces to a steady degree of emancipation. If a certain level of intelligence is required for completion of college, then it may also be said that level of intelligence is needed for a woman to attain a noticeable degree of emancipation.

The findings of the study seem to point out that if emancipation of women is to be enhanced, for reasons in addition to those of family planning, then factors that nurture intellectual development be promoted — education, effective communications, stimulating environment, leisure for engaging in activities that help them to transcend animal nature.

It should be noted that although degree of emancipation was not shown to be a good predictor of fertility, it had greater association with fertility than did the four cultural factors which were the main variables of the study. These cultural factors had been suggested by earlier studies of a scope bigger than that of the CPU study. The investigator feels that if she had studied this factor with research tools primarily designed to assess emancipation, rather than just using whatever obtained data she identified as getting at emancipation, that the association between this and the focal variable, fertility, might have been found significant.

If such a study revealed a still insignificant association, then one can strongly suspect that psychological variables which have been dealt with in similar fertility studies so far, should be studied together with physiological or biological factors, not by themselves.

AN IMPACT STUDY OF THE LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY EXTENSION SERVICES PROJECT IN MIAG-AO, ILOILO

Blanquita S. Garcia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The sample survey technique was employed in the study. The sample consisted of one hundred ninety-one household heads who were picked at random from livestock/poultry raisers of the first six densely populated barangays in the project area.

The project was manned by five technical and four non-technical personnel with a budget of ₱132,960. The project had conducted 48 training programs dealing with five important aspects of livestock/poultry production and management. In these training programs 1,200 farmers were trained. A total of 2,837 visits made by BAI technicians were recorded for CY 1980. Within a six-year period (1975 to 1981) 1,314 farmers availed of credit assistance extended by BAI personnel through loans obtained from the Rural Bank of Miag-ao, basically used for cattle fattening. A total of 152 animals were dispersed to 138 recipients, some of whom were already granted ownership of the animals. Artificially inseminated swine totalled 1,485; these produced 6,349 offspring. Eighty-five farmers marketed their poultry/livestock produce, totalling 6,470 heads for CY 1980,

through the Livestock "Okasyon" Market. The present researches being conducted by the project are entitled: "A Study of the Artificial Insemination Scheme of Beef Cattle in Western Visayas" and "A Study on the Reproductive Performance of Cattle Serviced by the Dispersed Bull."

The respondents in this study were mostly male (67 per cent), 60 or more years of age, married, had elementary education and basically engaged in farming land which they themselves owned. The median total monthly income was ₱383.99.

Their over-all levels of aspiration were equally middle and high; educational and economic aspirations were high but social aspiration was relatively low. Middle level of organizational participation was reported and most of the respondents reported membership in some organizations in the community.

The majority (56 per cent) of the respondent households had one working member with median monthly income of ₱379.40 and monthly per capita income value of ₱75.96. The major portion of the total monthly expenditure of ₱553.72 (median value) was allotted to food (₱257.84) and to trans-

portation (P71.92). Their level of living was generally mid-standard (82.8 per cent).

Most of the respondents established their project between 1976 and 1979 with chickens as the most common animal raised; swine was the next common. Most raisers did not employ scientific methods, a fact that could be gathered from the usage of type of housing, plain water for cleaning purposes, range grazing and natural method of breeding.

Of the technical services extended by BAI personnel to the raisers, immunization was widely availed of by most respondents, followed by advice on feeding, sanitation and marketing. Project improvements such as reduced mortality and rapid weight gain were attributed to these BAI services. Technicians' visits were reported to be infrequent, done only once per year. Only eight per cent of the respondents claimed to have been trained in breeding and marketing aspects. It may be supposed that the respondents visited and trained were the users of scientific methods. Trainees on breeding or recipients of upgrading services, reported increases in litter size of their animals.

The established Accredited Livestock Market was gauged reported to be the most reasonable outlets, from the standpoint of pricing, as reported by 58 per cent of the raisers. The volume of animals sold

for CY 1980 totalled to 1,254 head of poultry and livestock. Of this total, 304 were swine; the rest were poultry. Another impact indicator of the project, aside from the total marketed livestock, was the revenue derived from the sales of the animals. Data showed that 73 per cent of the respondents had derived additional income from animal sales; most of them earned as much as P1,000 or even more. Ten liters of project-produced milk distributed free were consumed daily by 39 school children in two schools within the project area. This fact indicates another impact of the project.

Common problems brought out by informants deal with project funding; marketing, especially pricing; ; transportation facilities and insufficient assistance. These problems are common not only in BAI Livestock and Poultry Extension Project but in most projects which require material inputs and are income-generating. These may be attributed to lack of personnel; however, this was not clearly brought out in this study. Undoubtedly, some unfavorable generated effects and impacts generated in the project have been perceived by the project proponents and implementators. There apparently is a need to monitor and evaluate the progress of the project so that needed modifications can be made at various stages of project implementation.

THESIS ABSTRACTS

A STUDY OF THE COMPETENCE OF HILIGAYNON SIXTH-GRADE PUPILS IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE STRESS PATTERNS, OF PILIPINO WORDS WITH FALSE VISAYAN COGNATES¹

Ninfa G. Doronila

This study hopes to serve the general purpose of determining (1) whether it is true that similarities between Pilipino and the vernacular of a Philippine region could facilitate the study of Pilipino; and (2) what may be the probable causes of mispronunciation among elementary school children, particularly in the non-Tagalog areas.

This particular study was narrowed down to determining the competence of Hiligaynon (Visayan) sixth-grade pupils in the production of the stress patterns of Pilipino words which have false cognates in the vernacular (Hiligaynon).

Answers to the following questions were sought:

1. What Pilipino stress patterns are commonly missed by Hiligaynon sixth-grade pupils?
2. Who have greater percentage of errors in the production of Pilipino stress patterns, the

boys or the girls?

3. If there are outstanding differences in competence, to what may they be attributed?
4. Does mastery of Hiligaynon stress patterns facilitate or interfere with the learning of Pilipino by a Hiligaynon Visayan sixth-grade pupils? To what degree?

Twenty-four false cognates, put into eight groups of three words each, were used in the study. In the first phase of the study, the twenty-four test words were used in context form — the pupils were asked to read the answers to questions in Pilipino. These answers contained the most appropriate words. In the second testing, another group of sixth graders were asked to read the list of the same twenty-four false cognates, after they were told that those were Pilipino words.

In each of these tests a child who correctly produced sixteen out of

¹ Abstract of a masteral thesis done in compliance with requirements for a Master of Arts in Education, with a major in Pilipino, at Central Philippine University, 1982.

the twenty-four test words, or 66 per cent, was considered as having mastered the stress patterns tested for. On the contrary, a child who produced less than two-thirds of the words correctly was considered as not having mastered the stress patterns.

In the first testing, the general findings showed that on the whole, all the word groups were not difficult for the sixth graders in Guimaras schools who participated in this study.

When the performance of each of the eight central schools on any one of the eight groups of false cognates was considered, certain specific words were found difficult by the pupils of some schools in the district.

When the performance of male and female sixth graders in Guimaras schools was compared, it was found that the males seemed to find the Pilipino false cognates more difficult than the females did.

The results of the second testing showed that three types of words, na- + root word, ka- + root word and na + root word + -an were considered difficult by the boys. Girls seemed to have no particular difficulty with any group.

When the performance of the different sections was compared, Section A had difficulty with ka- + root word type and the na- + root word type.

Section B had the same difficulties as Section A.

Section C had difficulty with each particular group of words.

It seems then that, when presented in appropriate context, false cognates in Pilipino did not pose difficulty for sixth graders in Guimaras schools. On the other hand, when false cognates were presented as a list of isolated items (in the subsidiary study), many of the items were considered difficult. Although the first test was administered at the end of the school year and the second was at the beginning of the same grade level, it is conjectured that the difference found could be due to the method of presentation of the test items rather than to learning that the first group had had after one year's work in Grade VI Pilipino.

Words which tended to be difficult were those whose Hiligaynon cognates were, by impression, very common in the speech situations of Hiligaynon children. The more used speech habits must have interfered more strongly with the acquisition of the second language.

The study tends to suggest that, for Pilipino false cognates to be learned effectively, the words should be used in meaningful (Pilipino) context. Also, extensive drills should be given in the teaching of Pilipino items which have, as cognates, vernacular items which are common in the speech of the learners.

RICE PRODUCTION COSTS AND RETURN ANALYSIS IN THREE LEADING RICE PRODUCING TOWNS OF ILOILO SERVICED BY THE JALAU IRRIGATION PROJECT*

Silva U. Hipolito

This study was conducted primarily to gather information on the unit cost involved in producing a cavan of palay, on the unit price received from the sale of the same and the net return for the management and supervisory services of farmers in the three leading rice-producing towns of Iloilo serviced by the Jalaur Irrigation Project. A total of 127 rice farmer-respondents were made to answer the questions contained in the checklist. The data gathered were analyzed using modal frequencies, averages and percentages.

The study showed that a total of ₱1,284,238.42 was spent by the respondents in two cropping seasons. Highest expense was incurred on land rental (20.04%) while lowest was on miscellaneous expenses (0.01%). Average production cost per hectare per crop was ₱3,907.28.

A total of 33,084.6 cavans of

palay valued at ₱1,595,857.36 were produced by the respondents from an actual land area of 164.339 hectares in two cropping seasons. Average per hectare per crop was 100.6 cavans valued at ₱4,855.38.

Analyzed on per cavan basis, the farmers spent ₱38.82 to produce a cavan of palay which they sold for ₱48.70 on the average.

The return to the farmers for their management and supervisory services totalled ₱311,618.99 for the two cropping seasons covering the period November 1, 1980 to October 31, 1981. Further analysis showed a return of ₱1,226.84 per farm and ₱948.09 per hectare per crop, respectively. Based on the above figures, the computed monthly return to farmers' management and supervisory services amounted to ₱158.01 or ₱9.88 for every cavan of palay produced.

* Abstract of a masteral thesis done for the Master of Business Administration at Central Philippine University, 1983.

